Shift to the Mechanical

I was struck by the shift I felt Wealth of Nations was making from our previous readings, moving from the individual as a thinking, reasoning creature to the individual as a tool, or even a cog, in the mechanical workings of society. This hit hardest for me around chapter 8 when Smith was discussing poverty. Smith contended that the life of poverty is much worse than a rich life, and that the division of labor helped make the wealthy life possible and better. Though I know there is a difference between a life without poverty and a life of excess, I couldn't help think of all the problems money can bring, especially with this economic crisis we are going through. I though both of the idea that 'the more money you have, the more you can lose,' in relation to the crisis, and of people who live their lives in poverty (sometimes on purpose) and have incredible, wonderfully fulfilling lives (such as Ghandi, or missionaries, etc. ). I thought the difference between these two ideas, living well rich and living well in poverty, was that Smith's living well is concerned with the human as a cog in the mechanical society, whereas living well in poverty looks at the individual as a spiritual being that does not need the productions available through the division of labour. After pondering this, I found myself stuck wondering which was more important: should we look at man like Smith, in how he fits in a society, or should we look at man as a spiritual, thinking creature as we had been doing before?

Philosophy and Begging

"In the progress of sociey, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupations to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers" (11).

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"We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend on it entirely" (15).

"Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevelence only" (15).

"Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusments of human life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people" (33).

My business and economics major has a magnet on our refrigerator that drives me crazy. It says, "You're not paid to think! Shut up and do your job." While my roommate just likes to provoke people, Smith might agree with the magnet. I had some questions about how workers could invent things with a limited view, and so I was relieved when he allowed some improvements from philosophy. However, he then proceeded to make philosophy susceptible to divisions of specialization. Isn't philosophy an engagement with the meaning of life, and hence with all of the factors of life? How can a philosopher specialize, unless by specialize is meant 'think about everything all the time?' If he does specialize, he must necessarily be leaving some factor out of the meaning of life; and so could a 'specialized philosopher' help anyone? But then again, the workers don't take into account all factors of life, and they still come up with improvements, so likewise a philosopher might come up with improvements, if not perfect ones.

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Taking my second, third, and fourth quotes together, there seems to be very little difference separating the beggar and the working man. Why can we not address ourselves to someone else's humanity instead of his or her self-love? What would need to be done for such an address to take precedence over one to self-love? And, most importantly, it seems very hard to exist without addressing both poeple's humanity and self-love. Is it not true that in making a deal, I am more likely to buy from someone whom I judge more benevolent or good, i.e. more "human." Or is Smith all the way on the side of self-love?

Rousseau Pt. II

On the contrary, nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state, when, placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man, and limited equally by instinct and reason to protecting himself from the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by natural pity from needlessly harming anyone himself, even if he has been harmed. For according to the axiom of the wise Locke, where there is no property, there is no injury.

Rousseau here claims that the original cause for violence was the introduction of property, and that beforehand, man was tranquil and peaceful to his fellow man. However, if one looks at the state of nature of other non-human animals, it seems that violence is a natural part of most of their lives. Does Rousseau assume something that seems not to be true? Or is he referring to the middle stage in his idea of human development? If so, did the forming of communities cause one to claim property, or did the claiming of property begin the communal process?

Why lament the inevitable?

...all the subsequent progress has been in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact toward the decay of the species. (pg. 65)

Emerging society gave way to the most horrible state of war; since the human race, vilified and desolated, was no longer able to retrace its steps or give up the unfortunate acquisitions it had made, and since it labored only toward its shame by abusing the faculties that honor it, it brought itself to the brink of its ruin.  Horrified by the newness of the ill, both the poor man and the rich man hope to flee from wealth, hating what they once had prayed for. (pg. 68)

Savage man and civilized man differ so greatly in the depths of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of the one would reduce theo ther to despair.  (pg. 80)

...it (inequality) derives its force and growth form the development of our faculties and the progress of the human mind... (pg. 81)

Sorry for the mass of quotations, but I think that they collectively drive home what I understood to be  Rousseau's point.  Yes, the human race has endured a "fall" from a most ideal condition to one of vice and folly.  This fall was in the form of progress, however, and thus must be to some advantage.  Rousseau emphasizes the stark contrast between savage and civilized man.  The condition that he details throughout the discourse is not only unattainable, but also unsuitable for modern humans. Is it then worth lamenting?  I think that his discourse is just that; a discussion of the simultaneous fall and rise of the human race over time.  Inequality is an inevitable effect of progress "that reigns among all civilized people" (pg. 81).  Why dwell on what cannot be fixed?  (Or, does anyone think that it can be fixed??)

Rousseau Part II

"The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society." pg 60

"It is labor alone that, in giving the cultivator a right to the produce of the soil he has tilled, consequently gives him this rigth, at least until the harvest, and thus from year to year. With this possession continuing uninterrupted, i tis easily transformed into property." pg 67

I'm interested in how Rousseau defines and describes the invention of property. He appears to take a very strict view - property is bad because it leads directly to the rules of justice (bottom of 66) and revenge. But I wonder if Rousseau would like the idea of socialism - in which there is not property but there is society - or if he would say that is unfeasible, given human nature. And what other implications might arise from this description of property? Do men not own their bodies/minds? So wouldn't the concept of property already be implanted in them?

I also have another question, which might relate more to Part I. What is the purpose of Rousseau's savage man? I think it was Aristotle who said that everything has a puprose unique to itself and distinguished between all other animals and man by man's talent for reason or philosophy. Therefore, according to Aristotle, man's highest purpose was to philosophize. What would be the purpose of man in Rousseau's state of nature?

Inevitability in Rousseau

[Things in this state could have remained equal, if talents had been equal, and if the use of iron and the consumption of foodstuffs had always been in precise balance. But this proportion, which was not maintained by anything, was soon broken. The strongest did the most work; the most adroit turned theirs to better advantage; the most ingenious found ways to shorten their labor.   p. 67]

[It is clear that Rousseau sees society as an assembly of artificial men (see Brennan's post), but I would like to look at the inevitiability of man becoming artificial. Rousseau states that things could have remained equal if the consumption of foodstuffs had always been equal. But it would seem that this is impossible - all men are not equal in abilities, and (as he notes), without some body enforcing equality of production and consumption on the populace, the strong will naturally obtain more. Rousseau's option of how things could have remained equal seems impossible: only outside of society, in the natural state, can we have equality. I think Rousseau has done a pretty good job showing that the origin of inequality is society; I don't think he's done a great job of presenting a solution. I know this wasn't the point of his discourse, but then again, he admits he's not 100% sure what the point of his discourse is.

My question is: Rousseau claims that society is an assembly of artificial men, and that inequality naturally follows from the creation of society. Tracing his progress of mankind, he presents each step as a sort of inevitable progression from the previous advance. He claims that inequality is artificial since in the state of nature "inequality is practically non-existent." Does he believe that mankind could have avoided inequality? Also, we can understand that the the great list of wrongs he lists in the last paragraph of the book are the result of society. Is society inevitable, (and therefore these wrongs inevitable for mankind)? Does that which seperates man from the animals fate man for unjust society?]

Rousseau Part Deux

This is precisely the stage reached by most of the savage people known to us; and it is for want of having made adequate distinctions among their ideas or of having noticed how far these peoples already were from the original state of nature that many have hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel, and that he needs civilization in order to soften him. On the contrary, nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state . . . he is restrained by natural pity from needlessly harming anyone himself, even if he has been harmed. (64)

Despite the advice to work hard to see behind Rousseau's words and find his true motives, I was unable to do so since his words are so loaded and loud. I believe last class we thought one of Rousseau's claims is that man cannot help thinking of different possibilities/scenarios than reality, mainly because he is a naturally speculative creature. But section II seems to advocate, not just speculate, a different scenario than the status quo. I don't believe he wants to abandon society all together; he seems to indicate that the "happiest epoch" lived in a past society constituted of humans in an intermediary stage between the savage and societal man (p 65) (perhaps stage 2 of Patt-man's three-stage hypothesis). But the passions of greed and pride that corrode us today are a conditioned product of society, not human nature. Contrary to Hobbes, he thinks that the social advancements we have made through reason have led us away from the primitive compassion of nature. Like in Montaingne's "Of Cannibals," the natural man would immediately think it absurd that we allow for "a handful of people to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving multitude lacks necessities" (Rouss 81).

In response to one of Brennan's questions below, I believe Rousseau thinks our advancement was accompanied by a tragic loss - or perhaps our advancement was a lamentable loss.