Kant Part II

"For there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another...

The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective."

- Part II, "pages" 298 and 299 (not the common edition pages)

If I understand Kant correctly, he is arguing that to make universal judgments, we first have to make sure that we have a common understanding the object, and to do this, we check whether our perception of the object is the same as everyone else's perception. But what does he mean by "universally valid"? I think he means a concept that arises a priori and is common to all humanity. Does this also mean objectively true? I don't think so; we aren't talking about the object "in itself" but rather a commonly defined object (this reminds me of Hobbes' definitions). But how do we rise from these commonly defined obejcts - which may not be objectively real - to laws of nature, i.e. laws that are objectively true? Kant seems to connect the two by assuming that the way we experience things is a law of nature, and so by studying the origins of this law, we can see how all laws of nature are derived. But what if the former is not a law of nature? Confusion...

Clarifying Example

"What Copernicus did was take the existing a priori concept of the world, the notion that it was flat and fixed in space, and pose an alternative a p riori concept of the world, that it's spherical and moves around the sun; and showed that both of the a priori concepts fitted the existing sensory data."

The above excerpt comes from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which I found in Zen and the Art of Motorcylce Maintenance (I did not read Critique of Pure Reason along with our current, beefy assignment). I remembered coming across Hume and Kant in Zen and Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and wanted to review what the author, Robert Pirsig, had said about them. I, like a few others (I believe) in class on Monday, was having trouble interpreting what exactly Kant was claiming about human understanding and how it differed, if at all, from Hume's Enquiry.

Copernicus' method of forming the Copernican Revolution was a clarifying example for me, and I wish to share it here in hopes that other confused Kantian readers find clarification as well. Copernicus, as Kant states above, changed our internal understanding of the world from an unmoving, flat object to an orbiting, spherical object. Space and time constituted both understandings, and the spacial and temporal representation of a flat world fixed in our minds properly assimilated the flux of sensory data we experienced just as well as the spacial and temporal representation of a round world.

But Copernicus used the mind's intuitive faculties of perceiving things in space and time to amend our understanding to the one accepted today. Upon viewing a moon revolving around Jupiter through his telescope, he used intuitive faculties to form the concept of a round earth revolving around the sun. How could he have come to this assured truth, one he believed to be as true as we know it today, based solely on experience? He never experienced a round earth in one complete vision, considering humans were far from the ability to view the earth in third person from outer space. Even if he could sit afar and perceive the earth's shape, it would be hard to patiently watch it revolve around the sun for a year. The reasoning behind the Copernican Revolution was not an a posteriori synthetic judgment, but an a prior synthetic judgment. He spatially built the true image of the world and temporally revolved it around the sun, all in his mind. Brilliant!

"Human reason so delights building that it has several times built up a tower and then razed it to see how the foundation was laid. It is never too late to become reasonable and wise; but if the knowledge come late, there is always more difficulty in starting to reform." (p4)

This quote is very interesting to me for a couple reason. First, how often do we truly do this? How often do we look back at our past and utilize it for our future. So many times mistakes can be avoided because they have happened before, but we have not learned from them. Why don't we do this more? Second, what is the point where reform is impossible? Is there really a point where you can reverse the damage?

(Sorry this post is late, I just got back in town and did not have access to the internet)

Forms, and Triangles

"Whatever is given us as object must be given us in intuition. All our intuition, however, takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding intuits nothing but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' " (Remark II [p36])

I'm not sure if this is in response to Peter's post, or more of a continuation, but I too was stuck on Descartes', I mean Kant's description of space. Here Kant says "all bodies, together in the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts." If I am reading this right, then (in response to Peter) space (and therefore time as well?) is not necessary, but is instead simply our understanding of the form.(?) If I am not reading correctly, then I am pretty confused and either muddling or continuing Peter's question.

I also hope someone can help me understand the triangles in hemispheres part, whether in class or via the blog. I was having trouble visualizing it. (§13 285-286 [p33])

Limits of Experience and Obscure Metaphysics

"[Metaphysics] can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, not internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason... it must be called pure philosophical knowledge" (p13, 265?).

"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (19, 274 ?).

"There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: 'This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of the science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason'" (20, 271).

"If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysician" (25, 278).

"Appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth; but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion" (p40; 292ish).

What is experience? One of several interesting divisions Kant makes in this work is the line of the "bounds of all possible experience" (25, 278). It seems one cannot experience anything Metaphysical, or perhaps it is only that one cannot know anything Metaphysical from experience. Experience is confined to the realm of subjective construction, apparently; it cannot instruct us about the most real stuff (whatever it is) "out there." We have already created what we will experience before we experience it. And yet, the "true" lessons tought by the wise men confined to this realm may be "indispensable for the guidance of understanding and of the will in life" (25, 278). Why then speculate? "Consider that not everyone is bound to study metaphysics" (p11, 264); "But as [Metaphysics] can never cease to be in demand - since the interest of common sense are so intimately interwoven with it..." (5, 257). Why can Kant so easily separate the experiential or common sensical from the speculative or reasonable?

What is Metaphysics, exactly? It seems that Metaphysics must be the stuff of pure reason and intuition, with no impact from anything "out there." Metaphysics may be simply the turning of the wheel in Kant's head. But doesn't Metaphysics need to regard what is "out there?" If we all turn our wheels at the same speed, will we come up with the same Answer? Perhaps it is in the nature of Metaphysics to work in philosophical moments, which cannot be sustained, but instead quickly fall back down from their own weight. This would explain the uncertainty, dizziness, and even contradictions of Metaphysics adressed by several of the authors we have read, while still preserving the view that there is truth to be had in Metaphysics; it just cannot be sustained by itself.

Kant part 1

At the end of 4:282, Kant says that intuition can "precede the actuality of the object" only if "it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility." Later, towards the end of 4:283, he says "(Space and time) are pure intuitions, which are the ground a priori of the empirical intuitions, and hence can never be taken away themselves, but prove, precisely by being pure intuitions a priori, that they are mere forms of our sensibility which must preced all empirical intuition . . . and in conformity with which objects can be known a priori, though indeed only as they appear to us."

I am not sure that I understand BUT:

Is Kant saying that time and space are necessary? That is, they can't but be?

He has previously stated that intuited knowledge is "constructed" (4:281). The above quote demonstrates his notion that we interpret what is "out there" in terms of our a priori constructions. Is he reducing everything we think of as "out there" to internal objects?

But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods. (484)

This is coming in late so I'll make it quick. I want to make it clear that my problem is not attributed to Adama Smith; he seems to be a scientist commenting on the present system. But, as I was arguing with one of my friends who is a stuanch libertarian, I have a problem with a system that thrives off of human self-interest, and when I made this point, he stated: "greed is a natural human trait." I want to rehash Rousseau's question: "Is greed a result of a natural tendency or is it a result of a current society?" We have advanced beyond imagination under this system, but there have been other effects...

Adam Smith Part II

"That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident."

- Book IV, Chapter 2, pg 482

I don't quite understand the analogy Smith draws between this protectionism and the individual. He later argues that by seeking his own benefit, an individual unbewittingly seeks the benefit of his society. Because the person does not actively seek his society's benefit, Smith says that this case is analagous to that of the society that tries to protect itself. But I don't understand how the two fit together. If society is like an individual, shouldn't it seek its own gain, and precisely by doing so, aid the "general industry"? I'm not sure if I'm mixing up terms or what, but this analogy just isn't making sense to me.

Adam Smith's reliance on his proposed end for human society

The sole ostensive function of this post is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's conclusions presume a system of value, and further that this system of value is not the only reasonable one through which it is valid to make decisions with regard to one's life, education, and, as a matter of fact, economics. Really, that's all you need to know. I apologize for the length of this post and hope that your curiosity will not take you much farther than that summation I've just given you.

...though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would be deprived either of employment or subsistence... [they] may seek for it in another trade or in another place...
(IV.II, p. 499, 501)

Will a business be able to compete in the near future without outsourcing? In today's world, such a thing is lethal for a business; one must make the economical choice or some other business or country will make it first.

His solution here doesn't exactly seem as neat as he might have hoped. Other trades might not be available; and the brief "in another place" suggests a lack of concern for those people making the decision to leave their homes in search of a job.

I bring this modern reference up to demonstrate that Adam Smith really does have his finger on the pulse of the postmodern world. The economic choice is the only choice. We say, nobody can blame a CEO for layoffs; we say he or she had no choice in the matter. It simply had to be done.

A study of Adam Smith quickly reveals where this irresistible impetus originates. He suggests that labor is the currency of value; but why is this so? Why ought labor have value? When he speaks of education: why ought education in "utilities" be most important?

He says the following in order to compare the ancient instructional M.O. of utility and the modern educational structure:

In the ancient philosophy the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life [emphasis added]. In the modern philosophy it was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life...
V.I.III.2, p. 830

The entire goal of the nation in his view is happiness; or, perhaps, subsistence; or, perhaps, defense; take your pick. They each need the others. In any case a good person is only useful for Smith insofar as they add to the common defense and happiness:

Unless those few [ingenuous barbarians], however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honorable to themselves, may contribute very little to good government or happiness of their society.
V.I.III.2, p. 841, also cf. p. 845

It would appear as though happiness is the only thing of use in this life, and that, therefore, since philosophy, ethics, and any amount of education beyond utility do note necessarily take happiness as their aim, they can be of no purpose to anyone, anywhere, except in a monastery. It is as though the entire nobility of the human race, from the poorest starving child to the pompous aristocrat, were to consist entirely in our ability to feed and clothe and defend ourselves. It is as though the entire function of humanity could be exhausted with a purpose as dignified as the satisfaction of an itch.

To reiterate my purpose: Adam Smith quite accurately captures a system of value carried out well so as to achieve the ends of that system of value. It ought not be supposed, however, that this system of value, that is, that whose end is subsistence, defense, and/or happiness, is the only system of value by which it is reasonable for a human person to act. Beyond this my post has no purpose other than to suggest the alternative. I do not feel that anything beyond this point has any merit whatsoever for class discussion, given that it is entirely beyond the text. However, the notion that he presupposes a not rock-solid goal for humanity might be useful to keep in the back of our minds.

Certain people we have read have suggested that moral law, or, for example, The City of God, might supplant this as a system of value. There are other examples of systems of value by which one might act, and, in fact, make economic decisions. But these, as Smith notes, are not concerned with this life.

It may be possible, instead, that the function of human society ought to have something to do with the nature of humanity itself. Under Smith's system of utility, it would appear that humanity is just another animal whose capacities for thought, love, and self-awareness amount to a clever means toward survival; that is, the elements which constitute humanity are just means to an animalistic end. It seems more reasonable, to me at least, to suppose that humanity's end ought to involve, in some way, well, humanity. As opposed to Smith over there, supplying us with pins and chewing gum.

Humanity has a biological history, by which we evolved; it has a socioeconomic history, by which we became better at supplying utilities; surely it is not completely ridiculous to suppose that we might have an ethical history too, by which we might become more thoughtful, or loving, or judicious? Given that it is the entire office of our existence, couldn't we, or shouldn't we be primarily concerned with becoming better people? "But we need to eat!" Ah, right. Forget about all this then.

Academia vs. Education

The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but dubtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated. (V.I.II) p. 830

The demand for such instruction [the arts and sciences the people deemed necessary or convenient] produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. p. 837

Personally, I really enjoyed Smith's riffing on the current academic system in England. To hear one who was a moral professor talk about the inefficiency, vanity, and frivolousness of much of the the higher education system was really a gas. I also found some of his stronger rhetoric (language) in these parts. It seems like he is content to merely describe the way the invisible hand guides people, but when it gets to the university system, Smith gets pumped and it shows in his writing. I think the Baconian feeling here of studying productive subjects (math and mechanics by name) is impossible to miss, and Smith also attacks the frivolouss focus on metaphysics. I'd like to talk about the second quote however. Smith is truly invested in educating the masses, both in how to read and write, and also how to live morally and couragously. There's a very populist mentality coming from the write who is stereotyped as being the number one proletariat oppresor. More specifically, I'd like to talk about the idea of a higher demand for knowledge resulting in better teachers and masters of the subject. Smith claims that every instructor were private, then only useful topics (reading, writing, accounting) would be taught. Does Smith want every worker's education to be like that of a woman - a course in solely the most pragmatic lessons (modesty, chastity, economy for women)? Can we expect music and the arts to properly flourish if we do not teach them? Finally, why should we expect a market made of button pushers who "generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become [!!!]" (840) to correctly determine the subjects that are necessary and conveniant?

Costs of Progress

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them.  Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. 1.  (pg. 753 in Cannan edition)

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization.  Bk. V, Ch. 1, Pt. 1. (pg. 764)

These two passages reminded me a lot of Rousseau, but they invoked different feelings than last week's readings did.  As some of you may remember, I understood Rousseau to be giving a sort of "that was then, this is now" message.  I was frustrated that his discourse makes readers ponder and potentially long for the "then" when it is impossible to revert back to the state of savage man.  In today's readings, Smith points to yet another fall that accompanies progress.  As society becomes more civilized, people become less warlike and thus defense of society is more costly.  Enhancements in artillery and the need for more extensive training of warriors are expensive and time-consuming.  By introducing the fiscal consequence of such advancements, Smith makes me wonder whether societal progress is worth it?  Now I'm just flat out discouraged.  Don't get me wrong, I love being a civilized human.  But there is something about a more primitive state that is appealing.  How do we confront reality while longing for the ideal? 

Wealth of Nations pt. II

Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no public institutions, are generally the best taught.

Smith here gives his support for private education, or so it seems. How well does this correspond with his teaching of the so-called "web of connectedness?" Does private education promote an attempt to seclude oneself from interaction with the outside world?

" Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has occasion for."

This includes both the street porter and the philosopher. Thus, we need pamphlets like "You Can Get Rich With PLS!" to convince ourselves or our parents that it's "worthwhile," since profitability is the measure of use to society.

Perhaps we can pause and consider: society, in one way or another, affords us liberal education, a chance to not contribute to the general public but to only receive the labor of professors and janitors, and the vitals and "fewel" to keep us alive. Is it mere cultural conflict to accept this, when the low-wage laborers who form the foundation of our consumer economy would not necessarily voluntarily give it to us, believing in its common betterment? If they don't afford it to us voluntarily, are we taking it from them? Where is the surplus coming from by which we can "mess around" for four years? What are we going to give back?

I work therefore I am...bad joke.

"How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufacturers" 1.1, p. 6.

Somewhat in response to Matt and Pat (hehe) I was struck by Smith's focus on labor as something that connects people.  Many people labor in many different trades in many different places to produce one thing; people are connected through products and through labor.  Labor also defines people against one another: we both worked to produce this pin, but you drew out the wire and I ground the top.  Finally, people are defined by their labor: I am a farmer, you are an investment banker, you are a stay-at-home mom.  Matt and Patt-man have rightly pointed out a paradigm shift (and I hope we discuss how significant that shift is or is not) from man as a spiritual individual to a working man.

I've been thinking about labor in relation to our identity.  Our labor connects, separates, and defines us.  If someone drops the ball and doesn't do their work there may be consequences for the whole community, but if you take away someone's industry they may not know who they are anymore.  There is also unseen labor such as that in the home that very much affects who we are.  There is absolutely a connection between labor and person, between work and sense of self.  What does Smith have to say about how labor shapes and stunts the self?

"Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either."

To start, I would like to comment on the rambling that Smith goes on: It was told that Adam Smith was so absent minded that at one point in his life he just wandered and was so out of it, that people could not find him for three weeks. He was found later in only his underwear. Whether or not this story is true, it might explain why Smith seems to go on certain tangents about metal or coins. 

Regarding the quote, I find this one in particular to be quite thought provoking. We all can agree that in any point in time it seems that the more money or land one has, the more power they have. But, at what point does that power shift from responsible distribution and compassion for the civil and military duties to greed and lust for power? Similar to the question I asked last week, what is to prevent someone who is born into power to not simply take power by paying his way up? What can Smith say to prevent something like this?

Shift to the Mechanical

I was struck by the shift I felt Wealth of Nations was making from our previous readings, moving from the individual as a thinking, reasoning creature to the individual as a tool, or even a cog, in the mechanical workings of society. This hit hardest for me around chapter 8 when Smith was discussing poverty. Smith contended that the life of poverty is much worse than a rich life, and that the division of labor helped make the wealthy life possible and better. Though I know there is a difference between a life without poverty and a life of excess, I couldn't help think of all the problems money can bring, especially with this economic crisis we are going through. I though both of the idea that 'the more money you have, the more you can lose,' in relation to the crisis, and of people who live their lives in poverty (sometimes on purpose) and have incredible, wonderfully fulfilling lives (such as Ghandi, or missionaries, etc. ). I thought the difference between these two ideas, living well rich and living well in poverty, was that Smith's living well is concerned with the human as a cog in the mechanical society, whereas living well in poverty looks at the individual as a spiritual being that does not need the productions available through the division of labour. After pondering this, I found myself stuck wondering which was more important: should we look at man like Smith, in how he fits in a society, or should we look at man as a spiritual, thinking creature as we had been doing before?

Philosophy and Begging

"In the progress of sociey, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupations to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers" (11).

---

"We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend on it entirely" (15).

"Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevelence only" (15).

"Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusments of human life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people" (33).

My business and economics major has a magnet on our refrigerator that drives me crazy. It says, "You're not paid to think! Shut up and do your job." While my roommate just likes to provoke people, Smith might agree with the magnet. I had some questions about how workers could invent things with a limited view, and so I was relieved when he allowed some improvements from philosophy. However, he then proceeded to make philosophy susceptible to divisions of specialization. Isn't philosophy an engagement with the meaning of life, and hence with all of the factors of life? How can a philosopher specialize, unless by specialize is meant 'think about everything all the time?' If he does specialize, he must necessarily be leaving some factor out of the meaning of life; and so could a 'specialized philosopher' help anyone? But then again, the workers don't take into account all factors of life, and they still come up with improvements, so likewise a philosopher might come up with improvements, if not perfect ones.

---

Taking my second, third, and fourth quotes together, there seems to be very little difference separating the beggar and the working man. Why can we not address ourselves to someone else's humanity instead of his or her self-love? What would need to be done for such an address to take precedence over one to self-love? And, most importantly, it seems very hard to exist without addressing both poeple's humanity and self-love. Is it not true that in making a deal, I am more likely to buy from someone whom I judge more benevolent or good, i.e. more "human." Or is Smith all the way on the side of self-love?

Rousseau Pt. II

On the contrary, nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state, when, placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man, and limited equally by instinct and reason to protecting himself from the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by natural pity from needlessly harming anyone himself, even if he has been harmed. For according to the axiom of the wise Locke, where there is no property, there is no injury.

Rousseau here claims that the original cause for violence was the introduction of property, and that beforehand, man was tranquil and peaceful to his fellow man. However, if one looks at the state of nature of other non-human animals, it seems that violence is a natural part of most of their lives. Does Rousseau assume something that seems not to be true? Or is he referring to the middle stage in his idea of human development? If so, did the forming of communities cause one to claim property, or did the claiming of property begin the communal process?

Why lament the inevitable?

...all the subsequent progress has been in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact toward the decay of the species. (pg. 65)

Emerging society gave way to the most horrible state of war; since the human race, vilified and desolated, was no longer able to retrace its steps or give up the unfortunate acquisitions it had made, and since it labored only toward its shame by abusing the faculties that honor it, it brought itself to the brink of its ruin.  Horrified by the newness of the ill, both the poor man and the rich man hope to flee from wealth, hating what they once had prayed for. (pg. 68)

Savage man and civilized man differ so greatly in the depths of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of the one would reduce theo ther to despair.  (pg. 80)

...it (inequality) derives its force and growth form the development of our faculties and the progress of the human mind... (pg. 81)

Sorry for the mass of quotations, but I think that they collectively drive home what I understood to be  Rousseau's point.  Yes, the human race has endured a "fall" from a most ideal condition to one of vice and folly.  This fall was in the form of progress, however, and thus must be to some advantage.  Rousseau emphasizes the stark contrast between savage and civilized man.  The condition that he details throughout the discourse is not only unattainable, but also unsuitable for modern humans. Is it then worth lamenting?  I think that his discourse is just that; a discussion of the simultaneous fall and rise of the human race over time.  Inequality is an inevitable effect of progress "that reigns among all civilized people" (pg. 81).  Why dwell on what cannot be fixed?  (Or, does anyone think that it can be fixed??)

Rousseau Part II

"The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society." pg 60

"It is labor alone that, in giving the cultivator a right to the produce of the soil he has tilled, consequently gives him this rigth, at least until the harvest, and thus from year to year. With this possession continuing uninterrupted, i tis easily transformed into property." pg 67

I'm interested in how Rousseau defines and describes the invention of property. He appears to take a very strict view - property is bad because it leads directly to the rules of justice (bottom of 66) and revenge. But I wonder if Rousseau would like the idea of socialism - in which there is not property but there is society - or if he would say that is unfeasible, given human nature. And what other implications might arise from this description of property? Do men not own their bodies/minds? So wouldn't the concept of property already be implanted in them?

I also have another question, which might relate more to Part I. What is the purpose of Rousseau's savage man? I think it was Aristotle who said that everything has a puprose unique to itself and distinguished between all other animals and man by man's talent for reason or philosophy. Therefore, according to Aristotle, man's highest purpose was to philosophize. What would be the purpose of man in Rousseau's state of nature?

Inevitability in Rousseau

[Things in this state could have remained equal, if talents had been equal, and if the use of iron and the consumption of foodstuffs had always been in precise balance. But this proportion, which was not maintained by anything, was soon broken. The strongest did the most work; the most adroit turned theirs to better advantage; the most ingenious found ways to shorten their labor.   p. 67]

[It is clear that Rousseau sees society as an assembly of artificial men (see Brennan's post), but I would like to look at the inevitiability of man becoming artificial. Rousseau states that things could have remained equal if the consumption of foodstuffs had always been equal. But it would seem that this is impossible - all men are not equal in abilities, and (as he notes), without some body enforcing equality of production and consumption on the populace, the strong will naturally obtain more. Rousseau's option of how things could have remained equal seems impossible: only outside of society, in the natural state, can we have equality. I think Rousseau has done a pretty good job showing that the origin of inequality is society; I don't think he's done a great job of presenting a solution. I know this wasn't the point of his discourse, but then again, he admits he's not 100% sure what the point of his discourse is.

My question is: Rousseau claims that society is an assembly of artificial men, and that inequality naturally follows from the creation of society. Tracing his progress of mankind, he presents each step as a sort of inevitable progression from the previous advance. He claims that inequality is artificial since in the state of nature "inequality is practically non-existent." Does he believe that mankind could have avoided inequality? Also, we can understand that the the great list of wrongs he lists in the last paragraph of the book are the result of society. Is society inevitable, (and therefore these wrongs inevitable for mankind)? Does that which seperates man from the animals fate man for unjust society?]

Rousseau Part Deux

This is precisely the stage reached by most of the savage people known to us; and it is for want of having made adequate distinctions among their ideas or of having noticed how far these peoples already were from the original state of nature that many have hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel, and that he needs civilization in order to soften him. On the contrary, nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state . . . he is restrained by natural pity from needlessly harming anyone himself, even if he has been harmed. (64)

Despite the advice to work hard to see behind Rousseau's words and find his true motives, I was unable to do so since his words are so loaded and loud. I believe last class we thought one of Rousseau's claims is that man cannot help thinking of different possibilities/scenarios than reality, mainly because he is a naturally speculative creature. But section II seems to advocate, not just speculate, a different scenario than the status quo. I don't believe he wants to abandon society all together; he seems to indicate that the "happiest epoch" lived in a past society constituted of humans in an intermediary stage between the savage and societal man (p 65) (perhaps stage 2 of Patt-man's three-stage hypothesis). But the passions of greed and pride that corrode us today are a conditioned product of society, not human nature. Contrary to Hobbes, he thinks that the social advancements we have made through reason have led us away from the primitive compassion of nature. Like in Montaingne's "Of Cannibals," the natural man would immediately think it absurd that we allow for "a handful of people to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving multitude lacks necessities" (Rouss 81).

In response to one of Brennan's questions below, I believe Rousseau thinks our advancement was accompanied by a tragic loss - or perhaps our advancement was a lamentable loss.

Artificial Human: Good, Bad, or Just Redundant?

Here is the final stage of inequality...
Here everything is returned... to a new state of nature...
--p. 79

...no attentive reader can fail to be struck by the immense space that separates these two states [the natural and the civil]...
why, with original man gradually disappearing, society no longer offers to the eyes of the wise man anything but an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions which are the work of all these new relations and have no true foundation in nature.
--p. 80

It is enough for me to have proved that this is not the original state of man, and that this is only the spirit of society, and the inequality that society engenders, which thus change and alter all our natural inclinations...
Moreover, it follows that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to natural right...
--p. 81

How does artificiality fit in with Rousseau's sense of what it means to be human? Rousseau seems to take liberty to be an essential part of what it means to be human (cf. p. 74, "...a man is not born a man."). But from this liberty eventually but inevitably spring its abuses (cf. p. 75, middle paragraph; cf. p. 77 "For the vices..."). Especially in the last few pages as quoted above, this "new state of nature," in which the essence of mankind engenders its inequalities, is increasingly portrayed as artificial, unnatural, and without basis in 'natural man.'

So perhaps humankind and 'natural human'-kind are inherently divided by this "immense space"; perhaps humans as they are now are inherently artificial beings. What does this mean for us? Artificiality does not seem like a good thing, especially when it enables such horrors as a person agreeing to "plunge my sword... into my pregnant wife's entrails." Our capacity for thought enables these terrors, but it also enables love. Just as a savage would neither cede his or her liberty nor seek revenge, neither could he or she be capable of protecting his or her family as a modern person would.

So what are we left with? Does Rousseau want us to accept our state as it is? His development of man (pp. 60-63) demonstrates a Hume-esque interest in judgment by experience; this methodology suggests to me that Rousseau's priority could be to present the truth about humanity as it is. But then there is this sense from his tone that he takes this artificiality to be a lamentable thing; that savage man, for all his inhumanity, is somehow preferable. We gain something from the crossing of the gap, but with that gain comes inequality and other vices.

So does Rousseau think it's good to be who we are? Is this separation from nature, this artificiality, this humanity, this "ardor for making oneself the topic of the conversation" a bald fact about the human race as we are? Is it a development worthy of praise and gladness? Is it a tragic, lamentable loss?

With so few sources of illness, man in this state of nature has little need for remedies, and even less for physicians; the human race is, in this respect, in no worse a condition than any other species . . . man differs from the beasts in this respect (idea-sense relation) only in a matter of degree]

Rousseau throughout uses non-human animal observation as a method of describing the "natural man." This is an ingenious shift toward darwinian evolution and, later, behaviorist psychology. How does he justify it?

To continue Patt-man's comment on Rousseau's justification for leaving out the origin of man, it's also strange that he doesn't think to consider the observation of children in addition to non-human animals.

But, he takes as given that "natural" equals "non-societal." This is not true even of non-humans. Where does he get his image of the "solitary" person? Does it come from a new take on the natural equality of all people as equality of psyche?

Women, reason, and pity

"Amiable and virtuous women citizens, it will always be the fate of your sex to govern ours." Letter, p. 31

While I was excited to see women called "citizens" as opposed to just recognized as members of society or not recognized at all, Rousseau seems to be talking less about how women can be active participants in the state's politics and more about what their proper place is: married, in the home, and modestly attired.  Doesn't quite seem like a citizen to me.

"Although it might be appropriate for Socrates and minds of his stature to acquire virtue through reason, the human race would long ago have ceased to exist, if its preservation had depended solely on the reasonings of its members." p.55, end of the paragraph about pity

This quote stayed with me for a long time after I read it.  I wonder if Rousseau considers himself a man with a mind of Socratic stature or if he puts himself with everyone else whose virtue developed not through reason but was inspired by pity.  I'd like to talk more about his idea of pity and of reason.

"I would have wanted to be born in a country where the sovereign and the people could have but one and the same interest, so that all the movements of the machine always tended only to the common happiness. SInce this could not have taken place unless the people and the sovereign were one and the same person, it follows that I ould have wished to be born under a democrative goverement, wisely tempered." (p26)

"For liberty is like those solid and tasty foods or those full bodies wines which are appropriate for nourishing and strengthening robust constitutions that are used to them, but which overpower, ruin, and intoxicate the weak and delicate who are not suited for them. Once people are accustomed to masters, they are no longer in a position to get along without them. If they try to shake off the yoke, they put all the more distance between themselves and liberty, because, in mistaking for liberty an unbridged license which is its opposite, their revolutions nearly always deliver them over to seducers who simply make their chains heavier." (p27). 

In reading Rousseau's descriptions of both a democracy and liberty, I wondered if this sort of definition was relevant in my own life. I do believe that when Rousseau says that he wants his land to be a "state where, all the private individuals being known to one another...and where that pleasant habit of seeing and knowing one another turned love of homeland into love of the citizens rather than love of the land." It would come to my attention that maybe Rousseau is referring to the truest form of a democracy, where a small group of people run the government. In our modern day, most Americans would consider our country to be a Democracy, but how is this so when we are a population of 300 million, and in more cases have far more consideration for the land than our own people?

Next, is the issue of liberty, with which a modern comparison can be made. Rousseau makes it clear that Liberty can only be used when necessary and with those who are truly ready to accept it. I make the comparison to two events in recent history that make me question the spread of what we call "freedom" or liberty. First, the obvious comparison is the Iraq war. The United States has the mission to spread Democracy and Freedom to the middle East, but is it the case that they might have not been and still might not be ready for a state of Liberty? How do we know when a country or group of people is ready to embrace such a state? Another case would be with the British presence in India. When is a country or state ready to accept the ways of Liberty? Does is happen naturally or with force from a country with liberty?

On the Decline

"Why is man alone subject to becoming an imbecile? Is it not that...man, in losing through old age or other accidents all that his perfectibility has enabled him to acquire, thus falls even lower than the animal itself?" (p45)

This quote, along with a few other things Rousseau said (such as the difference between savage man and man with machine) made me think that Rousseau sees man as a mainly declinitive (yes, I made that word up, but it's the best suited in my mind...) creature. This was rather counter-intuitive for me, especially since we have in our culture, and I do not believe it is a newer sentiment, an attribution of wisdom to the aged. It does, however, seem to be somewhat in line with the description of the immortals in Gulliver's Travels, and that made me wonder if (as long as I'm not misreading what Rousseau is saying here) both Swift and Rousseau would coincidently be wrong together, or if they were right about this decline? Is there a point in the course of human life that man starts to fall and lose all that he has gained? Moreover, has man on the whole started (or did he start a long time ago) to decline (which is something else I think Rousseau has been saying)? It does appear to me that I am leaving out the possibility of the decline not being necessary, but then my question is simply how does man avoid the decline?

Excused?

"I admit that, since the events I have to describe could have taken place in several ways, I cannot make a determination among them except on the basis of conjecture. But over and above the fact that these conjectures become reasons when they are the most probable... and the sole means that a person can have of discovering the truth...[my consequences] will not therby be conjectural, since, on the basis of the principles I have just established, no other system is conceivable that would not furnish me with the same results, and from which I could not draw the same conclusions. This will excuse me from... [many, many surprising and seemingly questionable things that I have said and will say]" (59).

During the course of my reading, I discovered Rousseau claiming things about the state of nature ("go[ing] on at such length about the supposition of that primitive condition" (58)) that often violated my "inveterate prejudices" (58) and sense of the way things are. Such bold claims would cause him to have some very difficult explaining to do later, which he would do by very questionable means (most of which I think fall under the elipses at the end of the quote above).

For example, he says that without "any need for one another, they would hardly encounter one another twice in their lives, without knowing or talking to one another" (48). He portrays an isolated, solitary version of natural man that I don't think (with my "inverterate prejudice") accurately represents the human person. Because of this early attribute, he has later trouble about with how language arises, since no knowledge or mental ability comes about without necessity (48). He eventually sidesteps a full solution to this "thorny problem" which occupies philosophers "for whole centuries without interruption" (49) so that he can "inquire how they might have begun to be established" (49). How can he pull such a move? I believe this and other claims and subsequent arguments of his fall in the excused elipses, specifically under "the way in which the lapse of time compensates for the slight probability of events" (59), or one of the other objections that he lists.

Therefore, my question is: how is Rousseau excused? He seems to think that he is excused because he tried his best and because he said so (when he set his first principles, which "should not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better suited to shedding light on the nature of things than on pointing out their true origin" (38-39) --how can you know nature without origin?). Also, perhaps his system is fine but the "results" and "conclusions" that he is aiming for are off. Thus, my question contains many questions, but generally it is about his excuse statement at the end. Do we think he is excused, and can you help me understand how? Perhaps he didn't have time to treat all of those objections, and so he shot for a general pardon?

Hume 'N' History

"Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English" (VIII.I, p55).

"Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but frienship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these cricumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies" (55-56).

Here are two related topics of interest.

The first concerns the purpose of reading history. "Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature" (55). We see a lot of history in PLS, and I have always thought this one of the, if the not the chief value (perhaps Brennan would contend that seeking truth in general is) for doing PLS and humanities in general. I think I could make a case against myself (if indeed I know myself well enough) and Hume that we are both out to know what we need to know, rather than just out to know in general. Anyway, Hume is invoking a similar principle (need-to-know) with the whole nature of enquiring into human understanding itself. And indeed, he says, "Its chief use..." Also, if we might as well study our contemporaries, why history? Presumably, we all think that we get a wider communication through history and literature, overcoming the alienating limits of time rather than only space.

Secondly, perhaps this second quote gives an imperfect example of what I mean when I say that Hume may be resigning himself to limits and then cursing what is beyond them. It is true that here the limits aren't as strict (and the knowledge not quite the same) as in past sections of the book, for he is talking about applying a human principle analogous to the constant conjunction or uniformity of nature. (As a further qualification, I do not really want to undermine his sense of custom or belief that establishes the connection between conjoined things in nature). I just want to point out that Hume is not open to all possibilities, and that he is very quick to reject what could be a possible ammendation to his limits. Should he be more open by his own standards?

This example can probably relate to miracles, as well as to Swift's horse land. Also, just now I looked at the seminar page and saw Andrew's headline. Sorry for any repitition.

Mankind's originality?

Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in the particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human actions and behavior. 

Hume states earlier that he believes that there is a "great uniformity among the actions of men". Hume seems to be not only describing the uniformity of men, but also of the universe. That "every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it." Is this the same for mankind? Are we in a way predestined? Or the reaction of necessary force? 

Hume says that our human nature basically remains the same, and that the same events happen from the same causes. Is there any room for spontaneity in Hume's world? What about some sort of chaos that is unnaturally provoked? I feel that Hume has us all lumped into one giant category that he forgets to examine the uniqueness of the individual, rather than the whole. 

A Gossip Hungry Race

"The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricularum, the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder." (Chapter X, Part II, p. 83)

I found it curious that Hume seemed to envision this avidum genus auricularum to be a continuous race, not a race merely existant in a moment in history. I decided that he was, in fact, correct; at least for now we are still a gossip hungry race that seems to thrive on such things as E! (tv or magazine) or The National Enquirer, etc. Despite Hume's (seemingly) accurate description of the human race, he fails to give sufficient reason as to why we are the race he depicts. One reason he offers is the desire of individuals to gain fame by being 'the one who figured out' or 'spread the truth'...of course Hume put it more eloquently, but you get the idea. Is it as simple as he proposes? Or is there some other, bigger or more underlying reason that we as a race are so attracted to spreading gossip and similar stories?

Hume and Miracles

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined - (about 4 pages into Section X)

Perhaps Hume is starting with a definition of 'miracle' that most easily conducts the great division between faith and reason that he wants to effect. Perhaps there are natural forces that are not easily accessed, or that interact with faith rather than reason, such that only a person who believes without reason that such a force is accessible can, in fact, access that force. This sounds rather hokey . . .

Hume is quite happy to assign ulterior motives to proponents of miracles; why should he not be equally willing to see ulterior motives in his categorical disproof of miracles, or the rhetorically charged definition of "miracle" with which he began?

Hume And Love

I felt kind of out-of-synch with the rest of the class today, and as we ended on kind of a 'downer' note today despite my optimism about Hume I feel compelled to explain myself a little, hopefully to someone's benefit.

There exists a tendency to think that Hume is kind of stealing away any hope for confidence or certainty in the world. John, especially, expressed this kind of distress which it's possible to take from Hume. But it doesn't have to be that way. This enquiry and our experiencing it isn't, to me, a cold separation of terms as with a scalpel, but instead it's more like a love story.

You know how in the Symposium there's the notion that you can't love something you already have? Well, I feel that when you think you have knowledge about something, you think you have the truth and so you aren't interested in truth anymore. Every new philosophy, book, or acquaintance is a potential enemy; every new idea presented to you must either be fit in with your current beliefs or summarily refuted. When you think you know something, it is expedient to run away from all new information, and to cower from (what I would call) truth, lest you fall prey to (what this person would call) deception or trickery.

But with the limits Hume places on human knowledge, you are deprived of possession of the truth. As a result you are free to love truth, and the things you formerly 'knew' are matters of belief. You can and ought to defend your opinions voraciously but if you perceive greater truth in some new argument, you can accept it without contradiction or shame. I perceive a great fear of being thrown into confusion or doubt among people who take pride in their knowledge (a la Descartes and the maelstrom). But if you are in love with truth, no confusion or doubt or new opinion can remove from you the joy of the seeking for truth in which you have engaged yourself. No change in belief can depress your emotions because it is your priority to be in love with truth, not to merely possess it. Loving the truth means confidence in belief, prudence (not reticence) in dealing with other beliefs, and a certain courage in dealing with new texts or ideas.

I'd even go so far to say that this love of truth is the entire point of PLS: to inject yourself with these books and these ideas, to let them really hit you, to temper yourself, test your mettle and see what emerges from the forge. It's my sentiment that what's so 'depressing' about Hume is that accepting what he's saying is to accept uncertainty. But if you give uncertainty with respect to knowledge a chance, you might find certainty with respect to love of truth to be much more challenging and rewarding.

If 'love' wasn't the right word to describe the seeking for truth, I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have just made a fool/nerd of myself in front of people whose company I enjoy in class twice a week. I hope this benefited someone, or at least cemented their opinions by contrast with mine; and I hope this has made me and my apparent delight-in-lack-of-knowledge seem less, rather than more, crazy. If none of those succeed, at least here you can find a rationale for why Hume need not be paralyzing.

Hume I

The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sense. (pg. 10)

This seems to be a premise that Hume takes to show many of his other ideas. Because of this, he concludes that experience is critically important to the discovery of cause and effect, which is critically important to discover everything that deals with matter of fact. What is the consequence, though, of saying that nothing in the realm of matter of fact can be discovered unless through knowledge, but writing a work in which each person cannot experience, but only use reason to understand? What also does this do to the style of learning that we in PLS or we in universities use to learn?

Metapost: Re-tagging

Attention people who have been tagging things like "Gulliver's Travels Parts I-II" instead of just "Gulliver's Travels" like I've been correcting them to: you're right and I'm wrong. I wanted to avoid things like "Hobbes Part II omit 25, 26, 27 Part III 24" &c. in the tag cloud; but despite the existence of ways to get to a specific class period's postings with the current method (e.g. /-/labels/group 1/hobbes, &c.), I think it'll be expedient to do some re-tagging.

The end result will be such that the tags for Descartes will be:
meditations
discourse on method 1
discourse on method 2

So for Hume all group 1 entries will have "hume, enquiry concerning human understanding 1, group 1" and all group 2 entries will have "hume, enquiry concerning human understanding 2, group 2," &c.

So they'll still be tagged by author and by book, but now if the specific book (not author) is split up into more than one class, then each class will have a tag, e.g. above.

But you guys only ever to have to tag your posts with "group 1" or "group 2," since that's the only thing needed for the printer-friendly thing to work. I'll continue to maintain those tags which purpose is for finals preparation.

I may also start adding tags for author, depending on whether that's desired; I'll find out about that tomorrow.

If anyone is experiencing load-time issues, please let me know.

Custom is King

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses.  p.29

To trot out a good ol' fashioned PLS cliche, Custom is King. We saw Herodotus describing one tribe that always ate their dead, and one tribe that always burnt their dead. We saw Gulliver (in the first half of his travels) learning time and again that what seems huge is minuscule, and what seems important is trivial. Here, however, we see Custom coming into the picture in a radically different way...or does it? Herodotus and Gulliver teach us that subjective judgements may be valuable, but should not be taken as Truth. Hume seems to be preaching the same sermon, except he is now applying judgements that were previously associated with morals and rituals to every aspect of understanding. With Hume, we realize that there is every single moment of our lives may be (pardon me for mixing metaphors) like a different island of Gulliver's travels - what we learn from one moment (or island) can not necessarily be brought to the next. However, Custom applying to every understanding is far more radical than the Custom of morals and rituals that Herodotus and Swift present. But, this point could be debated. If we would like to, we can take that as a first question. Judging from what we have read, is it fair to say that, Custom is no longer just King,  but Custom is man's (false) God? By this, I mean that if one assumes that God is a delusion, then God is just an imaginary friend that humans thought up in order to make sense of a world in which things don't actually make sense. It seems to me that Custom, and Cause and Effect serves the same purpose - to provide an explanation of a world that cannot be sufficiently explained, (although Cause and Effect do "appear" to result in concrete betterment of our world. 

Hume-ility

Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting any thing, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as the grossest matter.
--p.48, last paragraph of VII.I

It is not uncommon for 'humility' with respect to human knowledge to be supposed to consist of an assertion of knowledge of some other fact. For example, we questioned Bacon's supposed humility with regard to knowledge; Descartes's capacity for doubt found its bottom when he supposed his "clear and distinct perception" to be equivalent to knowledge. Pascal, I think, can be said to be nearer to Hume in this regard.

Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief.
--p.31, second paragraph of V.II

In re-imagining of human knowledge, Hume presents a system wherein one claims to know no more than one actually experiences. That which is usually considered to be knowledge ("I know the sun will come out tomorrow") is recognized, for Hume, to be belief ("I believe the sun will come out tomorrow"). I don't think, however, that in Hume's opinion this change would make the Annie song any less optimistic.

It seems to me like a reasonable presumption from Hume's philosophy would be to find it paralyzing: one is not, after all, supposed to "know" much of anything useful.

The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes.
--p.51, second-to-last paragraph of VII.II

Cf. footnotes 5 and 8: Hume, however moderate (and occasionally pessimistic) the tone of this particular book, seems to believe that his philosophy can be of practical purpose. It seems to me that Hume is proposing that we do not need to presume to know as much as we often do presume to know in order to function. Belief, for Hume, appears to serve just that same purpose, with the added benefit of humility.

So much of this semester has been concerned with "throwing open the windows," with the search for Truth and the bounds of human knowledge. Hume, so far as I can see, approaches the question from an entirely new angle: "what can we know?" not in terms of "let's look at what exists" but rather "let's look at ourselves." How does Hume's redefinition of knowledge and belief fit in with the trends we've seen thus far? Is his philosophy blinding, paralyzing, and limiting, or is it empowering, honest, and keenly perceptive?

In all this, I hope we can get to the philosopher's-role-in-the-city question from the first part...

Is experience necessary or is sense enough?

"No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it . . ."

(end of 6th paragraph of section IV)

Hume argues in this section that even if we have sensory knowledge, we will never determine causes or predict effects unless we also have experience. I wonder if this is true. First of all, we could take the extreme example of an omnipotence (ie God); I've heard it said many times that if we could know absolutely everything about the universe at the present moment, we would also know its past and future, because that past and future are necessary to the universe's current configuration. This makes sense to me. If everything has a cause and effect and nothing is created or destroyed (the universe is just a set of constant particles bouncing off each other), then couldn't I tell from their current position what their next position will be? Couldn't we use reason to understand space and motion, sort of like in Lucretius did?

But even if we don't take this extreme example, there still might be problems. I wonder how Hume would react to modern chemistry. He claims that no one could predict water turning to ice, but couldn't we predict this merely by examining the molecular structure of water? Or if we didn't have knowledge of the effect, couldn't we get pretty close, come up with a pretty good hypothesis with a reasonable percentage of certainty?

Basically, could Hume's problem not be "merely sense" but "merely limited sense"?

Hume vs. Metaphysics

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. (Sec. I, p. 2)
Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing. But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. (Sec. I, p. 5. My emphasis on profound)

In "Of the Different Species of Philosophy," Hume seems to claim there are two philosophical sects: the "easy and obvious" and the "accurate and abstruse" (2). It initially appears that he attacks the first sect, but he finishes the section condemning the second. Hume seems to be concerned with the accuracy of our knowledge more than whether that knowledge accords with reality. He changes the category "accurate and abstruse" to "profound and abstract," or he at least creates a subdivision under his second category. This change in wording reflects his view that the abstractness of metaphysics leads to human error when discerning metaphysical principles. Does this text reject metaphysics completely or does it dissuade humans from engaging in metaphysical philosophy? In other words, does Hume believe that metaphysics is bogus or does he believe that metaphysical principles exist yet outside our minds' comprehension (and therefore useless to humans).

revisiting swift and misogyny

quick note that i thought i'd post: i asked angela my spouse what she thinks about swift and the issue of woman-hating, and she said, to his favor, that he is very interested in the body and all it's "inappropriate" functions. The body having typically been associated with femininity, Swift is doing one of two good things: dissociating intellectualized masculinity from body-hating, or bringing (perceived) femininity to the fore. not that this settles the issue, but i thought that was an interesting way to look at it.

Hume Section I - Section VII

"This influence of the will we know by consciousness." Section VII, Part I, pg. 42

"But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable." Section VII, Part I, pg. 43

This is the beginning of Hume's discussion on the "necessary connexion" by which two events are related.  These passages are a bit of a tease; Hume asserts that the influence of the will is something that can be known and taken as truth, but then rejects the idea that impulses of the will connect actions.  Yes, the influence of the will can be seen in our experiences.  According to Hume, however, this tells us nothing about the power that relates these events.  It is only by repeated circumstances (custom/habit) that we begin to "feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant" (Section VII, Part II, pg. 52).  Personally, I find the the influence of the will much more convincing than the description of some inherent "feeling" that leads one to the "necessary connexion."  Throughout the work, Hume dismisses experience as unreliable because it is so fickle.  In my opinion, feelings are even less conclusive than actual experience.  Why/How does Hume find solace in the connexion that we "feel in the mind" (Section VII, Pat II, pg. 50)?