"Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English" (VIII.I, p55).
"Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but frienship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these cricumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies" (55-56).
Here are two related topics of interest.
The first concerns the purpose of reading history. "Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature" (55). We see a lot of history in PLS, and I have always thought this one of the, if the not the chief value (perhaps Brennan would contend that seeking truth in general is) for doing PLS and humanities in general. I think I could make a case against myself (if indeed I know myself well enough) and Hume that we are both out to know what we need to know, rather than just out to know in general. Anyway, Hume is invoking a similar principle (need-to-know) with the whole nature of enquiring into human understanding itself. And indeed, he says, "Its chief use..." Also, if we might as well study our contemporaries, why history? Presumably, we all think that we get a wider communication through history and literature, overcoming the alienating limits of time rather than only space.
Secondly, perhaps this second quote gives an imperfect example of what I mean when I say that Hume may be resigning himself to limits and then cursing what is beyond them. It is true that here the limits aren't as strict (and the knowledge not quite the same) as in past sections of the book, for he is talking about applying a human principle analogous to the constant conjunction or uniformity of nature. (As a further qualification, I do not really want to undermine his sense of custom or belief that establishes the connection between conjoined things in nature). I just want to point out that Hume is not open to all possibilities, and that he is very quick to reject what could be a possible ammendation to his limits. Should he be more open by his own standards?
This example can probably relate to miracles, as well as to Swift's horse land. Also, just now I looked at the seminar page and saw Andrew's headline. Sorry for any repitition.
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