Excused?

"I admit that, since the events I have to describe could have taken place in several ways, I cannot make a determination among them except on the basis of conjecture. But over and above the fact that these conjectures become reasons when they are the most probable... and the sole means that a person can have of discovering the truth...[my consequences] will not therby be conjectural, since, on the basis of the principles I have just established, no other system is conceivable that would not furnish me with the same results, and from which I could not draw the same conclusions. This will excuse me from... [many, many surprising and seemingly questionable things that I have said and will say]" (59).

During the course of my reading, I discovered Rousseau claiming things about the state of nature ("go[ing] on at such length about the supposition of that primitive condition" (58)) that often violated my "inveterate prejudices" (58) and sense of the way things are. Such bold claims would cause him to have some very difficult explaining to do later, which he would do by very questionable means (most of which I think fall under the elipses at the end of the quote above).

For example, he says that without "any need for one another, they would hardly encounter one another twice in their lives, without knowing or talking to one another" (48). He portrays an isolated, solitary version of natural man that I don't think (with my "inverterate prejudice") accurately represents the human person. Because of this early attribute, he has later trouble about with how language arises, since no knowledge or mental ability comes about without necessity (48). He eventually sidesteps a full solution to this "thorny problem" which occupies philosophers "for whole centuries without interruption" (49) so that he can "inquire how they might have begun to be established" (49). How can he pull such a move? I believe this and other claims and subsequent arguments of his fall in the excused elipses, specifically under "the way in which the lapse of time compensates for the slight probability of events" (59), or one of the other objections that he lists.

Therefore, my question is: how is Rousseau excused? He seems to think that he is excused because he tried his best and because he said so (when he set his first principles, which "should not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better suited to shedding light on the nature of things than on pointing out their true origin" (38-39) --how can you know nature without origin?). Also, perhaps his system is fine but the "results" and "conclusions" that he is aiming for are off. Thus, my question contains many questions, but generally it is about his excuse statement at the end. Do we think he is excused, and can you help me understand how? Perhaps he didn't have time to treat all of those objections, and so he shot for a general pardon?

Hume 'N' History

"Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English" (VIII.I, p55).

"Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but frienship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these cricumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies" (55-56).

Here are two related topics of interest.

The first concerns the purpose of reading history. "Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature" (55). We see a lot of history in PLS, and I have always thought this one of the, if the not the chief value (perhaps Brennan would contend that seeking truth in general is) for doing PLS and humanities in general. I think I could make a case against myself (if indeed I know myself well enough) and Hume that we are both out to know what we need to know, rather than just out to know in general. Anyway, Hume is invoking a similar principle (need-to-know) with the whole nature of enquiring into human understanding itself. And indeed, he says, "Its chief use..." Also, if we might as well study our contemporaries, why history? Presumably, we all think that we get a wider communication through history and literature, overcoming the alienating limits of time rather than only space.

Secondly, perhaps this second quote gives an imperfect example of what I mean when I say that Hume may be resigning himself to limits and then cursing what is beyond them. It is true that here the limits aren't as strict (and the knowledge not quite the same) as in past sections of the book, for he is talking about applying a human principle analogous to the constant conjunction or uniformity of nature. (As a further qualification, I do not really want to undermine his sense of custom or belief that establishes the connection between conjoined things in nature). I just want to point out that Hume is not open to all possibilities, and that he is very quick to reject what could be a possible ammendation to his limits. Should he be more open by his own standards?

This example can probably relate to miracles, as well as to Swift's horse land. Also, just now I looked at the seminar page and saw Andrew's headline. Sorry for any repitition.

Mankind's originality?

Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in the particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human actions and behavior. 

Hume states earlier that he believes that there is a "great uniformity among the actions of men". Hume seems to be not only describing the uniformity of men, but also of the universe. That "every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it." Is this the same for mankind? Are we in a way predestined? Or the reaction of necessary force? 

Hume says that our human nature basically remains the same, and that the same events happen from the same causes. Is there any room for spontaneity in Hume's world? What about some sort of chaos that is unnaturally provoked? I feel that Hume has us all lumped into one giant category that he forgets to examine the uniqueness of the individual, rather than the whole. 

A Gossip Hungry Race

"The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricularum, the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder." (Chapter X, Part II, p. 83)

I found it curious that Hume seemed to envision this avidum genus auricularum to be a continuous race, not a race merely existant in a moment in history. I decided that he was, in fact, correct; at least for now we are still a gossip hungry race that seems to thrive on such things as E! (tv or magazine) or The National Enquirer, etc. Despite Hume's (seemingly) accurate description of the human race, he fails to give sufficient reason as to why we are the race he depicts. One reason he offers is the desire of individuals to gain fame by being 'the one who figured out' or 'spread the truth'...of course Hume put it more eloquently, but you get the idea. Is it as simple as he proposes? Or is there some other, bigger or more underlying reason that we as a race are so attracted to spreading gossip and similar stories?

Hume and Miracles

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined - (about 4 pages into Section X)

Perhaps Hume is starting with a definition of 'miracle' that most easily conducts the great division between faith and reason that he wants to effect. Perhaps there are natural forces that are not easily accessed, or that interact with faith rather than reason, such that only a person who believes without reason that such a force is accessible can, in fact, access that force. This sounds rather hokey . . .

Hume is quite happy to assign ulterior motives to proponents of miracles; why should he not be equally willing to see ulterior motives in his categorical disproof of miracles, or the rhetorically charged definition of "miracle" with which he began?

Hume And Love

I felt kind of out-of-synch with the rest of the class today, and as we ended on kind of a 'downer' note today despite my optimism about Hume I feel compelled to explain myself a little, hopefully to someone's benefit.

There exists a tendency to think that Hume is kind of stealing away any hope for confidence or certainty in the world. John, especially, expressed this kind of distress which it's possible to take from Hume. But it doesn't have to be that way. This enquiry and our experiencing it isn't, to me, a cold separation of terms as with a scalpel, but instead it's more like a love story.

You know how in the Symposium there's the notion that you can't love something you already have? Well, I feel that when you think you have knowledge about something, you think you have the truth and so you aren't interested in truth anymore. Every new philosophy, book, or acquaintance is a potential enemy; every new idea presented to you must either be fit in with your current beliefs or summarily refuted. When you think you know something, it is expedient to run away from all new information, and to cower from (what I would call) truth, lest you fall prey to (what this person would call) deception or trickery.

But with the limits Hume places on human knowledge, you are deprived of possession of the truth. As a result you are free to love truth, and the things you formerly 'knew' are matters of belief. You can and ought to defend your opinions voraciously but if you perceive greater truth in some new argument, you can accept it without contradiction or shame. I perceive a great fear of being thrown into confusion or doubt among people who take pride in their knowledge (a la Descartes and the maelstrom). But if you are in love with truth, no confusion or doubt or new opinion can remove from you the joy of the seeking for truth in which you have engaged yourself. No change in belief can depress your emotions because it is your priority to be in love with truth, not to merely possess it. Loving the truth means confidence in belief, prudence (not reticence) in dealing with other beliefs, and a certain courage in dealing with new texts or ideas.

I'd even go so far to say that this love of truth is the entire point of PLS: to inject yourself with these books and these ideas, to let them really hit you, to temper yourself, test your mettle and see what emerges from the forge. It's my sentiment that what's so 'depressing' about Hume is that accepting what he's saying is to accept uncertainty. But if you give uncertainty with respect to knowledge a chance, you might find certainty with respect to love of truth to be much more challenging and rewarding.

If 'love' wasn't the right word to describe the seeking for truth, I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have just made a fool/nerd of myself in front of people whose company I enjoy in class twice a week. I hope this benefited someone, or at least cemented their opinions by contrast with mine; and I hope this has made me and my apparent delight-in-lack-of-knowledge seem less, rather than more, crazy. If none of those succeed, at least here you can find a rationale for why Hume need not be paralyzing.

Hume I

The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sense. (pg. 10)

This seems to be a premise that Hume takes to show many of his other ideas. Because of this, he concludes that experience is critically important to the discovery of cause and effect, which is critically important to discover everything that deals with matter of fact. What is the consequence, though, of saying that nothing in the realm of matter of fact can be discovered unless through knowledge, but writing a work in which each person cannot experience, but only use reason to understand? What also does this do to the style of learning that we in PLS or we in universities use to learn?