Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Be that as it may,  have previously admitted many things as wholly certain and evident that nevertheless I later discovered to be doubtful.  What sort of things where these?  Why, the earth, the sky, the stars, and all the other things I perceived by means of the senses.  But what was it about these things that I clearly perceived?  Surely the fact that the ideas of thoughts of these things were hovering before my mind.  But even now I do not deny that these ideas are in me.

Meditations 35



Descartes makes a very profound distinction here between a thing and an idea of a thing.  Previously, we have read people (Cervantes, for example) who have distinguished between appearance and reality, but I think this is the first time someone has effectively severed particular things from the thought of them.

What are the implications of this?

Descartes seems to proceed along the same lines as Plato's character Timaeus, in positing different corresponding things for each kind of thought.  For thoughts of mutable things, there are uncertain objects.  For thoughts of entirely immutable things (or God), there must correspond an entirely certain object.

Is this Neoplatonic?  Does perfection generate (or "emanate") imperfection?  If so, why?  So far, God has no desire or impulse, only infinite qualities.  Why would such a philosophical God make an uncertain and imperfect world? 

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