Metapost: Tagging

As you are dying to know, the results of the poll were:

author: 6
book: 4
reading: 3

Unless someone feels strongly about this for some reason, I guess we'll use "author" "group #" and "book" for the tags. Again, I'll maintain them, but if you want to put them in like that that's great.

There is no poll now; if you want to make one, go to the Layout tab and add a gadget; poll is a choice.

Be that as it may,  have previously admitted many things as wholly certain and evident that nevertheless I later discovered to be doubtful.  What sort of things where these?  Why, the earth, the sky, the stars, and all the other things I perceived by means of the senses.  But what was it about these things that I clearly perceived?  Surely the fact that the ideas of thoughts of these things were hovering before my mind.  But even now I do not deny that these ideas are in me.

Meditations 35

Descartes makes a very profound distinction here between a thing and an idea of a thing.  Previously, we have read people (Cervantes, for example) who have distinguished between appearance and reality, but I think this is the first time someone has effectively severed particular things from the thought of them.

What are the implications of this?

Descartes seems to proceed along the same lines as Plato's character Timaeus, in positing different corresponding things for each kind of thought.  For thoughts of mutable things, there are uncertain objects.  For thoughts of entirely immutable things (or God), there must correspond an entirely certain object.

Is this Neoplatonic?  Does perfection generate (or "emanate") imperfection?  If so, why?  So far, God has no desire or impulse, only infinite qualities.  Why would such a philosophical God make an uncertain and imperfect world? 

So, I don't have a quote, but thinking along the lines of the principle of charity as Professor Affeldt encouraged us to do last class I'm wondering about Descartes' belief in God being based on his thought conception of God.  As I'm learning in my theology class Aquinas defines theology as faith seeking understanding.  It seems to require a great leap of faith that God exists in our understanding therefore an even more perfect God exists in reality, and I admire Descartes' trust both in his own faculties and in the possibility of a more perfect God than can exist in his own understanding.  We are also studying in my theology class how faith is rooted in experience and how one cannot assume universal experience of faith because each person's experience is different.  Learning about Descartes' experience is one way of understanding faith.  It may not be the same as my experience but it may be the same as others' and it certainly worked for him.  Is this all the validity a faith argument needs?

Christian Influence

Thus there remains only the idea of God. I must consider whether there is anything in this idea that cold not have originated from me I understand by the name "God" a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists--if anything else exists. Indeed all these are such that, the more carefully I focus my attention on them, the less possible it seems they could have arisen from myself alone. This from what has been said, I must conclude that God necessarily exists...76:45

Given that Decartes discusses at length his conception of the true power and capabilities of God, would we go about saying that he believes in a Christian God? He states that God is infinite and that "nothing can be added to his perfection." Does Descartes adopt a Christian attitude toward God, or does he create his own understanding? Under what notion does Descartes think that God is an actual existing thing, and how could we break down this argument? It seems that he might jump to quickly, or rather, that he simply assumes that since he is a thinking thing, that God must be a thinking thing. How does he get to this point? And how does he back it up?

Doubtful Analogies?

"But then were I perchance to look out my window and observe men crossing the square, I would ordinarily say I see the men themselves just as I say I see the wax. But what do I see aside from hats and clothes, which could conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be men. Thus what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind (Meditation 2, 32)."

Descartes often uses fascinating, brief analogies to illustrate his points. I wonder to what degree they work as well as to what degree he intends them to work. This particular analogy picks up on a question I have lingering from last class.

I will treat the question first. Basically, last class I got hung up on how (as it appeared to me) Descartes switched methods when he got to the superspecific fields of dioptrics and meteors (Discourse, 77). When the object of his inquiry got overly messy or practical or minute, I think that he (knowingly) started to rely on a posteriori effects to prove causes, rather than his standard use of a priori reasoning from causes to effects. To me, this reversal seems important precisely because it is not his main point--it seems to challenge his established method of finding certainties without empirical evidence.

What the quote is supposed to illustrate is how the apriori reasoning is what gives the certainty of what the thing is. In other words, Descartes knows the man is a man by a judgment of his mind, not because he saw their clothes. Similarly, he knows the wax is wax (whatever that is) by a judgment of his mind, and not because he touched, saw, felt, or smelt it. Is it actually possible to know what the wax is by thought alone? That is my question.

I will now examine the analogy. The first hurdle is that he sees the clothes. The clothes seem to be signs of the man that lies within. Are the qualities of the wax signs that point to the quantities that make up the essence of the wax, and which are only known by thought? From what Descartes has been saying all along about his method, it seems that the mind would have no need for signs. Should he be able to know that there are men crossing the street without even looking?

Perhaps a solution is to carry over the word see as a metaphor for the insight of the mind that grasps the wax's quantifiable essence. If we do this, then perhaps the mind "sees" the quantitative essence of the wax by adding up qualitative sensory information, a sort of mental equation, done (astoundingly) "silently and without words" (32).

But then where does the sensory information come from, if not the world? But he "has supposed [the world] to be nothing" (27). Yet he has also supposed the world to be mechanical and quantitative matter (20). I am confused. The point is that by relocating the analogy of the clothed men into the mind does not seem to have eliminated the need for some impact from the outside world.

Perhaps he simply means, "I judge them to be men" in spite of the possible deception of the appearence (i.e. that they could be robots. By the way, he probably meant the irony that is obvious with his conception of the mechanical body). But even so, how else could he judge them to be men unless he had the possibly deceptive appearance?

Unless some others of you "see" it better, it seems this analogy does not carry through far enough to be a help. It illustrates what can happen when one tries to use sensory processes to make an analogy to a process of the mind. Descartes seems to see the danger of this move; speaking in the synopsis of the third meditation, he writes, "Since my intent was to draw the minds of readers as far as possible from the senses, I had no desire to draw upon comparisons based upon corporeal things" (14). Is this one example simply a consequence of his brief laxity of the "reins" of the "confines of truth" (29-30)? Do any of you interpret this analogy in a different way that sheds better light upon my original question, or are there other analogies at key moments that should be called into question? How much is he relying on them and for what purpose? Do they help us beyond making us feel as if we understand something he said better? If so, how should we read them so as to get the truth without being mislead?

The Idea of God

"The whole force of the argument rests on the fact that I recognize that it would be impossible for me to exist, being of such a nature as I am (namely, having in me the idea of God), unless God did in fact exist." Meditation 3, A&T 52

I'm not sure that I understand how Descartes can say that God's existence is based on him having the idea of God. In the first meditation, Descartes says,

"For indeed when painters themselves wish to represent sirens and satyrs by means of especially bizarre forms, they surely cannot assign to them utterly new natures. Rather, they simply fuse together the members of various animals. Or if perhaps they concoct something so utterly novel that nothing like it has ever been seen before (and thus is something utterly fictitious and false), yet certainly at the very least the colors from which they fashion it ought to be true." etc. Meditation 1, A&T 20

So basically I do not understand how the idea of God has to mean that there is a God. Why couldn't the idea of God come from a combination of ideas, or be something "utterly novel?" Maybe I missed a big part of his explanation, but this is what stood out to me when I finished.

Descartes' Method

The first [rule] was never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such. (18)

I formulated a provisional code of morals . . . to obey the laws and customs of my country, constantly holding on to the religion which, by God's grace, I had been instructed from my childhood, and governing myself in everything else according to the most moderate opinions and htose furthest from excess. (22-23)

As I think several of my fellow posters have pointed out, Descartes claim of taking nothing for granted is perhaps not very strong. While he doubts a considerable amount, he leaves out at least one essential: his ability to reason logically and accurately. If indeed there were an "evil deceiver," wouldn't this deceiver be capable of twisting Descartes' mind so that what he believes to be logical is in fact a fallacy? "Je pense donc je suis" appears to be logical, both to Descartes and to us. But how do we know our perception of "logical" is not skewed? We can't know this, and neither can Descartes.

Therefore, Descartes does not doubt everything; he keeps faith in his reason. This would certainly appear to negate all his further claims (if his original premise - je pense donc je suis - is incorrect, all further conclusions must also be incorrect). However, I wonder if his method is nevertheless effective. I think that Descartes realizes that if he doubts his reason, he will never be able to know anything, and by studying the way in which he devises a "provisional code of morals" we can see more clearly his response to this difficulty. He decides that it is better to have faith in something than to doubt everything and accomplish nothing (this goes back to Dante, or Eliot, who argued that "the way up is the way down" and any movement is better than none). This may lead him to error, but at least he has a chance of discovering the truth. So, once again, he has placed that faith in his reason. How else could he choose the criteria for his morals? By what standards does he judge this provisional code?

Descartes’ method cannot give him complete or perfect knowledge, but it does provide a better basis for his beliefs. It helps him to apprehend more fully God, himself, and the created world, and this apprehension helps him live and strive productively. Although he does not state it as such, as long as he does not doubt his mind, this then must be his goal. Whether the world he senses is real is finally unimportant; Descartes cares not whether it is real, but how best to deal with it.

Descartes' Deception

My plan has never gone beyond trying to reform my own thoughts and building upon a foundation which is completely my own. And if, my work having pleased me sufficiently, I here show you a model of it, it is not for the reason that I would wish to advise anyone to imitate it (p. 9)

Before I comment on this excerpt, I want to agree with Brennan that perhaps our discussion should begin discussing the reliabilty of the first premise of Descartes' Method: to only accept things one can "clearly and distinctly" perceive.

As for the excerpt, I believe Descartes is being coy. For whatever reason - concealing discordance with the church or practicing the rhetorical device of humility - Descartes lies when he says he does not want anyone to imitate his model. The prerequisites (basically saying that, "if you're stupid then this is not for you") for using his method and the publication of the Discourse imply that Descartes wants to share his method to assert its influence on people's way of thinking.

Having said this, I believe premises such as the Method's first maxim and the cogito are meant to be more objective than subjective. And perhaps they are. In response to John's claim that the cogito is extremely subjective, I believe it is extremely objective. For if one were to be Baconian and conduct a survey, all participants would likely agree they were capable of independent thought. The cogito could be a proof of existence based on objective data rather than "clear and distinct perception." Or maybe I just have a "clear and distinct perception" that this is so. Ha....

Metapost: Little things

Don't worry about things like extraneous brackets and posts stuck inside the quote box. I will go through periodically and fix those things, or I can help with how to fix things like that by email.

I would also like to know how you guys want things to be tagged-- I will maintain that too-- so there is a poll to the side. This will affect how you find posts during finals. Do you want to search "bacon" or "bacon, reading 1" or "new organon," etc.?

I am working on a printer-friendly button, but until then copy/paste might have to do, sorry.

EDIT: The printer-friendly button works now, or ought to. Use it to minimize paper, etc.

Je pense, donc je suis

As much as I hope we get into chapter six and the way Descartes echoes, or expands upon, Bacon, I think the issues presented in Chapter 4 might be more prevalent in our minds during the first Descartes class, so I thought it might be useful to speak on that.

And noticing that this truth -- I think, therefore I am -- was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of philosophy I was seeking. --Descartes p.18

It would appear that shortly after this Descartes draws from this assertion the following conclusion:

And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this I think, therefore I am that assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I could see very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist, I judged that I could take as a very general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is merely some difficulty in properly discerning which are those that we distinctly conceive.

It is the most important observation I intend to make in this post that, despite being discovered by Descartes chronologically after his initial premise, this idea is logically prior to his je pense, donc je suis. That is to say, it is impossible to believe that this I think, therefore I am is true unless you first accept that things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly-- such as Descartes saw that cogito, ergo sum distinctly-- are true.

Is this really an acceptable grasping point? Surely there has existed at least one person who has converted from one religion to another, or has in some other way clearly and distinctly perceived something other than he or she clearly and distinctly perceived at an earlier date. Descartes seems to refer to this idea in other places: "anything the knowledge of which was not so natural to our souls that one could not even pretend to be ignorant of it" on page 24, "they are nearly all so evident that it is necessary only to understand them in order to believe them" on page 38, "common sense" and "reason" on page 43.

In what way is this apparent reliance on 'clear and distinct perception' in any way distinct from a confidence in one's beliefs? That is to say, Descartes seems to think he has struck upon something eminently true, and derived from it a system also eminently true. Let us leave his I think, therefore I am aside for a moment and face his most logically prior assumption: he asserts that what each individual sees clearly by reason / common sense to be true, is true. In what way is this distinct from, say, relativism?

From Anselm's Proslogion Chapter 3:

Not only does this something than which no greater can be conceived exist, but it exists in so true a sense that it cannot even be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to form the conception of an object whose non-existence shall be inconceivable; and such an object is of necessity greater than any object whose existence is conceivable: wherefore if that than which no greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist; it follows that that than which no greater can be conceived is not that than which no greater can be conceived [for there can be thought a greater than it, namely, an object whose non-existence shall be inconceivable]; and this brings us to a contradiction. And thus it is proved that that thing than which no greater can be conceived exists in so true a sense, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist: and this thing art Thou, O Lord our God! And so Thou, O Lord my God, existest in so true a sense that Thou canst not even be conceived not to exist.

I figure this will probably get brought up.

Discourse on Method: Doubt and Feasibility

...I thought it necessary that I do exactly the opposite, and that I reject as absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see whether, after this process, something in my beliefs remained that was entirely indubitable. Pg. 18

I was immediately struck by the similarity between this sentiment and Bacon's "if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin in doubts he shall end in certainties." Both use doubt as their cornerstone and have a lust for science with which they will become in Descartes word's (and Bacon's too...) "masters and possessors of nature (35)." They seem to be speaking the same language. I was struck, however, by one radical difference between the two. Bacon seems to stress the objective perspective for every issue, including philosophy, while there could be nothing more subjective than "I think, therefore I am." My more "conventional" question would be "how well do Bacon and Descartes reconcile with each other - Would Bacon be okay with Descartes' guidelines for finding one's first truth?" However, I would like to talk about the feasibility of any man attempting Descartes' plan for obtaining truth. Particularly, is this a text that many (or any) can base their lives off of, or is it impossible to truly doubt all things (as one might point  his seemingly flawed reasoning for 'I think, therefore I am as evidence)?

The Existence of God

"On the other hand, returning to examine the idea I had of a perfect being, I found that existence was contained in it in the same way in which the equality of its three angles to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, or that the equidistance of all its parts from its center is contained in the idea of a sphere, or even more plainly still, and that, consequently, it is, at the very least, just as certain that God, who is this perfect being, is or exists, as any demonstration in geometry could be."  pg. 21

After realizing that he is imperfect, Descartes determines that there is a more perfect being "upon which [he] depended, and from which [he] had acquired all..." (19).  This is God, whose existence is prior to and responsible for all others.  I find Descartes' argument to be based on assumptions rather than certainties.  For such a weighty topic, I expected more conclusive reasonings.  Descartes emphasizes the superiority of understanding to coming to know via senses and imagination, yet he fails to support his claim that God is the most perfect being with sound proofs (in my opinion).  It is, to him, one of those things that "you just know," like the fact that the sum of the three angles of a triangle equals the sum of two right angles.  In Phil Inq last semester, I had a problem with Descartes regarding his circular and flawed "I think, therefore I am" reasoning.  Again, I think that his ability to know and articulate his methodology is limited.  Is his reasoning sufficient or is it incomplete?  

End of Part 52

"For the curse did not make creation entirely and forever rebellious; but in virtue of that ordinance 'in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread,' by every kind of effort . . . it will at length in some measure be subdued so as to provide man with his bread, that is, the necessities of human life."

Professor Affeldt suggested Bacon's intentions for regaining the power of dominion over nature as a kind of Babel Tower approach.  I have two thoughts on this:

In the above quote, Bacon is not hoping to overthrow the curse of the Fall.  His thought is something like this: "We are supposed to have bread by the sweat of our brow, but we don't even have that!  We must sweat in natural philosophy so as to feed ourselves!  The curse did not say that we would starve!"

We, on the other hand, have taken his method (or the foundation it laid) and divorced it from necessity.  None of us are fed by the sweat of our brow; we rely on technology and the surpluses it allows, as well as the "free market" and the distribution of labor it generates, so that we can go to school, watch movies, eat tomatoes in January, and so on.  Also, we do not believe that women should be ruled by their "husbands," which is part of the curse.  Is this actually the dominion Bacon had in mind, to overthrow the curse?  Or did he only intend to make use of human efforts in a more effective way?

"For man by the fall fell at the same from his state of innocence and from his dominion over creation.  Both of these losses, however, can even in this life be in some part repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences...it is now by various labors (not certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labors) at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the uses of human life" (189).

These closing lines put an interesting cap on what we were talking about in the last class how Bacon despairs of just sitting around and contemplating things but charges Christians to seize their full humanity back as it was in the Garden of Eden through both faith and works.  He proclaims that "arts and sciences" can repair humanity's relationship with God, and I wonder how the arts fit into this given our discussion of how Bacon seems only preoccupied with experiment, data, and tv ratings.

This is an interesting progression from Sem III and the Julianesque "all will be well" mentality of throwing oneself over to the will of God.  Is it Bacon's frustration with exactly such thinking that makes him so action-oriented?  

Also, Bacon only alludes to men's punishment during the fall, that they must sweat for their bread, and Bacon offers redemption through faith and works only in terms of overcoming this punishment.  Where is women's role in his New Organon?

Ridiculous?

Is Bacon's elaborate method of exploring the essence of heat really the best way to go about re-structuring the knowledge of the world? It seems that his investigation of heat is unnecessarily involved, as well as plausibly rather incomplete. Just when looking at the sources of heat he used, I found his selections somewhat questionable, and rather than the experiment driven foundation, which he so adamantly advocated in Book 1, his selections seemed to be slightly experience based, but mostly whatever Bacon could think of that did or could involve heat. If Bacon's purpose is to build new foundations upon which a better, truer (more fact based) society can rest, is this really the best/only way to go about it? Why does Bacon use this method?

To God, truly, the giver and Architect of Forms, and it may be to the angels and higher intelligences, it belongs to have an affirmative knowledge of Forms immediately and from the first contemplation. But this assuredly is more than man can do, to whom it is granted only to proceed at first by negatives and at last to end in affirmatives, after exclusion has been exhausted. 2:15

For most of Book Two, Bacon had been discussing matters of science, in particular the details of heat. Rarely, at any point, does Bacon mention the idea of God. Generally, it seems that with most scientific experiments the unique and innovative ideas that are created are rarely identified with a spiritual element. At what point does religion start to answer the more advanced questions of science? Why is Bacon attributing the "knowledge of forms" to God? Is religion, i.e. God, an easy answer to the questions that we do not know about science, and what is the true separation between God and Science?

The end of the Bacon

"But of these the final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with human action" (2.2).

After recycling the phrase "True knowledge is knowledge by causes" (2), Bacon attempts to qualify it by speaking on Aristotle's four causes. In the interest of his science, he immediately dispenses with the final cause, the telos or 'that for the sake of which' a thing exists (also called the 'end'). His claim is that the final cause is inhibiting the progress of his scientific method, seemingly due to its connection with the (supposedly subjective) human viewpoint, and therefore it should be eliminated from all serious science aimed at human betterment.

In my opinion, he is causing himself some problems. First of all, Bacon does not seem to claim that the final cause does not exist, although in 1.60 he asserted the non-existence of the Prime Mover. If the final cause does exist, how can he ignore it in his "quest to find a way at length into [Nature's] inner chambers" (preface, p89)? He himself admitted that "no one can endow a given body with a new nature, or successfully and aptly transmute it into a new body, unless he has attained a competent knowledge of the body" (2.7). In other words, the quote expresses his 'obey nature to control nature' principle; apparently the final cause is not included in the competent knowledge, and it need not be obeyed or hearkened.

Now it is clear that Bacon proposes to serve humanity. A (if not the) major goal of his is to facilitate the kind of human action which was referenced in the opening quote, in which case the final cause was helpful. Does he plan to ignore the final cause until a question of human action comes up, and then beg for it back as Bacon pushes for humanity's bacon? Or does he intend to substitute the line "what in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most true" (2.4) in place of the final cause? If so, how can he ignore a thing's intended, natural meaning in relation to the person (for this is the core of the telos) in order to let it better serve that same person? Is it wise or even possible for utility to sidestep the natural purpose of something?

What he does do is make formal laws (only to be distilled by pains) the highest level of causal significance and mental unity (2.3). His Metaphysics is the investigation of these formal, natural laws (2.9). (The invesitgation is quite difficult in comparison to other alternatives such as contemplation or, not explicitly mentioned, revelation: see the end of 2.15). Does not even these formal laws presuppose a rational ordering--complete with causal connections--of the universe which is possible only with the purposeful final causes? How does he know that the universe is even intelligible without a final cause?

Finally, I think that Bacon eliminates the final cause because he sees it as connected with the "Idols of the Tribe," through his own statement that "the human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds" (1.45), among other impeding human affections. I would argue that the final cause answers such deep expectations of the person for order and meaning, involving how all things are ordered in relation to the inquirer (or to a group of inquierers, such as a Church or humanity in general). How can Bacon help anyone if he chooses blindness to the deepest level of significance of a natural thing for the sake of thorough data collection? Does he think that he can still contribute to the happiness of the person or help them to their own telos, or destiny?

If my name shows up as Patt-man, its because I have another blog. This is Patrick Johnson.

Bacon: The New Organon, Preface and Book I

The human understanding is moved by those things most which strike and enter the mind simultaneously and suddenly, and so fill the imagination, and then it feigns and supposes all other things to be somehow, though it cannot see how, similar to those few things by which it is surrounded. (47)

In this passage and several others, Bacon describes what he views as an erroneous method of pursuing the truth. Bacon would prefer that the mind proceed from a first axiom to a second and then to a third, rather than skip the middle step and proceed either from the first to the third or the third to the first. He claims that trying to generalize from a few axioms or trying to deduce axioms from a hypothesized generalization is not productive. Bacon's proposed method certainly has its appeal; the mind would proceed in a perfect, logical progression. However, I wonder if this method is possible for a finite, human being. How far can a single individual travel (or even a billion united humans) towards complete truth? Bacon's method is the more cautious route - its conclusions would certainly be true - but perhaps it is better to take risks and try for a greater leap in knowledge. I might even argue that Bacon's method would result in complete stasis (wouldn't each individual have to "re-travel" the same road of his teachers? he would have to understand every step that led to the present conclusions, wouldn't he?), in which case, our original method might be the superior. Even if we don't always reach the correct conclusion, we reach that conclusion much more quickly and with greater ease, and it is far better to have movement of any kind (whether forward or back) then to remain motionless without hope of any hope of moving forward. In this sense, I think that intuition, imagination, and inspiration have their place in the pursuit of knowledge, and that maybe they offer the only feasible "help" to drag our slow minds towards truth.

So in summary: is Bacon's method (about which I admit we haven't actually read yet) feasible for finite beings? is there any place for imaginaiton, intuition, and inspiration when we seek the truth? and if the conclusions drawn from these sources are built on shaky foundations, are they worth the risk of error?

"A natural philosophy pure and unmixed"

Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped for. (Bk 1, Aphorism 95)

Bacon's method often identifies an ideal middle ground between two less-desirable extremes. In this case, he defines natural philosophy as that which is "pure and unmixed."  For Bacon, the true natural philosopher utilizes both his faculties of understanding and those of sense perception.  A common theme in past seminars has been finding the balance between reason and experience.  In the subsequent aphorism, Bacon states that "we have as yet no natural philosophy that is pure."  Philosophers are threatened by other academic pursuits that cloud the search for wisdom.  Aside from logic, natural theology, and mathematics, what other diversions have challenged the natural philosophers?  Is Bacon's ideal natural philosophy attainable?   

The New Organon, Book I

But Idols of the Marketplace are the most troublesome of all--- idols which have crept into the understanding through the alliances of words and names (Book 1.59)

Bacon claims that the Idols of the Marketplace are the most dangerous type of his four idols which keep men from understanding the truth. Why, though, are they the most dangerous, rather than Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, or Idols of the Theater, each of which he spends a significant amount of time discussing? What is it about the false ideas that come from one's peers that makes them so dangerous, and why are these people more influential than those considered experts, oneself, or even human nature itself?

Knowing for the sake of knowing?

Nor again is it a lesser evil, that in their philosophies and contemplations their labor is spent in investigating and handling the first principles of things and highest generalities of nature; whereas utility and the means of working result entirely from things intermediate. Hence it is that men cease not from abstracting nature till they come to potential and uninformed matter, nor on the other hand from dissecting nature till they reach the atom; things which, even if true, can do but little for the welfare of mankind. (Bk 1, Aphorism 66)

Bacon, with his method, seeks to form a middle ground between two philosophies dealing with knowledge: one claiming that humanity knows everything and the other claiming that humanity knows nothing. The first is or should be universally rejected, and the second seems like it should be rejected as well, due to the possible interpretation that we can do nothing since we know nothing.

However, with the first principles and "highest generalities of nature," Bacon seems to advocate adopting the second extreme rather than his middle ground. He appears to reject delving into the universals, even if one were to correctly use his Baconian method. He argues this not because of the sheer difficulty of discovering a universal and asserting its validity, but because of the apparent uselessness of the endeavor, "even if true." Before even applying the scientific method, should we ask if the science is useful? Or should we consider all knowledge unconditionally good - to know for the sake of knowing? Knowing for the sake of knowledge was a theme brought up in the Tempest; Prospero lost his kingship since he dedicated his time to reading and obtaining knowledge. Before allocating resources and sacrificing time for a scientific project, should we first consider the project's potential utility?

The New Organon

And for myself, I am not raising a capitol or pyramid to the pride of man, but laying a foundation in the human understanding for a holy temple after the model of the world... For whatever deserves to exist deserves also to be known, for knowledge is the image of existence

An important part of Bacon's philosophy seems to be his interest in resisting the human temptation to 'fly off to universals,' and likewise in this work he seems to present simply a methodology, keeping predictions about a world in which his philosophy is followed vague at best (cf. his "idle wishes" in aphorism #129). This separates him from any one of the authors we've read in past seminars who have set up some image of a utopian commonwealth. Instead, he takes a very realistic approach: he does not intend his work to immediately penetrate "common apprehension," but he does seem hopeful that his methodology will, eventually, serve as a guide into new discoveries and inventions for humanity. How does this work fit in with other works like "The Republic," "On Cannibals," "The City of God," "Utopia," etc.? What would a 'Baconian' city look like?

Shakespeare's Tempest

O wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world
That has such people in't!

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