Hume vs. Metaphysics

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. (Sec. I, p. 2)
Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing. But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. (Sec. I, p. 5. My emphasis on profound)

In "Of the Different Species of Philosophy," Hume seems to claim there are two philosophical sects: the "easy and obvious" and the "accurate and abstruse" (2). It initially appears that he attacks the first sect, but he finishes the section condemning the second. Hume seems to be concerned with the accuracy of our knowledge more than whether that knowledge accords with reality. He changes the category "accurate and abstruse" to "profound and abstract," or he at least creates a subdivision under his second category. This change in wording reflects his view that the abstractness of metaphysics leads to human error when discerning metaphysical principles. Does this text reject metaphysics completely or does it dissuade humans from engaging in metaphysical philosophy? In other words, does Hume believe that metaphysics is bogus or does he believe that metaphysical principles exist yet outside our minds' comprehension (and therefore useless to humans).