But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods. (484)

This is coming in late so I'll make it quick. I want to make it clear that my problem is not attributed to Adama Smith; he seems to be a scientist commenting on the present system. But, as I was arguing with one of my friends who is a stuanch libertarian, I have a problem with a system that thrives off of human self-interest, and when I made this point, he stated: "greed is a natural human trait." I want to rehash Rousseau's question: "Is greed a result of a natural tendency or is it a result of a current society?" We have advanced beyond imagination under this system, but there have been other effects...

Adam Smith Part II

"That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident."

- Book IV, Chapter 2, pg 482

I don't quite understand the analogy Smith draws between this protectionism and the individual. He later argues that by seeking his own benefit, an individual unbewittingly seeks the benefit of his society. Because the person does not actively seek his society's benefit, Smith says that this case is analagous to that of the society that tries to protect itself. But I don't understand how the two fit together. If society is like an individual, shouldn't it seek its own gain, and precisely by doing so, aid the "general industry"? I'm not sure if I'm mixing up terms or what, but this analogy just isn't making sense to me.

Adam Smith's reliance on his proposed end for human society

The sole ostensive function of this post is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's conclusions presume a system of value, and further that this system of value is not the only reasonable one through which it is valid to make decisions with regard to one's life, education, and, as a matter of fact, economics. Really, that's all you need to know. I apologize for the length of this post and hope that your curiosity will not take you much farther than that summation I've just given you.

...though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would be deprived either of employment or subsistence... [they] may seek for it in another trade or in another place...
(IV.II, p. 499, 501)

Will a business be able to compete in the near future without outsourcing? In today's world, such a thing is lethal for a business; one must make the economical choice or some other business or country will make it first.

His solution here doesn't exactly seem as neat as he might have hoped. Other trades might not be available; and the brief "in another place" suggests a lack of concern for those people making the decision to leave their homes in search of a job.

I bring this modern reference up to demonstrate that Adam Smith really does have his finger on the pulse of the postmodern world. The economic choice is the only choice. We say, nobody can blame a CEO for layoffs; we say he or she had no choice in the matter. It simply had to be done.

A study of Adam Smith quickly reveals where this irresistible impetus originates. He suggests that labor is the currency of value; but why is this so? Why ought labor have value? When he speaks of education: why ought education in "utilities" be most important?

He says the following in order to compare the ancient instructional M.O. of utility and the modern educational structure:

In the ancient philosophy the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life [emphasis added]. In the modern philosophy it was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life...
V.I.III.2, p. 830

The entire goal of the nation in his view is happiness; or, perhaps, subsistence; or, perhaps, defense; take your pick. They each need the others. In any case a good person is only useful for Smith insofar as they add to the common defense and happiness:

Unless those few [ingenuous barbarians], however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honorable to themselves, may contribute very little to good government or happiness of their society.
V.I.III.2, p. 841, also cf. p. 845

It would appear as though happiness is the only thing of use in this life, and that, therefore, since philosophy, ethics, and any amount of education beyond utility do note necessarily take happiness as their aim, they can be of no purpose to anyone, anywhere, except in a monastery. It is as though the entire nobility of the human race, from the poorest starving child to the pompous aristocrat, were to consist entirely in our ability to feed and clothe and defend ourselves. It is as though the entire function of humanity could be exhausted with a purpose as dignified as the satisfaction of an itch.

To reiterate my purpose: Adam Smith quite accurately captures a system of value carried out well so as to achieve the ends of that system of value. It ought not be supposed, however, that this system of value, that is, that whose end is subsistence, defense, and/or happiness, is the only system of value by which it is reasonable for a human person to act. Beyond this my post has no purpose other than to suggest the alternative. I do not feel that anything beyond this point has any merit whatsoever for class discussion, given that it is entirely beyond the text. However, the notion that he presupposes a not rock-solid goal for humanity might be useful to keep in the back of our minds.

Certain people we have read have suggested that moral law, or, for example, The City of God, might supplant this as a system of value. There are other examples of systems of value by which one might act, and, in fact, make economic decisions. But these, as Smith notes, are not concerned with this life.

It may be possible, instead, that the function of human society ought to have something to do with the nature of humanity itself. Under Smith's system of utility, it would appear that humanity is just another animal whose capacities for thought, love, and self-awareness amount to a clever means toward survival; that is, the elements which constitute humanity are just means to an animalistic end. It seems more reasonable, to me at least, to suppose that humanity's end ought to involve, in some way, well, humanity. As opposed to Smith over there, supplying us with pins and chewing gum.

Humanity has a biological history, by which we evolved; it has a socioeconomic history, by which we became better at supplying utilities; surely it is not completely ridiculous to suppose that we might have an ethical history too, by which we might become more thoughtful, or loving, or judicious? Given that it is the entire office of our existence, couldn't we, or shouldn't we be primarily concerned with becoming better people? "But we need to eat!" Ah, right. Forget about all this then.

Academia vs. Education

The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but dubtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated. (V.I.II) p. 830

The demand for such instruction [the arts and sciences the people deemed necessary or convenient] produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. p. 837

Personally, I really enjoyed Smith's riffing on the current academic system in England. To hear one who was a moral professor talk about the inefficiency, vanity, and frivolousness of much of the the higher education system was really a gas. I also found some of his stronger rhetoric (language) in these parts. It seems like he is content to merely describe the way the invisible hand guides people, but when it gets to the university system, Smith gets pumped and it shows in his writing. I think the Baconian feeling here of studying productive subjects (math and mechanics by name) is impossible to miss, and Smith also attacks the frivolouss focus on metaphysics. I'd like to talk about the second quote however. Smith is truly invested in educating the masses, both in how to read and write, and also how to live morally and couragously. There's a very populist mentality coming from the write who is stereotyped as being the number one proletariat oppresor. More specifically, I'd like to talk about the idea of a higher demand for knowledge resulting in better teachers and masters of the subject. Smith claims that every instructor were private, then only useful topics (reading, writing, accounting) would be taught. Does Smith want every worker's education to be like that of a woman - a course in solely the most pragmatic lessons (modesty, chastity, economy for women)? Can we expect music and the arts to properly flourish if we do not teach them? Finally, why should we expect a market made of button pushers who "generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become [!!!]" (840) to correctly determine the subjects that are necessary and conveniant?

Costs of Progress

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them.  Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. 1.  (pg. 753 in Cannan edition)

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization.  Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. 1. (pg. 764)

These two passages reminded me a lot of Rousseau, but they invoked different feelings than last week's readings did.  As some of you may remember, I understood Rousseau to be giving a sort of "that was then, this is now" message.  I was frustrated that his discourse makes readers ponder and potentially long for the "then" when it is impossible to revert back to the state of savage man.  In today's readings, Smith points to yet another fall that accompanies progress.  As society becomes more civilized, people become less warlike and thus defense of society is more costly.  Enhancements in artillery and the need for more extensive training of warriors are expensive and time-consuming.  By introducing the fiscal consequence of such advancements, Smith makes me wonder whether societal progress is worth it?  Now I'm just flat out discouraged.  Don't get me wrong, I love being a civilized human.  But there is something about a more primitive state that is appealing.  How do we confront reality while longing for the ideal? 

Wealth of Nations pt. II

Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no public institutions, are generally the best taught.

Smith here gives his support for private education, or so it seems. How well does this correspond with his teaching of the so-called "web of connectedness?" Does private education promote an attempt to seclude oneself from interaction with the outside world?