law and grace

Chapter 14:

"So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptation of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or opther strong desire, but the feareof that Invisible Power, which they everyone Worship as God."

"When the tranferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another; . . . or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion . . . This is not Contract, but Gift, Free-gift, Grace."

To continue Miriam's general direction about Hobbes's reading ("rereading?") of Christianity, I wonder how his understanding of the origins of the commonwealth and the nature of humans without commonwealth relate to general biblical understanding.

How is his "state of nature" different from the Roman Catholic idea?

Hobbes believes religion is necessary for the securing of common law and peace. Thus, he takes a distinctly sociopsychopolitical approach to religion. Does his rhetoric of the practicality of religion undermine religion itself or reinforce it?

Moreover, his language of "grace" is distinctly biblical. Is he changing the biblical ideas to suit his own model, or are they mutually compatible?

Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.  Ch. 14, p. 190.

I laughed out loud when I read this new twist on an old gem.  Hobbes has reinvented the Golden Rule to be not so much a positive "the more love you give away the more you shall get in return," but a defensive "don't give people any more credit than you know they should give to you."  Is this really the law of the Gospel?  Is this really how we should think of one another and of ourselves?

Hobbes in this text seems to be trying to get people to take reframe the way they look at themselves, at religion, and at a common-wealth and ask themselves if the beliefs they had previously held on these topics are really the way things are.  He seems to be trying to ground everything in reality and no longer support common notions just because they are common especially if these notions have become overly romanticized.  Is this a breath of fresh air or a digression into just another extreme?

Was God created out of fear?

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods were at first created by humane fear: Which spoken of the Gods, is very true...But the acknowledging of one Eternall, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertures, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in the time to come. (Part 1: Chapter 12. Page 170)

The question of the creation of religion is brought up in this passage. Was religion created out of a sense of fear, security, or inspiration? In our Catholic view, we do believe that Jesus created Christianity. But what about the basic roots of A religion in general. Not neccesarily our Christian religion, but the praise and glory of a higher being? What sparked human interest in praising something that might not even exist? Is it as Hobbes says, out of fear? 

Language and Fact

"No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing." (Part 1, Chpt VII, paragraph 3, [p.131])

Besides being confused by the end of this passage (even after several attempts), and finding my confusion ironic since Hobbes puts such an emphasis on language as the root of knowledge, I found myself wondering not only how Bacon and Descartes would take this, but how we should react. Can we only know what is conditional? Or are the efforts made by Bacon and Descartes legitimate, and should we follow suit in attempting to find absolute knowledge? I found the bit about memory to be quite similar to our discussion about Descartes (how do we know memory is real/correct), but Descartes seemed to be able to push past that. So I guess I'm also wondering if the sense and memory objection is valid? I apologize for any convolution in my language, and hope that this post can reach your understanding.

A Taste of Reason and Anthropology in Hobbes, Compared with Descartes

"He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do... yet...the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration" (End of introduction, Macpherson ed p83)

"That is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it" (Part I, Ch 3, Mac ed p. 96)

"For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be take for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it" (I,5,112)

At the end of the introduction Hobbes seems to propose or presuppose an objective structure of man such that he can know Man-kind by knowing himself and such that other men can verify what he says in themselves. He also states explicitly in the introduction that "the similitude of the Passions, which are the same in all men...not the similitude of the objects of the Passions" (82-83). Descartes seemed to make a similar assumption that what worked for him was the correct method for good reasoning.

In part one, ch 3, Hobbes establishes that a constant ("regulated, guided") train of thought is only possible through the presence of desire. He suggests that in this way the end will be kept always in mind and wandering thoughts will be "quickly again reduced into the way" (96). This method of thought regulated by desire seems much different from the indifferent intellection of Descartes. We had even wondered if Descartes was an ascetic.

But in ch 5, Hobbes praises mathematical reasoning and insists that certain comes about much the way Descartes thought, with a building up of consequences (112). Hobbes characterizes the passions as being harmful to right reason (see third quote above).

To what extent does Hobbes presuppose or propose a common humanity, if he does? How does the desire that allows constant thought differ from passions? What is the place of desire in relation to reason for Hobbes? For Descartes? Who is closer to the truth?