"[Metaphysics] can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, not internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason... it must be called pure philosophical knowledge" (p13, 265?).
"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (19, 274 ?).
"There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: 'This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of the science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason'" (20, 271).
"If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysician" (25, 278).
"Appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth; but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion" (p40; 292ish).
What is experience? One of several interesting divisions Kant makes in this work is the line of the "bounds of all possible experience" (25, 278). It seems one cannot experience anything Metaphysical, or perhaps it is only that one cannot know anything Metaphysical from experience. Experience is confined to the realm of subjective construction, apparently; it cannot instruct us about the most real stuff (whatever it is) "out there." We have already created what we will experience before we experience it. And yet, the "true" lessons tought by the wise men confined to this realm may be "indispensable for the guidance of understanding and of the will in life" (25, 278). Why then speculate? "Consider that not everyone is bound to study metaphysics" (p11, 264); "But as [Metaphysics] can never cease to be in demand - since the interest of common sense are so intimately interwoven with it..." (5, 257). Why can Kant so easily separate the experiential or common sensical from the speculative or reasonable?
What is Metaphysics, exactly? It seems that Metaphysics must be the stuff of pure reason and intuition, with no impact from anything "out there." Metaphysics may be simply the turning of the wheel in Kant's head. But doesn't Metaphysics need to regard what is "out there?" If we all turn our wheels at the same speed, will we come up with the same Answer? Perhaps it is in the nature of Metaphysics to work in philosophical moments, which cannot be sustained, but instead quickly fall back down from their own weight. This would explain the uncertainty, dizziness, and even contradictions of Metaphysics adressed by several of the authors we have read, while still preserving the view that there is truth to be had in Metaphysics; it just cannot be sustained by itself.
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