A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined - (about 4 pages into Section X)
Perhaps Hume is starting with a definition of 'miracle' that most easily conducts the great division between faith and reason that he wants to effect. Perhaps there are natural forces that are not easily accessed, or that interact with faith rather than reason, such that only a person who believes without reason that such a force is accessible can, in fact, access that force. This sounds rather hokey . . .
Hume is quite happy to assign ulterior motives to proponents of miracles; why should he not be equally willing to see ulterior motives in his categorical disproof of miracles, or the rhetorically charged definition of "miracle" with which he began?
No comments:
Post a Comment