"Human reason so delights building that it has several times built up a tower and then razed it to see how the foundation was laid. It is never too late to become reasonable and wise; but if the knowledge come late, there is always more difficulty in starting to reform." (p4)

This quote is very interesting to me for a couple reason. First, how often do we truly do this? How often do we look back at our past and utilize it for our future. So many times mistakes can be avoided because they have happened before, but we have not learned from them. Why don't we do this more? Second, what is the point where reform is impossible? Is there really a point where you can reverse the damage?

(Sorry this post is late, I just got back in town and did not have access to the internet)

Forms, and Triangles

"Whatever is given us as object must be given us in intuition. All our intuition, however, takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding intuits nothing but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' " (Remark II [p36])

I'm not sure if this is in response to Peter's post, or more of a continuation, but I too was stuck on Descartes', I mean Kant's description of space. Here Kant says "all bodies, together in the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts." If I am reading this right, then (in response to Peter) space (and therefore time as well?) is not necessary, but is instead simply our understanding of the form.(?) If I am not reading correctly, then I am pretty confused and either muddling or continuing Peter's question.

I also hope someone can help me understand the triangles in hemispheres part, whether in class or via the blog. I was having trouble visualizing it. (§13 285-286 [p33])

Limits of Experience and Obscure Metaphysics

"[Metaphysics] can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, not internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason... it must be called pure philosophical knowledge" (p13, 265?).

"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (19, 274 ?).

"There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: 'This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of the science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason'" (20, 271).

"If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysician" (25, 278).

"Appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth; but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion" (p40; 292ish).

What is experience? One of several interesting divisions Kant makes in this work is the line of the "bounds of all possible experience" (25, 278). It seems one cannot experience anything Metaphysical, or perhaps it is only that one cannot know anything Metaphysical from experience. Experience is confined to the realm of subjective construction, apparently; it cannot instruct us about the most real stuff (whatever it is) "out there." We have already created what we will experience before we experience it. And yet, the "true" lessons tought by the wise men confined to this realm may be "indispensable for the guidance of understanding and of the will in life" (25, 278). Why then speculate? "Consider that not everyone is bound to study metaphysics" (p11, 264); "But as [Metaphysics] can never cease to be in demand - since the interest of common sense are so intimately interwoven with it..." (5, 257). Why can Kant so easily separate the experiential or common sensical from the speculative or reasonable?

What is Metaphysics, exactly? It seems that Metaphysics must be the stuff of pure reason and intuition, with no impact from anything "out there." Metaphysics may be simply the turning of the wheel in Kant's head. But doesn't Metaphysics need to regard what is "out there?" If we all turn our wheels at the same speed, will we come up with the same Answer? Perhaps it is in the nature of Metaphysics to work in philosophical moments, which cannot be sustained, but instead quickly fall back down from their own weight. This would explain the uncertainty, dizziness, and even contradictions of Metaphysics adressed by several of the authors we have read, while still preserving the view that there is truth to be had in Metaphysics; it just cannot be sustained by itself.

Kant part 1

At the end of 4:282, Kant says that intuition can "precede the actuality of the object" only if "it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility." Later, towards the end of 4:283, he says "(Space and time) are pure intuitions, which are the ground a priori of the empirical intuitions, and hence can never be taken away themselves, but prove, precisely by being pure intuitions a priori, that they are mere forms of our sensibility which must preced all empirical intuition . . . and in conformity with which objects can be known a priori, though indeed only as they appear to us."

I am not sure that I understand BUT:

Is Kant saying that time and space are necessary? That is, they can't but be?

He has previously stated that intuited knowledge is "constructed" (4:281). The above quote demonstrates his notion that we interpret what is "out there" in terms of our a priori constructions. Is he reducing everything we think of as "out there" to internal objects?