The end of the Bacon

"But of these the final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with human action" (2.2).

After recycling the phrase "True knowledge is knowledge by causes" (2), Bacon attempts to qualify it by speaking on Aristotle's four causes. In the interest of his science, he immediately dispenses with the final cause, the telos or 'that for the sake of which' a thing exists (also called the 'end'). His claim is that the final cause is inhibiting the progress of his scientific method, seemingly due to its connection with the (supposedly subjective) human viewpoint, and therefore it should be eliminated from all serious science aimed at human betterment.

In my opinion, he is causing himself some problems. First of all, Bacon does not seem to claim that the final cause does not exist, although in 1.60 he asserted the non-existence of the Prime Mover. If the final cause does exist, how can he ignore it in his "quest to find a way at length into [Nature's] inner chambers" (preface, p89)? He himself admitted that "no one can endow a given body with a new nature, or successfully and aptly transmute it into a new body, unless he has attained a competent knowledge of the body" (2.7). In other words, the quote expresses his 'obey nature to control nature' principle; apparently the final cause is not included in the competent knowledge, and it need not be obeyed or hearkened.

Now it is clear that Bacon proposes to serve humanity. A (if not the) major goal of his is to facilitate the kind of human action which was referenced in the opening quote, in which case the final cause was helpful. Does he plan to ignore the final cause until a question of human action comes up, and then beg for it back as Bacon pushes for humanity's bacon? Or does he intend to substitute the line "what in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most true" (2.4) in place of the final cause? If so, how can he ignore a thing's intended, natural meaning in relation to the person (for this is the core of the telos) in order to let it better serve that same person? Is it wise or even possible for utility to sidestep the natural purpose of something?

What he does do is make formal laws (only to be distilled by pains) the highest level of causal significance and mental unity (2.3). His Metaphysics is the investigation of these formal, natural laws (2.9). (The invesitgation is quite difficult in comparison to other alternatives such as contemplation or, not explicitly mentioned, revelation: see the end of 2.15). Does not even these formal laws presuppose a rational ordering--complete with causal connections--of the universe which is possible only with the purposeful final causes? How does he know that the universe is even intelligible without a final cause?

Finally, I think that Bacon eliminates the final cause because he sees it as connected with the "Idols of the Tribe," through his own statement that "the human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds" (1.45), among other impeding human affections. I would argue that the final cause answers such deep expectations of the person for order and meaning, involving how all things are ordered in relation to the inquirer (or to a group of inquierers, such as a Church or humanity in general). How can Bacon help anyone if he chooses blindness to the deepest level of significance of a natural thing for the sake of thorough data collection? Does he think that he can still contribute to the happiness of the person or help them to their own telos, or destiny?

If my name shows up as Patt-man, its because I have another blog. This is Patrick Johnson.