Hobbes and 1984

So:

Liberty, or Freedome, sgnifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition... p. 261

Plus

A Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to do. (262)

Brings me to:

...when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will; It is there fore the action, of one that was free... (262)

Hobbes conception of liberty is ultimatly one of the most crucial pillars of his philosophy. As much as I would like to agree with the Augustinian "We are the most free when we always choose to do God's will" viewpoint, I tend to agree with Hobbes that freedom is the absence of opposition. The second quote seems to get extra sticky when taken in Hobbes' philosophy, since he acknolwedges that "free-will" is an oxymoron (or an absurditie to use his language). By adding the phrase "what he has a will to doe" changes the meaning of the statement (in my reading) to mean we wouldn't need civil liberties for actions we have no will to commit, such as flag burning. Finally, as much as I don't want to accept the third quote, it seems consistent and valid with what Hobbes has been showing so far: If humans are essentially just reasonable beasts, if all theology is meant be taken merely as "Augustine's opinion," and if there is no "free-will" since all actions were determined by the first mover, then I am inclined to believe in Hobbes conception of liberty, and for the most part, his entire Leviathan. I would really love to bring in 1984 into this discussion, since so much of the novel seems to be a response to Hobbes' principles. 

At the climax of 1984, Winston is broken by O'Brien. The novel ends with an apathetic Winston noting that his relationship with Julia was "ungood." (Orwell, like Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes uses the idea that imprecise langauge can destroy what it means to be human). Finally, Winston accepts the Party's view of life, celebrates a recent battle victory over Eurasia, and the narrator acknowledges that for the first time in his life, Winston loves Big Brother. My question is: If Hobbes were to read Big Brother, would he actually have a problem with the society Orwell puts forth? Is there anything in particular in Orwell's that would make Hobbes say, "No! You got it wrong! This is a dystopia!"

--I appologize if this question leads too far out of the text, and not back into it, but 1984 might be my favorite novel, and it seems like to good of an opportunity to pass up.

Hobbes Pt. II

I don't have a quote, but I did find it interesting that someone who is supposed to be completely anti-Aristotle comes to the same conclusion as Aristotle on the best form of government. What is it about both Aristotle's and Hobbes' systems that lend themselves to monarchy, and how is our system so different that it lends itself to democracy?

Connection to Aristotle's Politics

For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy...(240)

While reading Part II, I couldn't help but notice strong similarities between Hobbes' method of explaining the Common-wealth and that of Aristotle in his discussion of regimes in Politics.  Both identify three ideal forms of government: rule by one, rule by part, and rule by all.  There are, in Aristotle's words, "deviations" from each of these forms.  Hobbes refers to these as "the same Formes misliked" (240).  The only discrepancy comes in their thoughts on rule by all.  For Aristotle, Polity, a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy, is the best regime and Democracy is a deviation of it.  As the quotation above tells us, Hobbes believes that Democracy is the proper form.  I find it interesting that what was a "deviation" for Aristotle is the best form of rule in Hobbes' time.  What happened to the idea of Polity?  How did Democracy become and remain the ideal form?  

There is no power on earth to be compared with him (Job).

The inscription and image on the front cover serve to instill fear, Hobbes' believed impediment to power, in a commenwealth's people. I think it is sort of an inverse vantage point to Machiavelli; both believe in ruling by fear, but Machiavelli views the principle from the ruler's stance whereas Hobbes seems to view it from the people's. Machiavelli advocates fear as a necessity to the ruler, and Hobbes advocates fear as a necessity to the people.

As mentioned in last class, it's ironic how Hobbes uses art and figurative language to form the Leviathan (the image, not the work). I believe he does so to take advantage of a metaphor's "deception" (102), straying from reason and pursuing indefiniteness for the sake of instilling fear. I read some of Job 41, from which the quote on the cover was extracted. Pretty intense. And just look at the cover. Imagine one of those little guys starting to break away from the group, and the big guy slowly shifts his gaze towards the wanderer and decimates him with his broadswoard. Or smashes him with that thingy in his left. I'm sleeping with the light on tonight.

Hobbes Part II

". . . they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it . . ." (229)

". . . there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection . . ." (230)

". . . because the major part hath by consenting voices decared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest . . ." (231)

". . . they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification." (232)

". . . it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall . . ." (233)

Hobbes describes these and other "Rights of Soveraignes" in Chap. XVIII. As I read, I instinctively balked at many of them - particularly that the sovereign's judgement is final and that the sovereign may never be deposed. To a certain extent this is due only to Hobbes' language: if one replaces "Soveraigne" with "government" (as Hobbes allows when he writes that the ruling body may be either an individual or an assembly), his statements don't seem so radical. However, even with this change, I wonder to how many of Hobbes' "Rights of Soveraignes" we have consciously or unconsciously agreed. Could even his statements about censorship be reconciled with our modern/American government? What about the government making moral or factual judgments, as with abortion - is this the place of government, and if one's personal judgments differ, how is one to respond?

law and grace

Chapter 14:

"So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptation of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or opther strong desire, but the feareof that Invisible Power, which they everyone Worship as God."

"When the tranferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another; . . . or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion . . . This is not Contract, but Gift, Free-gift, Grace."

To continue Miriam's general direction about Hobbes's reading ("rereading?") of Christianity, I wonder how his understanding of the origins of the commonwealth and the nature of humans without commonwealth relate to general biblical understanding.

How is his "state of nature" different from the Roman Catholic idea?

Hobbes believes religion is necessary for the securing of common law and peace. Thus, he takes a distinctly sociopsychopolitical approach to religion. Does his rhetoric of the practicality of religion undermine religion itself or reinforce it?

Moreover, his language of "grace" is distinctly biblical. Is he changing the biblical ideas to suit his own model, or are they mutually compatible?

Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.  Ch. 14, p. 190.

I laughed out loud when I read this new twist on an old gem.  Hobbes has reinvented the Golden Rule to be not so much a positive "the more love you give away the more you shall get in return," but a defensive "don't give people any more credit than you know they should give to you."  Is this really the law of the Gospel?  Is this really how we should think of one another and of ourselves?

Hobbes in this text seems to be trying to get people to take reframe the way they look at themselves, at religion, and at a common-wealth and ask themselves if the beliefs they had previously held on these topics are really the way things are.  He seems to be trying to ground everything in reality and no longer support common notions just because they are common especially if these notions have become overly romanticized.  Is this a breath of fresh air or a digression into just another extreme?

Was God created out of fear?

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods were at first created by humane fear: Which spoken of the Gods, is very true...But the acknowledging of one Eternall, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertures, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in the time to come. (Part 1: Chapter 12. Page 170)

The question of the creation of religion is brought up in this passage. Was religion created out of a sense of fear, security, or inspiration? In our Catholic view, we do believe that Jesus created Christianity. But what about the basic roots of A religion in general. Not neccesarily our Christian religion, but the praise and glory of a higher being? What sparked human interest in praising something that might not even exist? Is it as Hobbes says, out of fear? 

Language and Fact

"No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing." (Part 1, Chpt VII, paragraph 3, [p.131])

Besides being confused by the end of this passage (even after several attempts), and finding my confusion ironic since Hobbes puts such an emphasis on language as the root of knowledge, I found myself wondering not only how Bacon and Descartes would take this, but how we should react. Can we only know what is conditional? Or are the efforts made by Bacon and Descartes legitimate, and should we follow suit in attempting to find absolute knowledge? I found the bit about memory to be quite similar to our discussion about Descartes (how do we know memory is real/correct), but Descartes seemed to be able to push past that. So I guess I'm also wondering if the sense and memory objection is valid? I apologize for any convolution in my language, and hope that this post can reach your understanding.

A Taste of Reason and Anthropology in Hobbes, Compared with Descartes

"He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do... yet...the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration" (End of introduction, Macpherson ed p83)

"That is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it" (Part I, Ch 3, Mac ed p. 96)

"For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be take for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it" (I,5,112)

At the end of the introduction Hobbes seems to propose or presuppose an objective structure of man such that he can know Man-kind by knowing himself and such that other men can verify what he says in themselves. He also states explicitly in the introduction that "the similitude of the Passions, which are the same in all men...not the similitude of the objects of the Passions" (82-83). Descartes seemed to make a similar assumption that what worked for him was the correct method for good reasoning.

In part one, ch 3, Hobbes establishes that a constant ("regulated, guided") train of thought is only possible through the presence of desire. He suggests that in this way the end will be kept always in mind and wandering thoughts will be "quickly again reduced into the way" (96). This method of thought regulated by desire seems much different from the indifferent intellection of Descartes. We had even wondered if Descartes was an ascetic.

But in ch 5, Hobbes praises mathematical reasoning and insists that certain comes about much the way Descartes thought, with a building up of consequences (112). Hobbes characterizes the passions as being harmful to right reason (see third quote above).

To what extent does Hobbes presuppose or propose a common humanity, if he does? How does the desire that allows constant thought differ from passions? What is the place of desire in relation to reason for Hobbes? For Descartes? Who is closer to the truth?