And by the way, all this works for your soul, too

Quotes from § 49, pp.84-86, ak.336-338:

...because objects which cannot be given us in any experience, do not exist for us...

However as the Ego in the proposition, "I am," means not only the object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, just as body means not only external intuition (in space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies apart from my thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must likewise be answered in the negative.

And in a nearby footnote:

...the law of the permanence of substances has place for the purposes of existence only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be consigned and conjoined with others in experience, but never independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot hold good of the soul after death.

plus, in § 34:

...beyond [experience] no concepts have any significance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a foundation.

I have to take a break from reading to post about this, because this completely blew my mind.

So, okay, let's see here: objects exist, but we can't know anything about them-in-themselves. We can know about our experiences with them, and that is all we can know. Our sensibilities enable nature/the-totality-of-appearances. Our understandings / our a priori synthetic principles of possible experience enable experience itself in a way analogous to the way our minds 'create' space and time. So it ends up that every object that meaningfully exists can be experienced. Several parts of that are wrong, I'm sure, but is that it vaguely?

So Kant took all that, and then applied it to your mind.

This whole thing seems almost solipsistic, but without the self, somehow. This idea that we would not exist without being aware of oneself is fascinating and absolutely trippy. We are self-aware; we can observe ourselves, or in other words experience ourselves, and so we exist. But things which cannot be experienced make no impression on any sensibility; how could one suppose something like that to exist in any meaningful sense?

How does this connect to Rousseau, and what it means to be human? For Rousseau, humans are self-aware creatures, who think, who consider events in sequence, who place artificial systems of value over otherwise equivalent things (cf. the dancer segment). There was a sense in Rousseau that we were over ourselves, disconnected from ourselves. Here in Kant, the "ego" wouldn't even exist if we weren't sensing it! I just remember that passage in Rousseau, where the savage dies without even noticing that he had been alive. In Kant's philosophy, where existence itself seems so deeply and meaningfully engraved in the geography of the human mind, it would make sense that existence itself would depend on self-awareness. What are the implications of this?

I apologize in advance if any of this turns out to be invalidated in what I haven't read yet. I'll edit if necessary.

Experience and the Sensuous World

For we are not concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our understanding, but with nature as an object of possible experience; and in this case the understanding, since it makes experience possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all or that it is nature [namely, the existence of things determined according to universal laws].  (322, pg. 69)

Similar to the sentiments of some of my other group members, Kant confuses the you-know-what out of me.  This passage is especially mind-boggling, and it's never a good sign when the conclusion of a part is inconclusive!  So I'm hoping someone will be able to shed some light on this issue... Kant says that the sensuous world is 1) not an object of experience or 2) nature, which a few lines above is described as "an object of possible experience" in terms of our intelligible experience.  So doesn't (2) contradict (1)?  What is the distinction between these two conceptions of the sensuous world?  Doesn't everything boil down to experience and our faculties of understanding our experiences?

The Supreme Being

But as we can never know these beings of understanding as they are in themselves, that is, as definite, yet must assume them as regards the sensible world and connect them with it by reason, we are at least able to think this connection by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. "355"

I'm going to start off by saying even if I think I know that Kant is arguing, I probably am in the wrong. Because of that lack of confidence I am not going to give a cool "Greil on Kant" interpretation. I would simply like to talk through Kant's argument as to why we should believe in the immaterial being if we can never know it as the thing-in-itself. I guess some questions could also be, How does Kant's "proof" of a God compare to Descartes? Are their motivations the same? Do the two arguments support each other, or combat each other?

Kant Part II

"For there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another...

The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective."

- Part II, "pages" 298 and 299 (not the common edition pages)

If I understand Kant correctly, he is arguing that to make universal judgments, we first have to make sure that we have a common understanding the object, and to do this, we check whether our perception of the object is the same as everyone else's perception. But what does he mean by "universally valid"? I think he means a concept that arises a priori and is common to all humanity. Does this also mean objectively true? I don't think so; we aren't talking about the object "in itself" but rather a commonly defined object (this reminds me of Hobbes' definitions). But how do we rise from these commonly defined obejcts - which may not be objectively real - to laws of nature, i.e. laws that are objectively true? Kant seems to connect the two by assuming that the way we experience things is a law of nature, and so by studying the origins of this law, we can see how all laws of nature are derived. But what if the former is not a law of nature? Confusion...

Clarifying Example

"What Copernicus did was take the existing a priori concept of the world, the notion that it was flat and fixed in space, and pose an alternative a p riori concept of the world, that it's spherical and moves around the sun; and showed that both of the a priori concepts fitted the existing sensory data."

The above excerpt comes from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which I found in Zen and the Art of Motorcylce Maintenance (I did not read Critique of Pure Reason along with our current, beefy assignment). I remembered coming across Hume and Kant in Zen and Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and wanted to review what the author, Robert Pirsig, had said about them. I, like a few others (I believe) in class on Monday, was having trouble interpreting what exactly Kant was claiming about human understanding and how it differed, if at all, from Hume's Enquiry.

Copernicus' method of forming the Copernican Revolution was a clarifying example for me, and I wish to share it here in hopes that other confused Kantian readers find clarification as well. Copernicus, as Kant states above, changed our internal understanding of the world from an unmoving, flat object to an orbiting, spherical object. Space and time constituted both understandings, and the spacial and temporal representation of a flat world fixed in our minds properly assimilated the flux of sensory data we experienced just as well as the spacial and temporal representation of a round world.

But Copernicus used the mind's intuitive faculties of perceiving things in space and time to amend our understanding to the one accepted today. Upon viewing a moon revolving around Jupiter through his telescope, he used intuitive faculties to form the concept of a round earth revolving around the sun. How could he have come to this assured truth, one he believed to be as true as we know it today, based solely on experience? He never experienced a round earth in one complete vision, considering humans were far from the ability to view the earth in third person from outer space. Even if he could sit afar and perceive the earth's shape, it would be hard to patiently watch it revolve around the sun for a year. The reasoning behind the Copernican Revolution was not an a posteriori synthetic judgment, but an a prior synthetic judgment. He spatially built the true image of the world and temporally revolved it around the sun, all in his mind. Brilliant!

"Human reason so delights building that it has several times built up a tower and then razed it to see how the foundation was laid. It is never too late to become reasonable and wise; but if the knowledge come late, there is always more difficulty in starting to reform." (p4)

This quote is very interesting to me for a couple reason. First, how often do we truly do this? How often do we look back at our past and utilize it for our future. So many times mistakes can be avoided because they have happened before, but we have not learned from them. Why don't we do this more? Second, what is the point where reform is impossible? Is there really a point where you can reverse the damage?

(Sorry this post is late, I just got back in town and did not have access to the internet)

Forms, and Triangles

"Whatever is given us as object must be given us in intuition. All our intuition, however, takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding intuits nothing but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' " (Remark II [p36])

I'm not sure if this is in response to Peter's post, or more of a continuation, but I too was stuck on Descartes', I mean Kant's description of space. Here Kant says "all bodies, together in the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts." If I am reading this right, then (in response to Peter) space (and therefore time as well?) is not necessary, but is instead simply our understanding of the form.(?) If I am not reading correctly, then I am pretty confused and either muddling or continuing Peter's question.

I also hope someone can help me understand the triangles in hemispheres part, whether in class or via the blog. I was having trouble visualizing it. (§13 285-286 [p33])

Limits of Experience and Obscure Metaphysics

"[Metaphysics] can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, not internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason... it must be called pure philosophical knowledge" (p13, 265?).

"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (19, 274 ?).

"There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: 'This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of the science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason'" (20, 271).

"If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysician" (25, 278).

"Appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth; but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion" (p40; 292ish).

What is experience? One of several interesting divisions Kant makes in this work is the line of the "bounds of all possible experience" (25, 278). It seems one cannot experience anything Metaphysical, or perhaps it is only that one cannot know anything Metaphysical from experience. Experience is confined to the realm of subjective construction, apparently; it cannot instruct us about the most real stuff (whatever it is) "out there." We have already created what we will experience before we experience it. And yet, the "true" lessons tought by the wise men confined to this realm may be "indispensable for the guidance of understanding and of the will in life" (25, 278). Why then speculate? "Consider that not everyone is bound to study metaphysics" (p11, 264); "But as [Metaphysics] can never cease to be in demand - since the interest of common sense are so intimately interwoven with it..." (5, 257). Why can Kant so easily separate the experiential or common sensical from the speculative or reasonable?

What is Metaphysics, exactly? It seems that Metaphysics must be the stuff of pure reason and intuition, with no impact from anything "out there." Metaphysics may be simply the turning of the wheel in Kant's head. But doesn't Metaphysics need to regard what is "out there?" If we all turn our wheels at the same speed, will we come up with the same Answer? Perhaps it is in the nature of Metaphysics to work in philosophical moments, which cannot be sustained, but instead quickly fall back down from their own weight. This would explain the uncertainty, dizziness, and even contradictions of Metaphysics adressed by several of the authors we have read, while still preserving the view that there is truth to be had in Metaphysics; it just cannot be sustained by itself.

Kant part 1

At the end of 4:282, Kant says that intuition can "precede the actuality of the object" only if "it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility." Later, towards the end of 4:283, he says "(Space and time) are pure intuitions, which are the ground a priori of the empirical intuitions, and hence can never be taken away themselves, but prove, precisely by being pure intuitions a priori, that they are mere forms of our sensibility which must preced all empirical intuition . . . and in conformity with which objects can be known a priori, though indeed only as they appear to us."

I am not sure that I understand BUT:

Is Kant saying that time and space are necessary? That is, they can't but be?

He has previously stated that intuited knowledge is "constructed" (4:281). The above quote demonstrates his notion that we interpret what is "out there" in terms of our a priori constructions. Is he reducing everything we think of as "out there" to internal objects?