Theology and Deception in Descartes

To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative  of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God.

Meditations 81, A&T 53

We've talked about this as one of the most vital assumptions Descartes makes, but I don't think we've discussed deception in depth. First, for such a critical point, he doesn't seem to spend much time with his proof. I guess I find it interesting that although he is writing this to Christian theologians, he doesn't make any mention of Christ or an explicitly Biblical God in the entire text.  I would think that God used "trickery" in the Old Testament - ie. the Binding of Isaac. I also wonder what this says about Descartes moral structure - he seems to not take the consequences into account, but rather the action in itself. My questions are: Does Descartes truly believe that this point is as evident as he claims, or does he spend so little time on it because he knows it is a weak proposition? and This point of God's deception implies a personal God that interacts with the world, and while Descartes states this is a philosophical and not a theological treatise, what insights can we gain into Descartes' theology?

Descartes, Meditations II

There is, moreover, no doubt that God could have given me a nature such that I was never mistaken; again, there is no doubt that he always wills what is best. Is it then better that I should make mistakes than that I should not do so?

Does it seem, in the section where Descartes is questioning why God would have created him imperfectly, that he would like to, if given the chance, say that God made a mistake when he chose not to make Descartes imperfect? Is he simply supporting the decision of God because he is afraid of repercussions?

Descartes, Meditations 2

"... perhaps I am dreaming, as I recently objected against myself, in other words, that everything I am now thinking of is no truer that what occurs to someone who is asleep? Be that as it may, this changes nothing; for certainly, even if I were dreaming, if anything is evident to my intellect, then it is entirely true." - 71

"... the hyperbolic doubts of the last few days ought to be rejected as ludicrous. This goes especially for the chief reason for doubting, which dealth with my failure to distinguish being asleep from being awake. For I now notice that there is a considerable difference between these two; dreams are never joined by th ememory with all the other actions of life, as is the case with those actions that occur when one is awake." - 89

Are these two quotes convincing? Does Descartes fairly address dreams and matrix-esque illusions? Or does he gloss over this difficulty? I think we definitely might have trouble with the second quote. If I understand him correctly, Descartes is basically arguing that while he's awake, he can remember both his dreams and his waking life, whereas while he's asleep, his memories are bounded by the dream. But isn't this exactly the problem? If Descartes is dreaming his entire life, as he knows it, then wouldn't he be "bounded by the dream" and not remember his true, waking life? Or perhaps he has no memories of another life and has always lived within the dream. In either case, I don't see that he has solved this particular difficulty.

Descartes' Platonic Thoughts

Their truth is so open and so much in accord with my nature that, when I first discover them, it seems I am not so much learning something new as recalling something I knew beforehand.  In other words, it seems as though I am noticing things for the first time that were in fact in me for a long while, although I had not previously directed a mental gaze upon them. (Meditation 5, AT 64)

This passage reminds me of Plato's Meno, which demonstrates that certain knowledge is innate and can be recollected via inquiry.  I fully support both Plato and Descartes in their beliefs that there are certain ideas that have not been fabricated but rather "have their own true and immutable natures," but am wondering if this is a sound argument for the existence of God (AT 64).  I understand how it applies to and works for the idea of a triangle or some other mathematical figure.  The nonexistence of such things is impossible; one cannot even attempt to disprove their nature.  The existence of God, however, is an argument that has taken many forms and resulted in varied conclusions.  I am having trouble determining whether this approach is strong enough to support such a claim.  Is this something that each individual clearly and distinctly knows, as Descartes argues?  

Descartes & the Plato/Aristotle Dialogue

For this reason alone the entire class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing's "end," I judge to be utterly useless in physics. It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inquiring into the ends of God.

Descartes, Meditation Four, A&T 55

In the quoted passage, Descartes attempts to eliminate the Aristotelian procedure of determining a thing's use by its "end." Last time, Peter brought up neoplatonism as it relates to Descartes's "ideas" (cf. A&T83, about 6/16ths of the way down, for a possibly relevant passage). Plato looked up to the Forms, and Aristotle attempted to work more empirically; we see a somewhat similar situation here with Descartes and Bacon respectively.

Can we elaborate on this dialogue? In what ways is Descartes neoplatonic? How does his attempt to establish a basis of knowledge upon "clear and distinct perception" fit into the comparison to Plato? How would he respond to Bacon or Aristotle?

P.S. When I began reading Descartes for this class, I had forgotten how important he had been to me when I first read him Freshman year. I have always considered Descartes to be captivating: he is careful, logical, and apparently sensible. The thing he seeks is also enchanting: a pure basis for knowledge, obtained by mere meditation. I find "I think, therefore I am" to be a beautiful idea, even though I think it assumes more than he purports. His skepticism still strikes me deeply, but as much as I disagree that there is any basis for knowledge other than belief I find his notion of "clear and distinct perception," especially as described on the last two paragraphs of Meditation Four and on A&T 68-70, to be an excellent procedure by which one could determine what one truly believes and attain to it. Despite not actually agreeing with what he says, for what it's worth, I think Descartes is really worth paying close attention to.

Clear and Distinct is Unclear

But whatever type of argument I use, it always comes down to the fact that the only things that fully convince me are those that I clearly and distinctly perceive. And although some of these things I thus perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and inquire carefully, nevertheless, once they have been discovered, they are considered no less certain than the others (Meditiations, A&T 68-69).

I think it is agreed that Descartes intends his conclusions, of his existence and God, to be objective. This quote provides further evidence. First, it implicitly claims that Descartes' conclusions are certain. Second, it explicitly claims that people are not looking close enough or inquiring carefully if they disagree with the conclusions. The verb "discovered" indicates that Descartes believes his conclusions' reality are independent of an individual's deliberance.

But there is much disagreement regarding Descartes' principle criterion for accepting something as reality - his "clear and distinct perception." Is it relativism or a true revelation of reality? I found it interesting, but perhaps no help to the present question, that Descartes likens this "clear and distinct perception" to a conformation to "the good and the true" (58). According to Descartes, clearly and distinctly perceiving something is not a subjective, internal belief: "A great light in my intellect gave way to a great inclination in my will" (59). It seems that Descartes is saying that his reason did not ultimately ascertain his existence and God, but an external force that drew his will.