Christian Motivation

Let us now speak according to our natural lights (418).

This is building off of patt-man's post. The above quote is the prelude to the Wager. Here, Pascal seems interested in finding a position without revelation, only using "natural" reason. He does not prove the tenants of the Christian faith, but only the absurdity of choosing disbelief in God, or at least the non-absurdity of belief in God, to counter mockers of believers.

However, the Wager raises a broader problem with popular Christian motivation in general. Pascal here is not concerned with the truth content of belief as much as the imperative motivation to belief. But one who believes in God in the method of the Wager is not altruistic or loving, but only patient. That is, she would post-pone immediate enjoyment (the wagering of life now) for eternal and infinite happiness later. Heaven and hell are her ultimate motivating factors, not truth/untruth or right/wrong. Is this satisfactory? (Clearly, I think this is not satisfactory . . .)

Original sin, mercy/justice, love

695 (0r 445 for you, Blogmaster): Original sin is folly in the eyes of men, but it is put forward as such...but this folly is wiser than all men's wisdom, it is wiser than men.  For without it, what are we to say man is?  His whole state depends on this imperceptible point.

This is exactly what I brought up at the end of last class.  For Pascal, you can say nothing about men without original sin, that is, you can say nothing about men without viewing them through a Christian lens.  Is he really right about this?  If you take away this lens is there really nothing to be said?  I feel like a lot of non-Christian people have quite a bit to say about men.  Is original sin absolutely required or is Pascal's preoccupation with original sin (and his own reverence for Christian custom) the Achilles heel of this whole text?

But since I brought this up last time I'll say something in another vein as well.

418 (233): God's justice must be as vast as his mercy. Now his justice towards the damned is less vast and ought to be less startling to us than his mercy towards the elect.

I'm certainly more startled by God's justice towards the damned than his mercy to the elect because who is damned and who is elect? Why am I more startled by damnation than eternal life? Is it because I don't have the appropriate level of focus on what will happen to me after I die? Also,

421 (535): It is untrue that we are worthy to be loved by others. It is unfair that we should want such a thing.

What does Pascal think about love? What does he mean "it is unfair that we should want such a thing"? It is unfair of God to make us desire the love of others?

Two Things at Once

"A single thought is enough to occupy us: we cannot think of two things at once." 523 (145)

This line really struck me. It seemed to me that this entire time, Pascal has been trying to tell us how we need to know God and ourselves, our wretchedness and our capability for God, Jesus Christ as Divine and mortal, etc. I realize that these can be seen as one thought each, but he has been telling us (sorry, I can't remember where) that we are not looking to go to one side or even, as I got confused with last time, in the middle of two things, but rather to envelop them in their totality. God is eternal, and inasmuch encompasses 'abandonment and protection' in their respective infinities. It seems to me somewhat difficult to say, 'think of this infinite thing, and then think of the opposite infinite thing, and combine them into one, eternal yet encompassed thing.' I suppose it is like contemplating God's infinity but, it seems somewhat contradictory to me. But in case this is not really a great question, another thought (a second, if you will...) had been bothering me as I read.

"Wretchedness. The only thing that consoles us for our miseries is diversion. And yet it is the greatest of our miseries. For it is that above all which prevents us thinking about ourselves and leads us imperceptibly to destruction. But for that we should be bored, and boredom would drive us to seek some more solid means of escape, but diversion passes our time and brings us imperceptibly to our death." 414 (171)

"Without examining every particular kind of occupation it is sufficient to put them all under the heading of diversion." 478 (137)

With all of Pascal's talk of wretchedness and our necessary diversion from it, and furthered by this second quote, I started wondering if Pascal's occupation in writing these thoughts was simply a diversion. Maybe he is right, and we are wretched by nature. But perhaps it is also natural that we recognize our wretched state, not because of religion, and this is why we divert ourselves. Maybe we are wretched because there is no life after death, and since we have no way to cope with our own finiteness, we divert ourselves by playing games or playing poker or dreaming up deities and corresponding religions to give some meaning to our existence. I'm guessing Pascal would point to his wager, saying 'no way to know, so why not?,' but that just really isn't satisfactory to me, even though that has been one rationalization I myself use for being religious.

So, is Pascal consciously asking us to think beyond our means when he asks us to consider the union of two infinite opposites? Is he simply diverting himself from his own wretchedness?

Order. I should be much more afraid of being mistaken and then finding out that Christianity is true than of being mistaken in believing it to be true. 386

Early on in section II, we come across this quote from Pascal. With regards to religion, in relation to this quote, it would seem hard to pin down exactly what Pascal believes. It seems that we have two options here: Not believing in God, then being pleasantly surprised when he actually does exist. Or, believing in God, and then being completely let down if he does not exist. It would seem as though living a life completely devoted to a being or divine spirit and then realizing that it does not exist would be one of the biggest misfortunes a mortal being could endure. Is Pascal simply telling us not to get our hopes up? If God does exist, great! But if he doesn't, at least you prepared yourself... Is this the right mindset to have toward faith? What is the right one to have?

An Empty Wager?

"'You want to be cured of unbelief and you ask for the remedy: learn from those who were once bound like you and who now wager all they have... They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile.' - 'But that is what I am afraid of.' - 'But why? What have you to lose? But to show you that this is the way, the fact is that this diminishes the passions which are your great obstacles...'" (near end of 418, p125 common ed; #233 for Brennan, I'm guessing).

At the risk of stealing someone's post, I'm going to pose a question about Pascal's wager. Namely, can someone who wagers for God's existence truly have faith and truly be happy, by Pascal's own standards?

Now, at first glance it seems that he thinks happiness is to be won. "Here there is an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won" (418, p123).

However, it seems that the content of one's belief might be reduced to a simple choice faced with risk, a succumbing to fear (of hell) and not love (of God), or an essentialy orthopraxic concept of faith in which one just goes through the motions. This last option is what is addressed by my quote, which comes near the end of the wager discussion. There is a footnote on the word docile, and I quote, "That is, the unbeliever will act unthinkingly and mechanically..." (p125). Now, this footnote may or may not reflect the sense of that line - I think it's a bit hazy. I think it depends on how much Pascal requires one to invest in the choice/wager. But if it is right, and Pascal acknoweldges this unthinking activity as the result of taking the wager, how does this type of mindless practice square with the more nuanced descriptions of faith that he has given in other pensees? The wager seems to cheat the more reason-heavy portraits of faith to get them to the results of the heart-heavy portraits of faith, without the God given content of the heart-heavy portraits of faith with an annihilation of thinking at the end. A suave move, but is it legit?

Furthermore, the wager does not make use of revelation or references to Christ. This omission is problematic because he had previously informed us that Jesus Christ was the only way to God, and that those who came to know God without Jesus both forgot their elevated and heavy discourse and doomed themselves because of their pride. He echos this sentiment in the reading for today with his words on arguments for God's existence from nature: "Such knowledge, without Christ, is useless and sterile... I should not consider that he had made much progress towards his salvation" (449, p141, (556)).

But yet, Pascal was so excited about his wager. "How these words fill me with rapture and delight! -" (418, p125). And the last sentence of my first quote suggests that perhaps the wager = the Machine. "Write the letter about removing obstacles, that is the argument about the Machine, how to prepare it and how to use reason for the search" (11, p4, (246)). What then, is the point of the wager, and what does Pascal hope to accomplish by it? To what kind of 'faith' is he trying to sway people who love logical games? Perhaps it is simply a starting point to get peoples' big heads out of the way. Or perhaps what needs to be gotten out of the way is the passions, and while he might draw a distinction between his common claim that man cannot remove all passion and simply reducing harmful passions, there still remains the question about how passions could be reduced by an intellectual wager.

Pascal I

Caesar was too old, it seems to me, to go off and amuse himself conquering the world. Such a pastime was all right for Augustus and Alexander; they were young men, not easily held in check, but Caesar ought to have been more mature (II.49).

Description of man. Dependence, desire for independence, needs (IV.78).

I have put up two completely unrelated passages. Concerning the first: I found this passage extremely funny, and while this surely outs me as a nerd, I also wonder if Pascal was trying to be somewhat amusing. This is a question that I often ask the PLS thinkers, and this was the occasion that I found that Pascal was making a humorous attempt. Was he? As for the second passage: Is this truly the state of man? And if so, how does the compare to the view that Hobbes puts forth, in that all men desire to be peaceful, so that all men desire to join in community? These two viewpoints see to be opposed to each other. Are they? What does this do to ones view of Hobbes and to ones view of Pascal?

Believing in God

Do not be astonished to see simple people believing without argument.  God makes them love him and hate themselves.  He inclines their hearts to believe.  We shall never believe, with an effective belief and faith, unless God inclines our hearts, and we shall believe as soon as he does so. (380)

I was most interested in Pascal's final thoughts on the way in which we come to know God.  Until this point, the discourse had stressed the sound proofs of Christ's existence in terms of Scripture passages and prophecies that have been fulfilled.  Now, Pascal tells us that the truest way of knowing God is via some internal inclination.  While this certainly seems to be the most genuine form of religion, it is entirely separate from the other methods that had been described.  Are they alone sufficient ways of knowing God?  Is the man whose heart is inclined by God more religious than he who believes due to Scripture and prophecies? (These may seem like questions that Pascal has answered in the conclusion. I'm wondering if in doing so he has rejected or built on and perfected his earlier thoughts?)

Pascal I

"The only good thing for men therefore is to be diverted from thinking of what they are . . . but they do not answer like that because they do not know themselves" (#136, second part is much further on)

"One must know oneself. Even if that does not help in finding truth, at least it helps in running one's life, and nothing is more proper . . ." (#72)

"We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart . . . principles are felt, propositions proved . . ." (#110)

". . . it is most valuable to represent both to him. Man must . . . know both [animals and angels, to which his nature is related]." (#121)

"Thus we can know God properly only by knowing our own iniquities." (#189)

"I want him to consider nature just once, seriously and at leisure, and to look at himself as well . . ." (#199)

"The Christian religion alone is appropriate for all, being a blend of external and internal." (#219)

As I read, I was most interested in whether or not Pascal thought truth should be found by looking inside oneself. I have a bias towards this view, so I was on the lookout for quotes concerning this issue, which is why I have so many... sorry! But anyway. First Pascal seemed to agree, then he very clearly said the opposite, and finally he seemed to return to his original point of view. Does he mean that it is not enough to only look at oneself? I can agree with that, but isn't looking inwards still the proper starting point? Isn't this what Pascal himself did? But he also said that to consider oneself, to be alone with one's thoughts, is to be unhappy. Is worldly happiness so important then? Are we really unhappy when we think of ourselves? Should't we have a dual feeling to fit our dual natures, both exultation and despair?

Pascal and Doubt

It is clear that Pascal finds much at issue with Descartes both in his strong language ("I cannot forgive Descartes" 77) and in his writing (his rejection of studies of oneself, e.g. Montaigne, as frivolous, &c.).

I cannot help drawing a connection between the two, however:

...this is what makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to end. When we think we attach ourselves to any point and fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. Nothing stays for us. This is our natural condition, and yet most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses.
(72)

As a result of this uncertainty "we hate truth and those who tell it to us" (100), and we fear solitude or lack of diversion (cf. 139). Our reason, our senses, and our imagination all become forces of self-delusion. Descartes's doubt had a methodological purpose, and by and large proceeded somewhat calmly even as he razed down his beliefs; similarly, he resolved his problems with a divine 'finger snap.'

Pascal's unflinching look at humanity, however, places humans in an uncomfortable middle position, tangled between skepticism and dogmatism, between knowledge and doubt, reason and nature. How does this view of humanity compare and contrast with Descartes's doubt? In which aspects does it provide for less certainty and in which for more? What do you make of the ever-increasing hunger in the authors we've read thus far to really get at the nature of humanity, to strip away any and all pretense?

Pascal's Heart

We know the truth not only through our reason but through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to refute them . . . Our inability must therefore serve only to humble reason, which would like to be the judge of everything, but not to confute our certainty (Pensees 110).

It is intriguing to discover the personality of Pascal, who I previously knew as an international unit of pressure.

Here again is a discussion of truth and the human method of grasping it. Aquinas delineated three avenues of obtaining Truth (with a capital "T") - knowledge, opinion, and faith. Hobbes claimed there is no avenue to obtain Truth since all our knowledge is conditional; something is true if it follows a logical deduction from "if this is, then this is" constructions dependent on an agreed definition, and we can never know something that simply "is." Blaise advocates a separate avenue, the "heart." As the introduction states, the heart comprehends "pre-rational first principle and assenting to supra-rational propositions" (xxiii). As a further element that differentiates the heart from any other avenue, the heart is not controlled by us (100). What exactly does he mean by the heart? Is it closely analogous to Descartes' clear and distinct perception? How does it reconcile with Pascal's Hobbesian belief that true (perhaps True) justice is following the customs of one's country, a first principle seemingly derived from observing the inconsistent beliefs of humanity (86).

Modern Pascal

The whole of faith consists in Jesus Christ and Adam and the whole of morality in concupiscence and grace. # 226 (p. 72)

Perpetuity. This religion consists in believing that man has fallen from a state of glory and communion with God into a state of gloom, penitence and estrangement from God, but that after this life we shall be restored by a promised Messiah, and it has always existed on earth. # 281 (p. 90)

The first sentence concerned me. We now, as Christians, accept that the story of Adam and Eve is a figurative tale intended to explain why mankind isn't perfect. However, I feel that Pascal's proofs of Christianity are so much tidier because he has a firm belief that the world is 6,000 years old and that Adam was a flesh and blood individual. Once we start saying Adam and Eve is figurative, the Flood is figurative, Sodom and Gomorrah are figurative, all the way down the line, I feel we need to ask "Then why should the prophecies be taken literally?" and Pascal also claims that "The most weighty proofs of Jesus are the prophecies (# 335). If Pascal were to hear the modern take that we hold (more or less) the entire Old Testament figuratively, would he still hold onto his proof by prophecy?

I take his second quote to be Pascal's "Thesis of Christianity." I feel that it boils all the elements of his theology into its base components (it's like a dorm party that way). This sentence seems equally legitimate whether or not Adam or Noah were literal human beings - he even puts the language more passively. Does this Pensee hold up if the same critical interpretation of the Bible is applied to it?