For we are not concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our understanding, but with nature as an object of possible experience; and in this case the understanding, since it makes experience possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all or that it is nature [namely, the existence of things determined according to universal laws]. (322, pg. 69)
Similar to the sentiments of some of my other group members, Kant confuses the you-know-what out of me. This passage is especially mind-boggling, and it's never a good sign when the conclusion of a part is inconclusive! So I'm hoping someone will be able to shed some light on this issue... Kant says that the sensuous world is 1) not an object of experience or 2) nature, which a few lines above is described as "an object of possible experience" in terms of our intelligible experience. So doesn't (2) contradict (1)? What is the distinction between these two conceptions of the sensuous world? Doesn't everything boil down to experience and our faculties of understanding our experiences?
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