Here is the final stage of inequality...
Here everything is returned... to a new state of nature...
--p. 79
...no attentive reader can fail to be struck by the immense space that separates these two states [the natural and the civil]...
why, with original man gradually disappearing, society no longer offers to the eyes of the wise man anything but an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions which are the work of all these new relations and have no true foundation in nature.
--p. 80
It is enough for me to have proved that this is not the original state of man, and that this is only the spirit of society, and the inequality that society engenders, which thus change and alter all our natural inclinations...
Moreover, it follows that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to natural right...
--p. 81
How does artificiality fit in with Rousseau's sense of what it means to be human? Rousseau seems to take liberty to be an essential part of what it means to be human (cf. p. 74, "...a man is not born a man."). But from this liberty eventually but inevitably spring its abuses (cf. p. 75, middle paragraph; cf. p. 77 "For the vices..."). Especially in the last few pages as quoted above, this "new state of nature," in which the essence of mankind engenders its inequalities, is increasingly portrayed as artificial, unnatural, and without basis in 'natural man.'
So perhaps humankind and 'natural human'-kind are inherently divided by this "immense space"; perhaps humans as they are now are inherently artificial beings. What does this mean for us? Artificiality does not seem like a good thing, especially when it enables such horrors as a person agreeing to "plunge my sword... into my pregnant wife's entrails." Our capacity for thought enables these terrors, but it also enables love. Just as a savage would neither cede his or her liberty nor seek revenge, neither could he or she be capable of protecting his or her family as a modern person would.
So what are we left with? Does Rousseau want us to accept our state as it is? His development of man (pp. 60-63) demonstrates a Hume-esque interest in judgment by experience; this methodology suggests to me that Rousseau's priority could be to present the truth about humanity as it is. But then there is this sense from his tone that he takes this artificiality to be a lamentable thing; that savage man, for all his inhumanity, is somehow preferable. We gain something from the crossing of the gap, but with that gain comes inequality and other vices.
So does Rousseau think it's good to be who we are? Is this separation from nature, this artificiality, this humanity, this "ardor for making oneself the topic of the conversation" a bald fact about the human race as we are? Is it a development worthy of praise and gladness? Is it a tragic, lamentable loss?
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