"However, I could not reflect without some Amazement, and much Sorrow, that the Rudiments of Lewdness, Coquetry, Censure, and Scandal, should have Place by instinct in Womankind."  p. 240, end of Book IV, Chapter VII.

Okay, I'm bringin' it up.  Gulliver's take on women.  Why is he so keen to prove that women are naturally, instinctually ridiculous and inferior?  He goes to such lengths to reflect on humankind but puts particular energy towards bashing women.  Who are the females who meet with his approval, if any?  Why?  What is his perspective on women?  What is his perspective on women versus men?  Is Gulliver's reflection on women even important?

Swift Imagery

"The flying or floating Island is exactly circular; its Diameter 7837 Yards, or about four Miles and an Half, and consequently contains ten Thousand Acres.... Besides, as it is in the Power of the Monarch to raise the Island about the Region of Clouds and Vapours" (Part III, Ch 3, p161)

"That this Island cannot move beyond the Extent of the Dominions below; nor can it rise above the Height of four Miles" (163).

One part of Swift's style I find fascinating is his command over the world of images. When I am reading, there are certain chapters in this book where an image jumps out at me. Besides being impressive, these images often seemed packed full of metaphorical or satirical significance, though they often don't hold completely if I look too close. That is, certain images are briefly suggestive in one or more ways when they are coupled with some more of the text's content. What is Swift's intention with such imagery? Sometimes I perceive the imagery is louder than his words of satire.

For example, take the floating island of Laputa. Its a sheer joy to imagine such a huge floating disc, or even, as I sometimes pictured it, a huge floating sphere. Just imagine its moving up and down at will, its detachment from the land, its central loadstone cared for by Astronomers, its adamantine bottom, etc. Perhaps this floating island might suggest a huge, satiric, floating mind. It is detached from the "body" of the land, but his has to deal with rebellions, petitions, violent factions, etc of that "body" (see the last few paragraphs of Part III, Ch 3). The "mind" is often afraid to destory part of the "body," for the "health" of the "mind" depends on the "body" (the ship receives city victuals (ch2, p157) and can be cracked by the landscape (Ch3, 165).

Such an interpretation (if it contains any truth) would add to the satiric depiction of those people, who's meditations often disconnect them from reality, so much so that "in the common Actions and Behaviour of Life, I have not seen a more clumsy, awkward, and unhandy People" (Ch2, 158). One might take it further to be a shot at philosophic scientists such as Descartes, the flying island/land island being a possible mockery of his mind/matter system, or defeat of it. Such an interpretation would be supported by instances such as the encounter with the tailor (156), who makes errs in a complicated calculation about making his clothes. Another possibility is that Swift is chiding ivory tower people who never come down to reality, a theme that was present at other parts of the book (low humour, discussion of the giant kind's education (see part II, Ch 7, p133)).

My point is that grand images such as the flying island have all kinds of potential for reading. I suspect that part of the fun of reading Swift is trying to bridge the distance between the Author and all of the fronts of his satire, especially his choice of imagery. Do you find that the set of possibilities narrows down with reading, that Swift meant for multiple interpretations, that I am overreading or underreading the text, or something else?

Political Connection?

"The flying or floating island is exactly circular; its diameter 7837 yards, or about four miles and half, and consequently contains ten thousand acres. It is three hundred yards thick. The bottom, or under surface, which appears to those who view it from below is one even regular plate of adamant shooting up to the height of about to hundred yards".... (Page 161)

"If any town should engage in Rebellion or mutiny, fall into violent factions, or refuse to pay the usual tribute; the king hath two methods of reducing them to obedience. The first and the mildest course is by keeping the island hovering over such a town, and the lands about it; whereby he can deprive them of the benefit of the sun and the Rain, and consequently afflict the inhabitants with dearth and diseases."...(Page 164).

The first passage almost unnecessarily goes into detail about the island. It seems as though the passage is almost comical with how much is said, why would Gulliver know this much about the island? And if he does, what are the other motives behind it. It seems as though Swift might be poking fun at something, perhaps his opinion of the ridiculousness of the British monarchy?

Regarding the second passage, the power that the King has over his people is tyrannical. If anyone even goes against the wishes of the King, they will be punished. A big brother situation develops where it seems the King is watching every move, and with every move repercussions are given. What is this saying about  British power at that time? Is Swift taking note about the British power over other countries around the world, perhaps India or Ireland? 

Chief Disgust

"I was chiefly disgusted with modern History. For having strictly examined all the Persons of greatest Name in the Courts of Princes for an Hundred Years past, I found how the World had been misled by prostitute Writers, to ascribe the greatest Exploits in War to Cowards, the wisest Counsel to Fools, Sincerity to Flatterers, Roman Virtue to Betrayers of their Country, Piety to Atheists, Chastity to Sodomites, Truth to Informers." (And the rest of the paragraph, but you get the idea...) Part III Chapter 8 Paragraph 5 [p187 in Fox]

"As every Person called up made exactly the same Appearance he had done in the World, it gave me melancholy Reflections to observe how much the Race of human Kind was degenerate among us, within these Hundred Years past." Part III Chapter 8 Penultimate Paragraph [190 in Fox, paragraph before Peter's quote]

I was very interested when I read what I consider Gulliver's most concrete shift towards the hatred for people, or Yahoos, he displayed in Part IV. My question is, is this a shift at all? By that I mean, was Gulliver's hatred for humanity harbored all along, explaining his incessant traveling? Did the visit with the ghosts simply draw those feelings out? Or were they only there in part or even not there at all before these meetings? I also wondered to what extent were these feelings shared by Swift, and whether we are supposed to agree or if we are merely being presented with one view of humanity?

Also, what is up with all the darn capitalization and italicization?

Gulliver the Patriot

"I descended so low as to desire that some English Yeomen of the old Stamp might be summoned to appear"
- p188, end of part III chapter 8

After all the criticism he's thrown around, is Gulliver revealing his true patriotic stripes here? That is, perhaps he is not merely saying that England is worse than all of the other places in the world, but rather, that it is not living up to its mythology. (A comparable use of rhetoric in the USA might, in the face of domestic injustice, speak of the "real America" that the early settlers "fought and died for" and so on).

If so, this is perhaps the second instance, after Socrates, of a direct relationship between patriotism and criticism.

Gulliver's Travels Parts I and II

Although we usually call Reward and Punishment, the two Hinges upon which all Government turns; yet I could never observe this Maxim to be put in Practice by any Nation, except that of Lilliput...And these People thought it a prodigious Defect of Policy among us, when I told them that our Laws were enforced only by Penalties, without any Mention of Reward.  It is upon this account that the Image of Justice, in their Courts of Judicature, is formed with six Eyes, two before, as many behind, and on each Side one, to signify Circumspection; with a Bag of Gold open in her right Hand, and a Sword sheathed in her left, to shew she is more disposed to reward than to punish.  (Part I, towards the beginning of Chapter VI)

In addition to finding this the most humorous and enjoyable text we have read thus far, I was especially interested in Gulliver's descriptions of the Lilliputian system of government.  The above paragraph presents an image of Justice that I have never seen before.  Our judicial system is represented by a scale and commonly associated with the phrase "checks and balances."  There is certainly no room for reward for those who adhere to laws.  Is this, as the Lilliputians say, a "Defect of Policy among us?"  Or is our system, that which focuses on Punishment more than Reward, a more practical and effective one?

I want to bring up one other topic that I found central to the author's discoveries while traveling:

Undoubtedly Philosophers are in the Right when they tell us, that nothing is great or little otherwise than by Comparison...  (Part II, middle of Chapter I)

I really enjoyed the discussion that followed regarding "the relativity of our judgment of size" (footnote pg. 94).  Gulliver's perception of himself is altered after his stay with both the Lilliputians and the Brobdingnagians.  To the former, he is referred to as "Man-Mountain," whereas the latter treat him as humans treat "any little hateful Animal which we have a Mind to destroy" (pg. 95).  This really put things in perspective for me, as I think it did for Gulliver as well.  I don't really have a question, so I'll leave you with the words that kept me pondering: "Who knows but that even this prodigious Race of Mortals might be equally overmatched in some distant Part of the World, whereof we have yet no Discovery?" (pg. 95)

Swift's Purpose: More, Herodotus, and Mirrors

For, indeed, while I was in that Prince's country [Brobdingang], I could never endure to look in a glass after mine Eyes had becme accustomed to such prodigious Objects; because the Comparison gave me so despicable a Conceit of my self.

--Part II, ChapterVII, 5th paragraph from the end

I find the question of Swift's purpose with this work to be a really interesting one.

• First, although he provides some mention of the structure of the socities he visits (especially cf. Ch. VI, re: education of the Lilliputans), but in the third paragraph of I.IV, he says he will reserve details of Lilliputan society for a "greater Work," stating that the "chief Design at present being only to relate such Events... during [his] Residence" there. This is in concord with his response to the Captain's suggestion that he write on his journeys at the end of II.VII: that he (Swift) could do little more than to write of "common Events." To what extent can we look at his descriptions of Lilliputan and Brobdingnagian society in the same terms as we looked at other utopias, such as More's or Plato's?


• Swift also seems interested in subtly appraising his home country.
  

  I cannot but conclude the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth.

  --Part II, Chapter VI, very end

  
  This further reminds me of More, as they share criticisms such as that of precedent law. But Swift's criticism of England is more prevalent, from the jokes about the ladies' askance way of writing to the big-endian reference to party differences and so on. Does Swift's critique of England drive this work as a primary motivating force?
  


• With regard to the first quote of this post, I think that a primary function of this work is similar to that of Herodotus, in the sense that the stories from his travels suggest humility with respect to one's own country. In Lilliput the party difficulties seemed petty and their mighty fleets were playthings; in Brobdingnag his own country was made to seem as diminutive. Gulliver sees humanity from afar and from close up, and neither view is particularly stellar. Would it be accurate to propose that this work's purpose is to encourage the reader to look on his or her own society with a new lens?

P.S. I forgot Milton in the poll! It's okay, he wouldn't have won anyway.

Names

Lilliputians, Brobdingnagians, Laputans, Yahoos, and Houyhnhnms

While reading the introductory "A Letter from Capt. Gulliver, to His Cousin Sympson," One immediately stumbles upon Swift's odd names for the different races in his novel. He had to develop new words for the people and places on Gulliver's fictional journey (in a literal sense), but why contrive such obscure and difficult-to-say names?

Gulliver is very agitated in this letter, accusing the publisher of omitting from and adding to his work beyond what he wanted. He also defends himself against the "Sea-Yahoos," claiming their attack against his improper "Sea-Language" is unjust since language is inconstant. He states that neither him nor a Yahoo he was talking to could comprehend each's ideas since language changes with the people's desire to make it "new-fangled" (p. 30). Gulliver's description of miscomprehension reminds me of Hobbes' description of absurdity: the act of conversing with conflicting definitions of words. Based off of this and Gulliver's anger towards being misinterpreted, did Swift choose such absurd words as "Houyhnhnms" to avoid absurdity? Unless I'm missing some allusions, they don't seem to resemble any word in the English language. Or did Swift use them mainly for a laugh?

Swift and South Park

I do in the next Place complain of my own great Want of Judgement, in being prevailed upon by the Intreaties and false Reasonings of you and some others, very much against mine own Opinion, to suffer my Travels to be published. P. 29, Letter from Gulliver to Sympson

I carefully preserved them [the huge wasp stingers] all, and having since shewn them with some other Curiosities in several Parts of Europe; upon my Return to England I gave three of them to Gresham College, and kept the fourth for my self. p. 113

That nothing could now pass which was not extraordinary; wherein I doubted, some Authors less consulted Truth than their own Vanity or Interest, or the Diversion of ignorant Readers. P. 145

I think it's safe to say this is the funnest read of the semester so far - whether it's the meta-commentary Swift/Gulliver keeps giving, the ludicrousness of Gulliver being entangled in a sex scandal in Lilliputia, or the vulgarity of him pissing (I think that's the appropriate term here) out a fire in an imperial palace. I would like to talk about the reader-reaction that Swift is trying to impose throughout the book - he's constantly telling us to check the facts, as well as giving us regularly reminding us of the narrator's veracity. How does Swift present his message differently than South Park, The Daily Show, and The Colbert Report? 

 While South Park may seem like a vulgar step down for a "Great Books" Seminar, I have to imagine this book was considered pretty raunchy for its time. Both were very popular, and both offer biting critiques of the modern life. South Park does not pretend to present solutions for modern problems, but does Swift? He oh so sarcastically decries the Brobdingnag laws for being too naive, while the narrator doesn't come out and say "We should accept the Liliputian laws." Does Swift think that the foreign laws could actually be implemented in Britain, or are "the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth (132)" an incurable lot?

Gulliver's Travels, Parts I and II

"I was curious to know how this prince, to whose dominions there is no access from any other country, came to think of armies, or to teach his people the practice of military discipline. But I was soon informed, both by conversation, and reading their histories. For in the course of many ages they have been troubled with the same disease to which the whole race of mankind is subject; the nobility often contending for power, the people for liberty, and the King for absolute dominion. "

(last paragraph of Chapter VII, Part II)

It seems clear from this passage and from Swift's description of both the Lillipution and Brobdingnagian (?) cultures that Swift believes some problems are universal to mankind. But would he consider all problems universal? Does he allow for any significant difference between cultures, or is it all relative? Our narrator is pretty loyal to England, but I wonder if Swift actually agrees. Is any form of government truly better than another? And is there no hope of escape from this cycle of war? Is it inevitable that every government will become corrupt? This reminds me a lot of Plato's Republic and his devolution from timocracy to tyranny.

Christian Motivation

Let us now speak according to our natural lights (418).

This is building off of patt-man's post. The above quote is the prelude to the Wager. Here, Pascal seems interested in finding a position without revelation, only using "natural" reason. He does not prove the tenants of the Christian faith, but only the absurdity of choosing disbelief in God, or at least the non-absurdity of belief in God, to counter mockers of believers.

However, the Wager raises a broader problem with popular Christian motivation in general. Pascal here is not concerned with the truth content of belief as much as the imperative motivation to belief. But one who believes in God in the method of the Wager is not altruistic or loving, but only patient. That is, she would post-pone immediate enjoyment (the wagering of life now) for eternal and infinite happiness later. Heaven and hell are her ultimate motivating factors, not truth/untruth or right/wrong. Is this satisfactory? (Clearly, I think this is not satisfactory . . .)

Original sin, mercy/justice, love

695 (0r 445 for you, Blogmaster): Original sin is folly in the eyes of men, but it is put forward as such...but this folly is wiser than all men's wisdom, it is wiser than men.  For without it, what are we to say man is?  His whole state depends on this imperceptible point.

This is exactly what I brought up at the end of last class.  For Pascal, you can say nothing about men without original sin, that is, you can say nothing about men without viewing them through a Christian lens.  Is he really right about this?  If you take away this lens is there really nothing to be said?  I feel like a lot of non-Christian people have quite a bit to say about men.  Is original sin absolutely required or is Pascal's preoccupation with original sin (and his own reverence for Christian custom) the Achilles heel of this whole text?

But since I brought this up last time I'll say something in another vein as well.

418 (233): God's justice must be as vast as his mercy. Now his justice towards the damned is less vast and ought to be less startling to us than his mercy towards the elect.

I'm certainly more startled by God's justice towards the damned than his mercy to the elect because who is damned and who is elect? Why am I more startled by damnation than eternal life? Is it because I don't have the appropriate level of focus on what will happen to me after I die? Also,

421 (535): It is untrue that we are worthy to be loved by others. It is unfair that we should want such a thing.

What does Pascal think about love? What does he mean "it is unfair that we should want such a thing"? It is unfair of God to make us desire the love of others?

Metapost: Printing

UPDATE: Full HTML enabled in feeds; the "last # posts" links will now show blockquotes more effectively. Added "last 8 posts" option in case not all posts are tagged properly.

The new links for printing now include the author. They work by collecting the last six posts tagged with "group #," so if you haven't been tagging your posts it'd help if you at least tagged them with your group number. I'll do my best to add those tags if you forget them.

With this system it'd be inconvenient to just get all posts tagged with "group #" and "author," but I think this 'last six posters' system should work fine, unless for some reason you prefer the other option. I am fairly certain there are six people per group, I'm sure I'll realize soon if I'm wrong.

I'm aware the formatting is sparse in these new print versions right now. I'll fix that sooner than later.

If you're interested, here are the links for accessing:
the feeds:

• http://feeds2.feedburner.com/PLSSeminarIV2009


• http://feeds2.feedburner.com/PLSSeminarIV2009/group1


• http://feeds2.feedburner.com/PLSSeminarIV2009/group2

the simplified "printer-friendly" feeds:

• http://www.nd.edu/~bmclough/semiv


• http://www.nd.edu/~bmclough/semiv/group1


• http://www.nd.edu/~bmclough/semiv/group2

P.S. If this metaposting is getting really annoying / is useless, please let me know and I'll stop.

Two Things at Once

"A single thought is enough to occupy us: we cannot think of two things at once." 523 (145)

This line really struck me. It seemed to me that this entire time, Pascal has been trying to tell us how we need to know God and ourselves, our wretchedness and our capability for God, Jesus Christ as Divine and mortal, etc. I realize that these can be seen as one thought each, but he has been telling us (sorry, I can't remember where) that we are not looking to go to one side or even, as I got confused with last time, in the middle of two things, but rather to envelop them in their totality. God is eternal, and inasmuch encompasses 'abandonment and protection' in their respective infinities. It seems to me somewhat difficult to say, 'think of this infinite thing, and then think of the opposite infinite thing, and combine them into one, eternal yet encompassed thing.' I suppose it is like contemplating God's infinity but, it seems somewhat contradictory to me. But in case this is not really a great question, another thought (a second, if you will...) had been bothering me as I read.

"Wretchedness. The only thing that consoles us for our miseries is diversion. And yet it is the greatest of our miseries. For it is that above all which prevents us thinking about ourselves and leads us imperceptibly to destruction. But for that we should be bored, and boredom would drive us to seek some more solid means of escape, but diversion passes our time and brings us imperceptibly to our death." 414 (171)

"Without examining every particular kind of occupation it is sufficient to put them all under the heading of diversion." 478 (137)

With all of Pascal's talk of wretchedness and our necessary diversion from it, and furthered by this second quote, I started wondering if Pascal's occupation in writing these thoughts was simply a diversion. Maybe he is right, and we are wretched by nature. But perhaps it is also natural that we recognize our wretched state, not because of religion, and this is why we divert ourselves. Maybe we are wretched because there is no life after death, and since we have no way to cope with our own finiteness, we divert ourselves by playing games or playing poker or dreaming up deities and corresponding religions to give some meaning to our existence. I'm guessing Pascal would point to his wager, saying 'no way to know, so why not?,' but that just really isn't satisfactory to me, even though that has been one rationalization I myself use for being religious.

So, is Pascal consciously asking us to think beyond our means when he asks us to consider the union of two infinite opposites? Is he simply diverting himself from his own wretchedness?

Order. I should be much more afraid of being mistaken and then finding out that Christianity is true than of being mistaken in believing it to be true. 386

Early on in section II, we come across this quote from Pascal. With regards to religion, in relation to this quote, it would seem hard to pin down exactly what Pascal believes. It seems that we have two options here: Not believing in God, then being pleasantly surprised when he actually does exist. Or, believing in God, and then being completely let down if he does not exist. It would seem as though living a life completely devoted to a being or divine spirit and then realizing that it does not exist would be one of the biggest misfortunes a mortal being could endure. Is Pascal simply telling us not to get our hopes up? If God does exist, great! But if he doesn't, at least you prepared yourself... Is this the right mindset to have toward faith? What is the right one to have?

An Empty Wager?

"'You want to be cured of unbelief and you ask for the remedy: learn from those who were once bound like you and who now wager all they have... They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile.' - 'But that is what I am afraid of.' - 'But why? What have you to lose? But to show you that this is the way, the fact is that this diminishes the passions which are your great obstacles...'" (near end of 418, p125 common ed; #233 for Brennan, I'm guessing).

At the risk of stealing someone's post, I'm going to pose a question about Pascal's wager. Namely, can someone who wagers for God's existence truly have faith and truly be happy, by Pascal's own standards?

Now, at first glance it seems that he thinks happiness is to be won. "Here there is an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won" (418, p123).

However, it seems that the content of one's belief might be reduced to a simple choice faced with risk, a succumbing to fear (of hell) and not love (of God), or an essentialy orthopraxic concept of faith in which one just goes through the motions. This last option is what is addressed by my quote, which comes near the end of the wager discussion. There is a footnote on the word docile, and I quote, "That is, the unbeliever will act unthinkingly and mechanically..." (p125). Now, this footnote may or may not reflect the sense of that line - I think it's a bit hazy. I think it depends on how much Pascal requires one to invest in the choice/wager. But if it is right, and Pascal acknoweldges this unthinking activity as the result of taking the wager, how does this type of mindless practice square with the more nuanced descriptions of faith that he has given in other pensees? The wager seems to cheat the more reason-heavy portraits of faith to get them to the results of the heart-heavy portraits of faith, without the God given content of the heart-heavy portraits of faith with an annihilation of thinking at the end. A suave move, but is it legit?

Furthermore, the wager does not make use of revelation or references to Christ. This omission is problematic because he had previously informed us that Jesus Christ was the only way to God, and that those who came to know God without Jesus both forgot their elevated and heavy discourse and doomed themselves because of their pride. He echos this sentiment in the reading for today with his words on arguments for God's existence from nature: "Such knowledge, without Christ, is useless and sterile... I should not consider that he had made much progress towards his salvation" (449, p141, (556)).

But yet, Pascal was so excited about his wager. "How these words fill me with rapture and delight! -" (418, p125). And the last sentence of my first quote suggests that perhaps the wager = the Machine. "Write the letter about removing obstacles, that is the argument about the Machine, how to prepare it and how to use reason for the search" (11, p4, (246)). What then, is the point of the wager, and what does Pascal hope to accomplish by it? To what kind of 'faith' is he trying to sway people who love logical games? Perhaps it is simply a starting point to get peoples' big heads out of the way. Or perhaps what needs to be gotten out of the way is the passions, and while he might draw a distinction between his common claim that man cannot remove all passion and simply reducing harmful passions, there still remains the question about how passions could be reduced by an intellectual wager.

Pascal I

Caesar was too old, it seems to me, to go off and amuse himself conquering the world. Such a pastime was all right for Augustus and Alexander; they were young men, not easily held in check, but Caesar ought to have been more mature (II.49).

Description of man. Dependence, desire for independence, needs (IV.78).

I have put up two completely unrelated passages. Concerning the first: I found this passage extremely funny, and while this surely outs me as a nerd, I also wonder if Pascal was trying to be somewhat amusing. This is a question that I often ask the PLS thinkers, and this was the occasion that I found that Pascal was making a humorous attempt. Was he? As for the second passage: Is this truly the state of man? And if so, how does the compare to the view that Hobbes puts forth, in that all men desire to be peaceful, so that all men desire to join in community? These two viewpoints see to be opposed to each other. Are they? What does this do to ones view of Hobbes and to ones view of Pascal?

Believing in God

Do not be astonished to see simple people believing without argument.  God makes them love him and hate themselves.  He inclines their hearts to believe.  We shall never believe, with an effective belief and faith, unless God inclines our hearts, and we shall believe as soon as he does so. (380)

I was most interested in Pascal's final thoughts on the way in which we come to know God.  Until this point, the discourse had stressed the sound proofs of Christ's existence in terms of Scripture passages and prophecies that have been fulfilled.  Now, Pascal tells us that the truest way of knowing God is via some internal inclination.  While this certainly seems to be the most genuine form of religion, it is entirely separate from the other methods that had been described.  Are they alone sufficient ways of knowing God?  Is the man whose heart is inclined by God more religious than he who believes due to Scripture and prophecies? (These may seem like questions that Pascal has answered in the conclusion. I'm wondering if in doing so he has rejected or built on and perfected his earlier thoughts?)

Pascal I

"The only good thing for men therefore is to be diverted from thinking of what they are . . . but they do not answer like that because they do not know themselves" (#136, second part is much further on)

"One must know oneself. Even if that does not help in finding truth, at least it helps in running one's life, and nothing is more proper . . ." (#72)

"We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart . . . principles are felt, propositions proved . . ." (#110)

". . . it is most valuable to represent both to him. Man must . . . know both [animals and angels, to which his nature is related]." (#121)

"Thus we can know God properly only by knowing our own iniquities." (#189)

"I want him to consider nature just once, seriously and at leisure, and to look at himself as well . . ." (#199)

"The Christian religion alone is appropriate for all, being a blend of external and internal." (#219)

As I read, I was most interested in whether or not Pascal thought truth should be found by looking inside oneself. I have a bias towards this view, so I was on the lookout for quotes concerning this issue, which is why I have so many... sorry! But anyway. First Pascal seemed to agree, then he very clearly said the opposite, and finally he seemed to return to his original point of view. Does he mean that it is not enough to only look at oneself? I can agree with that, but isn't looking inwards still the proper starting point? Isn't this what Pascal himself did? But he also said that to consider oneself, to be alone with one's thoughts, is to be unhappy. Is worldly happiness so important then? Are we really unhappy when we think of ourselves? Should't we have a dual feeling to fit our dual natures, both exultation and despair?

Pascal and Doubt

It is clear that Pascal finds much at issue with Descartes both in his strong language ("I cannot forgive Descartes" 77) and in his writing (his rejection of studies of oneself, e.g. Montaigne, as frivolous, &c.).

I cannot help drawing a connection between the two, however:

...this is what makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to end. When we think we attach ourselves to any point and fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. Nothing stays for us. This is our natural condition, and yet most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses.
(72)

As a result of this uncertainty "we hate truth and those who tell it to us" (100), and we fear solitude or lack of diversion (cf. 139). Our reason, our senses, and our imagination all become forces of self-delusion. Descartes's doubt had a methodological purpose, and by and large proceeded somewhat calmly even as he razed down his beliefs; similarly, he resolved his problems with a divine 'finger snap.'

Pascal's unflinching look at humanity, however, places humans in an uncomfortable middle position, tangled between skepticism and dogmatism, between knowledge and doubt, reason and nature. How does this view of humanity compare and contrast with Descartes's doubt? In which aspects does it provide for less certainty and in which for more? What do you make of the ever-increasing hunger in the authors we've read thus far to really get at the nature of humanity, to strip away any and all pretense?

Pascal's Heart

We know the truth not only through our reason but through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to refute them . . . Our inability must therefore serve only to humble reason, which would like to be the judge of everything, but not to confute our certainty (Pensees 110).

It is intriguing to discover the personality of Pascal, who I previously knew as an international unit of pressure.

Here again is a discussion of truth and the human method of grasping it. Aquinas delineated three avenues of obtaining Truth (with a capital "T") - knowledge, opinion, and faith. Hobbes claimed there is no avenue to obtain Truth since all our knowledge is conditional; something is true if it follows a logical deduction from "if this is, then this is" constructions dependent on an agreed definition, and we can never know something that simply "is." Blaise advocates a separate avenue, the "heart." As the introduction states, the heart comprehends "pre-rational first principle and assenting to supra-rational propositions" (xxiii). As a further element that differentiates the heart from any other avenue, the heart is not controlled by us (100). What exactly does he mean by the heart? Is it closely analogous to Descartes' clear and distinct perception? How does it reconcile with Pascal's Hobbesian belief that true (perhaps True) justice is following the customs of one's country, a first principle seemingly derived from observing the inconsistent beliefs of humanity (86).

Modern Pascal

The whole of faith consists in Jesus Christ and Adam and the whole of morality in concupiscence and grace. # 226 (p. 72)

Perpetuity. This religion consists in believing that man has fallen from a state of glory and communion with God into a state of gloom, penitence and estrangement from God, but that after this life we shall be restored by a promised Messiah, and it has always existed on earth. # 281 (p. 90)

The first sentence concerned me. We now, as Christians, accept that the story of Adam and Eve is a figurative tale intended to explain why mankind isn't perfect. However, I feel that Pascal's proofs of Christianity are so much tidier because he has a firm belief that the world is 6,000 years old and that Adam was a flesh and blood individual. Once we start saying Adam and Eve is figurative, the Flood is figurative, Sodom and Gomorrah are figurative, all the way down the line, I feel we need to ask "Then why should the prophecies be taken literally?" and Pascal also claims that "The most weighty proofs of Jesus are the prophecies (# 335). If Pascal were to hear the modern take that we hold (more or less) the entire Old Testament figuratively, would he still hold onto his proof by prophecy?

I take his second quote to be Pascal's "Thesis of Christianity." I feel that it boils all the elements of his theology into its base components (it's like a dorm party that way). This sentence seems equally legitimate whether or not Adam or Noah were literal human beings - he even puts the language more passively. Does this Pensee hold up if the same critical interpretation of the Bible is applied to it?

Wisdom of Manoah

"Be penitent and for thy fault contrite,

But act not in my own affliction, Son,

Repent the sin, but if the punishment

Thou canst avoid, self-preservation bids;

Or th' execution leave to high disposal,

And let another hand, not thine, exact

the penal forfeit from thy self; perhaps

God will relent, and quit thee all his debt;

Who evermore approves and more accepts

(Best pleased with humble and filial submission)

Him who imploring mercy sues for life,

Then who self-rigorous chooses death as due;

Which argues over-just, and self-displeas'd

For self-offense, more then for God offended.

Reject not then what offerd means, who knows

But God hath sent before us (502-517)."

In this passage Manoah has come to his son pleading that Samson not give himself up for dead.  He wants his son to recognize that giving one's self over to God does not mean giving up.  Manoah argues that in repenting Samson may still preserve his own life; in the life he has left he may still please God and merit His mercy.  Do not act in your own affliction, others will do that for you, yet repent and live the life God still has given you.  Manoah tells Samson to put his life in his own hand's and his death in someone else's.  I wonder how the poem's ending relates to this wisdom.  Samson takes his life into his hands and dies by them as well.  Is this a vindication of Manoah's wisdom, and is that why he can rejoice at the end of the poem?  Is Manoah's wisdom an overarching theme of the poem?

"But what is strength without a double share / Of wisdom?" (ln 53-4)

Samson is caught between many things. He has great strength but poor judgment. His "intimate impulse" (in response to patt-man) is possibly part prophetic, part hormonal. He loves his own people but leaves their protection and ventures as an individual into his enemies' circle (885ff). No one would doubt his "manliness" yet he blames himself for being "effeminate" (562). He is attracted to, and hates his attraction to Dalila (and consequently hates Dalila). He wants to demonstrate the great power of God, yet "walks obscure" like those who do not believe in God (295-6). His divided torment comprehends him entirely.

The play itself seems to resonate with this tension of opposites. Dagon vs God of Israel, oppressed vs oppressor, male vs female, love vs hate, purity vs defilement, and so on. With such a warring premise, could it end otherwise than great destruction? Also, is the God of Israel proven by the ending? Or has said God only stooped to the power struggle of pagans, and incidentally won?

Metapost: Edit HTML tab

When entering in a new post, there are two tabs at the upper-right-hand side of the place where you type: Compose and Edit HTML. The latter tab can give you more control over what your posts look like.

There are only two types of content in these typical blog posts: paragraphs and quotes. Putting HTML tags at the beginning and end of text identifies what kind of content is between them.

<p>For example, in HTML each paragraph is between these two tags.</p>

<blockquote>Quotes are created out of any content between these two tags.</blockquote>

But the above looks like this:

Quotes are created out of any content between these two tags.

This has been happening in a few posts. The solution is this:

<blockquote><p>Quotes are created out of any content between these two tags.</p></blockquote>

Which looks like:

Quotes are created out of any content between these two tags.

If your post is looking kind of funny and you want to fix it, just go to the edit HTML tab and make sure all your paragraphs are between "p" tags and all your quotes are between "blockquote" and "p" tags. I will go back and fix any problems as soon as I can, but I thought this might help.

Copy/paste: <p></p> <blockquote><p></p></blockquote>

'Milton is a subtle student of evil.'

There is a lot in here that I hope we get to -- the similarities between Samson and Milton (in blindness, marital history, etc.), the apparent masculinity/femininity and/or mind/body dualities, etc. But since I have to pick one, here is a question on evil.

Towards the beginning Samson takes ownership over his problems:

Just are the ways of God,
And justifiable to Man

But justly, I myself have brought them [evils] on.
Sole author I, sole cause.

But the line between good and evil becomes less clear as the play goes on. Harapha gives reasons why Samson could be understood as a murderer; Delilah suggests that she will be remembered as a traitor by one side, and a patriot by another; and the chorus bemoans the apparent lack of justice:

God of our fathers, what is man!
That thou towards him with hand so various,
Or might I say contrarious,
Temperst thy providence through his short course,
Not evenly...
Though not disordinate, yet causeless suffering
The punishment of dissolute days, in fine,
just or unjust, alike seem miserable,
For oft alike, both come to evil end.

What is the role of evil in this work? How does the title of this post, a paraphrase (or possibly exact quote) of Professor Fallon's comment on Milton regarding Paradise Lost, play into this?

Imprisonment

"Which shall I first bewail, / Thy Bondage or lost Sight, / Prison within Prison / Inseparably dark? / Thou art become ( O worst imprisonment!) / The Dungeon of thy self; thy Soul..." (151-156)
"Mess. Then take the worst in brief, Samson is dead. / Man. The worst indeed, O all my hope's defeated / To free him hence! but death who sets all free / Hath paid his ransom now and full discharge..." (1570-1573)

The first quote stuck out right away when I read it, and it stayed with me throughout the reading, keeping my mind on the different ways Samson was imprisoned at different times in the story. The end of the story and the second quote surprised me, because though Samson was able to break free in one sense and defeat his Philistine captives, his final and absolute(?) freedom was brought about only by death. Considering the many ways Samson was imprisoned; blindness, lack of strength, physical imprisonment, etc; I think it might be interesting to explore from which of his imprisonments could only death free him, and how we might encounter similar imprisonments now.

Nature of women

"What e're it be, to wisest men and best. Seeming at first all heavenly under virgin veil, Soft, modest, meek, demure, Once join'd, the contrary she proves, a thorn intestin, far within defensive arms. A cleaving mischief, in his way to verture adverse and turbulent, or by her charms, draws him awry enslv'd."

(p93, 1034-1041)

Milton's perception of the deception of women is noted through this passage. It seems that with regard to Dallia, and women in general, they cannot be trusted. Even when Dallia tries to approach Samson in the page before, he will not let her come near, for he is afraid of her trickery. What is Milton saying about the character of  woman? Is he merely showing the deception of Dallia, or is he speaking about all women? 

Samson a charismatic?

"That what I motion'd was of God; I knew / From intimate impulse, and therefore urg'd / The Marriage on; that by occasion hence / I might begin Israel's Deliverance, / The work to which I was divenly call'd" (Samson, 222-226).

"I cannot praise thy Marriage choises, Son, / Rather approv'd them not; but thou didst plead / Divine impulsion prompting how thou might'st / Find some occasion to infest our Foes. /...[who] found soon occasion therby to make thee / Their Captive" (Manoa, 420-426).

"I begin to feel / Some rouzing motions in me which dispose / To something extraordinary my thoughts. / I with this Messenger will go along, / Nothing to do, be sure, that may dishonour / Our Law, or stain my vow of Nazarite. / ... This day will be remarkable in my life / By some great act, or of my days the last" (Samson, 1381-1389).

"Which when Samson / Felt in his arms, with head a while enclin'd / And eyes fixt he stood, as one who pray'd, / Or some great matter in his mind revolv'd (Messenger, 1635-1638)."

These quotes may give insight on how Samson knows what God requires of him. Do they give evidence that he is a charismatic, receiving direct inspiration from God? Or else, is he just a very religious man who does the best thing he can think of? Or worse, does he determine God's will by his own inclinations?

The first quote is about his first wife, who proved false (227). He then picked a second wife, Dalila, in the same way: "I thought it lawful from my former act, / And the same end; still watching to oppress / Israel's oppressours" (231-233). This marriage, too, he comes to think is a mistake. But before each marriage he seemed to see the marriage as part of his divine mission to destroy the Philistines. If his method for discerning these parts of his divine mission was the "intimate impulse" (223 - the footnote says "intimate" = "inward"), what becomes of the credibility of his method?

He seems to claim a similar inspiration before agreeing to be taken by the officer to the festival. What should we think of this action, then? Is it direct inspiration from God? A smart move with foresight?

Just before he has his grand finale, he has a moment of silence. Contrary to the messenger's thrust, I think it might make a difference whether he prayed or turned a matter over in his mind. Or perhaps he did both.

As much as I want to grant Samson charismatic ability and direct inspiration from God (that might come during a silent, reflective moment or during a moment of spiritedness) because its very cool, I cannot overlook his track record of being very wrong. Instead, I am inclined to think that Samson was a very good man with regards to virtue (173) --although he had his faults, as he is at pains to express--, for which reason God granted him his very strong powers. In other words, I grant that God gave Samson power because Samson was good at doing the right thing or deciding how to follow his mission (proclaimed by the angel), even though he might not have gotten it perfect (I say might because I wonder just how big a sin is trusting your wife - but then again perhaps he thought he was betraying loyalty to God). But I don't grant that God gave Samson direct inspiration, despite the fact that he might have thought so. Indeed, the kind of inspiration or desire that he may have took to be from God (at first, not later) may have been his "downfall," seeing as he "couldst repress" all other desires (541-559).

Therefore, I think that Samson is a very religious moralist (what if his strength is read as moral courage?) of sorts who God gives strength and does not abandon at the end (or how else would he have gotten the strength), but not a charismatic receiving diving inspiration, despite his own claims that evidence such a link. Some theologians (e.g. St. Paul) would say that because Jesus had not died and rose yet, a person such as Samson was still "under the law" and not able to become the "new creation" that goes with taking on the "Spirit of Christ." As such, Samson might be forced to take a much more active and much harder (in one sense, not in another) role than a true Christian might to achieve his salvation, or to do the right thing.

What do you think?

Hobbes and 1984

So:

Liberty, or Freedome, sgnifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition... p. 261

Plus

A Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to do. (262)

Brings me to:

...when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will; It is there fore the action, of one that was free... (262)

Hobbes conception of liberty is ultimatly one of the most crucial pillars of his philosophy. As much as I would like to agree with the Augustinian "We are the most free when we always choose to do God's will" viewpoint, I tend to agree with Hobbes that freedom is the absence of opposition. The second quote seems to get extra sticky when taken in Hobbes' philosophy, since he acknolwedges that "free-will" is an oxymoron (or an absurditie to use his language). By adding the phrase "what he has a will to doe" changes the meaning of the statement (in my reading) to mean we wouldn't need civil liberties for actions we have no will to commit, such as flag burning. Finally, as much as I don't want to accept the third quote, it seems consistent and valid with what Hobbes has been showing so far: If humans are essentially just reasonable beasts, if all theology is meant be taken merely as "Augustine's opinion," and if there is no "free-will" since all actions were determined by the first mover, then I am inclined to believe in Hobbes conception of liberty, and for the most part, his entire Leviathan. I would really love to bring in 1984 into this discussion, since so much of the novel seems to be a response to Hobbes' principles. 

At the climax of 1984, Winston is broken by O'Brien. The novel ends with an apathetic Winston noting that his relationship with Julia was "ungood." (Orwell, like Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes uses the idea that imprecise langauge can destroy what it means to be human). Finally, Winston accepts the Party's view of life, celebrates a recent battle victory over Eurasia, and the narrator acknowledges that for the first time in his life, Winston loves Big Brother. My question is: If Hobbes were to read Big Brother, would he actually have a problem with the society Orwell puts forth? Is there anything in particular in Orwell's that would make Hobbes say, "No! You got it wrong! This is a dystopia!"

--I appologize if this question leads too far out of the text, and not back into it, but 1984 might be my favorite novel, and it seems like to good of an opportunity to pass up.

Hobbes Pt. II

I don't have a quote, but I did find it interesting that someone who is supposed to be completely anti-Aristotle comes to the same conclusion as Aristotle on the best form of government. What is it about both Aristotle's and Hobbes' systems that lend themselves to monarchy, and how is our system so different that it lends itself to democracy?

Connection to Aristotle's Politics

For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy...(240)

While reading Part II, I couldn't help but notice strong similarities between Hobbes' method of explaining the Common-wealth and that of Aristotle in his discussion of regimes in Politics.  Both identify three ideal forms of government: rule by one, rule by part, and rule by all.  There are, in Aristotle's words, "deviations" from each of these forms.  Hobbes refers to these as "the same Formes misliked" (240).  The only discrepancy comes in their thoughts on rule by all.  For Aristotle, Polity, a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy, is the best regime and Democracy is a deviation of it.  As the quotation above tells us, Hobbes believes that Democracy is the proper form.  I find it interesting that what was a "deviation" for Aristotle is the best form of rule in Hobbes' time.  What happened to the idea of Polity?  How did Democracy become and remain the ideal form?  

There is no power on earth to be compared with him (Job).

The inscription and image on the front cover serve to instill fear, Hobbes' believed impediment to power, in a commenwealth's people. I think it is sort of an inverse vantage point to Machiavelli; both believe in ruling by fear, but Machiavelli views the principle from the ruler's stance whereas Hobbes seems to view it from the people's. Machiavelli advocates fear as a necessity to the ruler, and Hobbes advocates fear as a necessity to the people.

As mentioned in last class, it's ironic how Hobbes uses art and figurative language to form the Leviathan (the image, not the work). I believe he does so to take advantage of a metaphor's "deception" (102), straying from reason and pursuing indefiniteness for the sake of instilling fear. I read some of Job 41, from which the quote on the cover was extracted. Pretty intense. And just look at the cover. Imagine one of those little guys starting to break away from the group, and the big guy slowly shifts his gaze towards the wanderer and decimates him with his broadswoard. Or smashes him with that thingy in his left. I'm sleeping with the light on tonight.

Hobbes Part II

". . . they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it . . ." (229)

". . . there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection . . ." (230)

". . . because the major part hath by consenting voices decared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest . . ." (231)

". . . they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification." (232)

". . . it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall . . ." (233)

Hobbes describes these and other "Rights of Soveraignes" in Chap. XVIII. As I read, I instinctively balked at many of them - particularly that the sovereign's judgement is final and that the sovereign may never be deposed. To a certain extent this is due only to Hobbes' language: if one replaces "Soveraigne" with "government" (as Hobbes allows when he writes that the ruling body may be either an individual or an assembly), his statements don't seem so radical. However, even with this change, I wonder to how many of Hobbes' "Rights of Soveraignes" we have consciously or unconsciously agreed. Could even his statements about censorship be reconciled with our modern/American government? What about the government making moral or factual judgments, as with abortion - is this the place of government, and if one's personal judgments differ, how is one to respond?

law and grace

Chapter 14:

"So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptation of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or opther strong desire, but the feareof that Invisible Power, which they everyone Worship as God."

"When the tranferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another; . . . or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion . . . This is not Contract, but Gift, Free-gift, Grace."

To continue Miriam's general direction about Hobbes's reading ("rereading?") of Christianity, I wonder how his understanding of the origins of the commonwealth and the nature of humans without commonwealth relate to general biblical understanding.

How is his "state of nature" different from the Roman Catholic idea?

Hobbes believes religion is necessary for the securing of common law and peace. Thus, he takes a distinctly sociopsychopolitical approach to religion. Does his rhetoric of the practicality of religion undermine religion itself or reinforce it?

Moreover, his language of "grace" is distinctly biblical. Is he changing the biblical ideas to suit his own model, or are they mutually compatible?

Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.  Ch. 14, p. 190.

I laughed out loud when I read this new twist on an old gem.  Hobbes has reinvented the Golden Rule to be not so much a positive "the more love you give away the more you shall get in return," but a defensive "don't give people any more credit than you know they should give to you."  Is this really the law of the Gospel?  Is this really how we should think of one another and of ourselves?

Hobbes in this text seems to be trying to get people to take reframe the way they look at themselves, at religion, and at a common-wealth and ask themselves if the beliefs they had previously held on these topics are really the way things are.  He seems to be trying to ground everything in reality and no longer support common notions just because they are common especially if these notions have become overly romanticized.  Is this a breath of fresh air or a digression into just another extreme?

Was God created out of fear?

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods were at first created by humane fear: Which spoken of the Gods, is very true...But the acknowledging of one Eternall, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertures, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in the time to come. (Part 1: Chapter 12. Page 170)

The question of the creation of religion is brought up in this passage. Was religion created out of a sense of fear, security, or inspiration? In our Catholic view, we do believe that Jesus created Christianity. But what about the basic roots of A religion in general. Not neccesarily our Christian religion, but the praise and glory of a higher being? What sparked human interest in praising something that might not even exist? Is it as Hobbes says, out of fear? 

Language and Fact

"No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing." (Part 1, Chpt VII, paragraph 3, [p.131])

Besides being confused by the end of this passage (even after several attempts), and finding my confusion ironic since Hobbes puts such an emphasis on language as the root of knowledge, I found myself wondering not only how Bacon and Descartes would take this, but how we should react. Can we only know what is conditional? Or are the efforts made by Bacon and Descartes legitimate, and should we follow suit in attempting to find absolute knowledge? I found the bit about memory to be quite similar to our discussion about Descartes (how do we know memory is real/correct), but Descartes seemed to be able to push past that. So I guess I'm also wondering if the sense and memory objection is valid? I apologize for any convolution in my language, and hope that this post can reach your understanding.

A Taste of Reason and Anthropology in Hobbes, Compared with Descartes

"He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do... yet...the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration" (End of introduction, Macpherson ed p83)

"That is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it" (Part I, Ch 3, Mac ed p. 96)

"For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be take for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it" (I,5,112)

At the end of the introduction Hobbes seems to propose or presuppose an objective structure of man such that he can know Man-kind by knowing himself and such that other men can verify what he says in themselves. He also states explicitly in the introduction that "the similitude of the Passions, which are the same in all men...not the similitude of the objects of the Passions" (82-83). Descartes seemed to make a similar assumption that what worked for him was the correct method for good reasoning.

In part one, ch 3, Hobbes establishes that a constant ("regulated, guided") train of thought is only possible through the presence of desire. He suggests that in this way the end will be kept always in mind and wandering thoughts will be "quickly again reduced into the way" (96). This method of thought regulated by desire seems much different from the indifferent intellection of Descartes. We had even wondered if Descartes was an ascetic.

But in ch 5, Hobbes praises mathematical reasoning and insists that certain comes about much the way Descartes thought, with a building up of consequences (112). Hobbes characterizes the passions as being harmful to right reason (see third quote above).

To what extent does Hobbes presuppose or propose a common humanity, if he does? How does the desire that allows constant thought differ from passions? What is the place of desire in relation to reason for Hobbes? For Descartes? Who is closer to the truth?

Theology and Deception in Descartes

To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative  of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God.

Meditations 81, A&T 53

We've talked about this as one of the most vital assumptions Descartes makes, but I don't think we've discussed deception in depth. First, for such a critical point, he doesn't seem to spend much time with his proof. I guess I find it interesting that although he is writing this to Christian theologians, he doesn't make any mention of Christ or an explicitly Biblical God in the entire text.  I would think that God used "trickery" in the Old Testament - ie. the Binding of Isaac. I also wonder what this says about Descartes moral structure - he seems to not take the consequences into account, but rather the action in itself. My questions are: Does Descartes truly believe that this point is as evident as he claims, or does he spend so little time on it because he knows it is a weak proposition? and This point of God's deception implies a personal God that interacts with the world, and while Descartes states this is a philosophical and not a theological treatise, what insights can we gain into Descartes' theology?

Descartes, Meditations II

There is, moreover, no doubt that God could have given me a nature such that I was never mistaken; again, there is no doubt that he always wills what is best. Is it then better that I should make mistakes than that I should not do so?

Does it seem, in the section where Descartes is questioning why God would have created him imperfectly, that he would like to, if given the chance, say that God made a mistake when he chose not to make Descartes imperfect? Is he simply supporting the decision of God because he is afraid of repercussions?

Descartes, Meditations 2

"... perhaps I am dreaming, as I recently objected against myself, in other words, that everything I am now thinking of is no truer that what occurs to someone who is asleep? Be that as it may, this changes nothing; for certainly, even if I were dreaming, if anything is evident to my intellect, then it is entirely true." - 71

"... the hyperbolic doubts of the last few days ought to be rejected as ludicrous. This goes especially for the chief reason for doubting, which dealth with my failure to distinguish being asleep from being awake. For I now notice that there is a considerable difference between these two; dreams are never joined by th ememory with all the other actions of life, as is the case with those actions that occur when one is awake." - 89

Are these two quotes convincing? Does Descartes fairly address dreams and matrix-esque illusions? Or does he gloss over this difficulty? I think we definitely might have trouble with the second quote. If I understand him correctly, Descartes is basically arguing that while he's awake, he can remember both his dreams and his waking life, whereas while he's asleep, his memories are bounded by the dream. But isn't this exactly the problem? If Descartes is dreaming his entire life, as he knows it, then wouldn't he be "bounded by the dream" and not remember his true, waking life? Or perhaps he has no memories of another life and has always lived within the dream. In either case, I don't see that he has solved this particular difficulty.

Descartes' Platonic Thoughts

Their truth is so open and so much in accord with my nature that, when I first discover them, it seems I am not so much learning something new as recalling something I knew beforehand.  In other words, it seems as though I am noticing things for the first time that were in fact in me for a long while, although I had not previously directed a mental gaze upon them. (Meditation 5, AT 64)

This passage reminds me of Plato's Meno, which demonstrates that certain knowledge is innate and can be recollected via inquiry.  I fully support both Plato and Descartes in their beliefs that there are certain ideas that have not been fabricated but rather "have their own true and immutable natures," but am wondering if this is a sound argument for the existence of God (AT 64).  I understand how it applies to and works for the idea of a triangle or some other mathematical figure.  The nonexistence of such things is impossible; one cannot even attempt to disprove their nature.  The existence of God, however, is an argument that has taken many forms and resulted in varied conclusions.  I am having trouble determining whether this approach is strong enough to support such a claim.  Is this something that each individual clearly and distinctly knows, as Descartes argues?  

Descartes & the Plato/Aristotle Dialogue

For this reason alone the entire class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing's "end," I judge to be utterly useless in physics. It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inquiring into the ends of God.

Descartes, Meditation Four, A&T 55

In the quoted passage, Descartes attempts to eliminate the Aristotelian procedure of determining a thing's use by its "end." Last time, Peter brought up neoplatonism as it relates to Descartes's "ideas" (cf. A&T83, about 6/16ths of the way down, for a possibly relevant passage). Plato looked up to the Forms, and Aristotle attempted to work more empirically; we see a somewhat similar situation here with Descartes and Bacon respectively.

Can we elaborate on this dialogue? In what ways is Descartes neoplatonic? How does his attempt to establish a basis of knowledge upon "clear and distinct perception" fit into the comparison to Plato? How would he respond to Bacon or Aristotle?

P.S. When I began reading Descartes for this class, I had forgotten how important he had been to me when I first read him Freshman year. I have always considered Descartes to be captivating: he is careful, logical, and apparently sensible. The thing he seeks is also enchanting: a pure basis for knowledge, obtained by mere meditation. I find "I think, therefore I am" to be a beautiful idea, even though I think it assumes more than he purports. His skepticism still strikes me deeply, but as much as I disagree that there is any basis for knowledge other than belief I find his notion of "clear and distinct perception," especially as described on the last two paragraphs of Meditation Four and on A&T 68-70, to be an excellent procedure by which one could determine what one truly believes and attain to it. Despite not actually agreeing with what he says, for what it's worth, I think Descartes is really worth paying close attention to.

Clear and Distinct is Unclear

But whatever type of argument I use, it always comes down to the fact that the only things that fully convince me are those that I clearly and distinctly perceive. And although some of these things I thus perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and inquire carefully, nevertheless, once they have been discovered, they are considered no less certain than the others (Meditiations, A&T 68-69).

I think it is agreed that Descartes intends his conclusions, of his existence and God, to be objective. This quote provides further evidence. First, it implicitly claims that Descartes' conclusions are certain. Second, it explicitly claims that people are not looking close enough or inquiring carefully if they disagree with the conclusions. The verb "discovered" indicates that Descartes believes his conclusions' reality are independent of an individual's deliberance.

But there is much disagreement regarding Descartes' principle criterion for accepting something as reality - his "clear and distinct perception." Is it relativism or a true revelation of reality? I found it interesting, but perhaps no help to the present question, that Descartes likens this "clear and distinct perception" to a conformation to "the good and the true" (58). According to Descartes, clearly and distinctly perceiving something is not a subjective, internal belief: "A great light in my intellect gave way to a great inclination in my will" (59). It seems that Descartes is saying that his reason did not ultimately ascertain his existence and God, but an external force that drew his will.